State v. Dempsey

• Decision Date: 17 October 2005
• Docket Number: No. 2D04-5760.,2D04-5760.
• Citation: 916 So.2d 856
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Twanna N. DEMPSEY, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

916 So.2d 856

STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Twanna N. DEMPSEY, Appellee.

No. 2D04-5760.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

August 31, 2005.

Rehearing Denied October 17, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and C. Suzanne Bechard, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.

Danell G. DeBerg, St. Petersburg, for Appellee.

CASANUEVA, Judge.

The State of Florida appeals an order, arising from an unusual factual setting, that voided an executed and fully performed pretrial intervention (PTI) agreement. Although we appreciate the situation Twanna Dempsey presently confronts, the law does not afford her the remedy she received, and we must reverse.

For events occurring in mid-1995, the State charged Ms. Dempsey with exploitation of the elderly, grand theft, and abuse of an elderly or disabled person. The victim, a person for whom Ms. Dempsey was a caretaker, was seventy-eight years old at the time and suffered from diabetes, prostate cancer, Alzheimer's disease, and alcoholism. On February 20, 1998, Ms. Dempsey and the State entered into a PTI agreement under which Ms. Dempsey agreed to pay restitution to the victim and participate in the PTI program for twelve months. In exchange, the State agreed that upon full payment of restitution and her successful completion of twelve months in the PTI program, it would dismiss the charges. The written agreement also stated that the case and charges against her would not be subject to expunction pursuant to section 943.0585, Florida Statutes (1992), but could be sealed pursuant to section 943.059. The trial court thereafter ratified the agreement.

By April 1999 Ms. Dempsey had fully complied with her obligations under the agreement, so the State moved to dismiss the charges against her. On April 29, 1999, the trial court granted the State's motion and entered an order dismissing the case.

On September 16, 2004, Ms. Dempsey moved to set aside the PTI agreement, vacate the dismissal, and reinstate the charges against her. Her motion alleged that following the dismissal of the charges against her, she had pursued and completed a course of education to become certified as a school teacher, but she had been rejected for employment by several school districts. In particular, the Pinellas County School Board considered her participation in the PTI program an admission of guilt, thereby making her ineligible for employment within that district. She claimed she misunderstood her contract with the State, there was no "meeting of the minds," and the dismissal of her charges was "ambiguous" and should be deemed void because third parties, particularly the Pinellas County School Board, do not recognize the dismissal. She sought rescission of the contract due to her mistake as to the material effect of the PTI agreement, asserting that at the time she entered into the PTI agreement she assumed that the dismissal of the case against her would, in essence, wipe the slate clean.

During the motion hearing, her counsel particularly focused on the alleged frustration of the contract's purpose caused by her inability to obtain employment in the teaching field. In response, the State noted that the PTI contract contained no promise that her record would be wiped clean. Additionally, the State argued that during the negotiations preceding the contract, Ms. Dempsey never represented that she would be seeking a career as a schoolteacher. Finally, the State objected because it could not be returned to its precontract position as it now lacked a victim and its ability to proceed with a prosecution was severely impaired.

We sympathize with Ms. Dempsey's plight. Her pursuit of an education to become a productive member of this society evidences her fortitude and determination. However, there is no legal basis upon which the trial court's ruling may be upheld. Her remedy lies with either a legislative modification of existing statutory law or an executive decision by the school board to amend its exclusionary policy. These policy determinations are best left to those elected to make such decisions.

A PTI agreement is in the nature of a contract, similar to a plea agreement. Thus, rules of contract law apply. A.D.W. v. State, 777 So.2d 1101 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); see also Metellus v. State, 817 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (holding that a defendant will not be relieved of an obligation that was included as a specific component of a plea agreement that was bargained for and voluntarily entered into by him), approved on other grounds, 900 So.2d 491 (Fla.2005). Because the issue in this case presents a question of law, our standard of review is de novo. Cf. Escobar v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 898 So.2d 952 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (holding that the question of ambiguity in an insurance contract is a question of law for the court, not a question of fact for the jury).

Mutual mistake of material fact can be a basis on which to set aside a plea agreement. See Handley v. State, 890 So.2d 529 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (citing Fulcher v. State, 875 So.2d 647, 650 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (Cope, J., specially concurring)). Ms. Dempsey's contention is that because she did not know that the Pinellas County School Board would subsequently reject her application to teach solely on the basis of her participation in the PTI program, a mutual mistake of fact occurred, thereby preventing the contractual meeting of the minds requirement. The State counters that this is not so, because the PTI agreement itself clearly stated in paragraph seventeen:

17. The Defendant further stipulates and agrees that the case and charges referred to herein shall not be subject to expungement pursuant to Section 943.0585, Florida Statutes (1992)[sic], but may be sealed pursuant to Section 943.059, Florida Statutes (1992)[sic], provided the Defendant otherwise meets the...