State v. Deshawn D., No. 33504.

• Decision Date: 26 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. 33504.
• Citation: 44 A.3d 907,136 Conn.App. 373
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. DESHAWN D.

136 Conn.App. 373

44 A.3d 907

STATE of Connecticut

v.DESHAWN D.^*

No. 33504.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 31, 2012.

Decided June 26, 2012.

Joshua Michtom, for the appellant (defendant).

Rita M. Shair, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom were Brian Casinghino, senior assistant state's attorney, and, on the brief, Gail Hardy, state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

ROBINSON, SHELDON and BISHOP, Js.

BISHOP, J.

The defendant, Deshawn D., appeals from the judgment of the trial court committing him to the custody of the department of children and families (department) for a period of fourteen months and denying his motion, filed at the time of disposition, for a reduction in the term of his delinquency commitment based on credit for the predisposition time he had been held in detention. On appeal, he claims that (1) the court improperly denied his motion for a reduction in the term of his delinquency commitment and (2) the court's failure to give credit for predisposition detention on juvenile commitments violates procedural due process. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following factual and procedural history is relevant to our consideration of the issues on appeal. On April 18, 2011, the juvenile defendant was charged with a violation of probation under General Statutes § 46b–120. The defendant had been placed on probation on March 8, 2011, for a period of six months. As part of the probation orders, the defendant had been ordered to reside at home with his grandfather, who was his guardian at the time. Nevertheless, the defendant had left home for at least four days in April, 2011. As a result, on April 21, 2011, the defendant was taken into custody pursuant to an order issued by the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters in Hartford. He was thereafter held at various juvenile detention centers for a total of twenty-three days pending the disposition of his case. On May 13, 2011, the defendant admitted that he violated his probation. At the disposition hearing, the state recommended that the defendant be committed to the department and placed at the Connecticut Juvenile Training School for fifteen months. Although the defendant agreed with the state's recommendation that he be committed, he sought a commitment period of nine months. He filed a motion through which he sought credit against the length of his commitment for twenty-three days of predisposition detention. The court committed the defendant to the custody of the department for placement at the Connecticut Juvenile Training School for a period of fourteen months with no credit given for his predisposition detention. This appeal followed.

I

The defendant first claims that he has the right to credit for the period of predisposition detention based on the plain language of General Statutes § 18–98d¹, which, he argues, applies to delinquency proceedings. He argues, as well, that General Statutes § 46b–141d does not forbid the application of credit on sentences of juvenile commitment for predisposition detention and that the application of § 18–98d to juvenile delinquency proceedings is consistent with the overall goals of the juvenile justice system. We are not persuaded.

On appeal, the defendant's linguistic argument is subject to plenary review. Grady v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324, 332, 984 A.2d 684 (2009). “The principles that govern statutory construction are well established. When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1–2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sokaitis v. Bakaysa, 293 Conn. 17, 22–23, 975 A.2d 51 (2009).

Contrary to the defendant's statutory construction argument, § 18–98d, entitled “Credit for presentence confinement,” pertains only to those individuals who are committed to the control and custody of the commissioner of correction and not to those who have been subject to commitment under a different authority. See Johnson v. Manson, 196 Conn. 309, 312, 321 n. 12, 493 A.2d 846 (1985) (presentence credit is available only to pretrial detainees incarcerated in facility administered by commissioner of correction or who otherwise are subject to control of commissioner of correction), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063, 106 S.Ct. 813, 88 L.Ed.2d 787 (1986); see also Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, 259 Conn. 855, 866–67, 872, 792 A.2d 774 (2002). Because the defendant was committed to the custody of the department of children and families and not to the department of correction, § 18–98d is facially inapplicable to his detention circumstances.

In sum, the statutory provisions for the disposition of juvenile offenders and adult convicts are substantially dissimilar. Commitments of juvenile offenders to the department are made pursuant to General Statutes § 46b–140 (f), which authorizes the placement of juveniles into the custody of the commissioner of children and families, and not into the custody of the commissioner of correction, while § 18–98d contemplates the commitment of convicted adults to the department of correction.²

The defendant also argues that the provisions of § 46b–141d support, by analogy, his entitlement to credit for his predisposition detention. We are not persuaded. Section 46b–141d³, by its explicit terms, deals with credit for predisposition detention for a juvenile offender who is sentenced to a period of probation and provides, generally, for a credit toward the period of probation imposed at disposition for any days the juvenile offender served in detention prior to disposition. Importantly, § 46b–141d does not address, by its language, the situation presented in the case at hand in which the juvenile offender is committed to a period of confinement rather than probation. It is clear, however, from the provision of § 46b–141d regarding detention credits against probation that, if the General Assembly had desired to provide similar treatment to juvenile offenders committed to a period of confinement, not probation, the General Assembly could have done so.⁴

Accordingly, neither the plain language of § 18–98d nor that of § 46b–141d provides credit for predisposition detention when a juvenile offender is ordered committedto a period of confinement.⁵ Therefore, the court properly denied the defendant's motion for a reduction in the term of his delinquency commitment.

II

The defendant's final claim is that, by denying him credit for predisposition detention, the court has deprived him of his due process rights under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. More specifically, he argues that such a denial unconstitutionally discourages the exercise of constitutional trial rights, thereby rendering guilty pleas in such...