State v. Denney

• Decision Date: 14 February 1929
• Docket Number: 21544.
• Citation: 274 P. 791,150 Wash. 690
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE et rel. GRAYS HARBOR RY. & LIGHT CO. v. DENNEY, State Director of Public Works, et al.

274 P. 791

150 Wash. 690

STATE et rel. GRAYS HARBOR RY. & LIGHT CO. v. DENNEY, State Director of Public Works, et al.

No. 21544.

Supreme Court of Washington

February 14, 1929

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County; John M. Wilson, Judge.

Prohibition by the State, on the relation of Grays Harbor Railway & Light Company, against John C. Denney, Director of Public Works of the State, and others. From a judgment dismissing the petition, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Theodore B. Bruener, of Aberdeen, and Cleland & Clifford, of Olympia for appellant.

John H Dunbar and H. C. Brodie, both of Olympia, for respondents.

FRENCH J.

The Grays Harbor Railway & Light Company, appellant, is and has been for many years a public service company operating in the Grays Harbor district. Its functions are twofold, operating as it does a street railway system and an electric light plant, serving the needs of the cities of Aberdeen, Hoquiam Cosmopolis, and the surrounding territory. It comes within the statutory definition of a 'street railway' and also within the statutory definition of an 'electric company.'

Prior to the year 1915, and pursuant to section 10441, Rem. Comp. Stats., a valuation was made of the properties belonging to the company, and during the year 1915 a supplemental order was entered fixing the values of the property as of date June 30, 1915. There have been no subsequent valuation orders made, and neither of the orders separately valued the electric property and the street railway property. In October, 1927, complaint was filed with the department of public works of the state of Washington relative to the electric rates of appellant. Upon notice being given, the department proceeded by its engineers to commence a study of appellant's electric properties with a view to a revaluation thereof. Thereafter appellant sought and obtained an alternative writ of prohibition in the superior court, alleging generally that the department was proceeding to disregard its original and primary valuation and to make an entirely new valuation; alleging that such procedure was without and in excess of the jurisdiction of the department; alleging that, if the department was permitted to proceed, irreparable damage would result, and it would impose a large amount of additional cost and expense upon the appellant if a new valuation was made at that time rather than obtaining the value by use of additions and betterments to the primary valuation made in 1915.

Respondents filed their answer, making certain admissions and denials, and alleged affirmatively that the valuation orders of its predecessor showed palpable error, in that there was no separate valuation made of the electric properties and the street railway properties; alleged that many of the records pertaining to said valuation were lost to the department, and that it was therefore impossible for the department to segregate such values as of the date fixed in the prior orders; alleged that twelve years had passed since the date of such first valuations; that there had been a complete change in the conditions since the time of the first valuation of the combined properties; that it would be impossible and impracticable to make a valuation by net additions and betterments. They alleged further that the complaint is made with reference to the electric rates only, and that there has been no original and primary valuation of the electric property.

These allegations were denied by appellant's reply, and, after trial covering several days, the court found that it was a disputed fact as to whether appellant might be put to any particular amount of extra expense on account of the proposed method of procedure. Also that it was a disputed fact as to whether there was palpable error in the original appraisement; found that the department had jurisdiction of the subject-matter; found that the only question on the application for the writ was whether the department was proceeding erroneously; and held that appellant had a plain speedy, and adequate remedy at law by appeal, and that...