State v. Hurdle

• Decision Date: 31 January 2023
• Docket Number: AC 44701
• Citation: 217 Conn.App. 453,288 A.3d 675
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Marcus HURDLE
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

217 Conn.App. 453

288 A.3d 675

STATE of Connecticut

v.Marcus HURDLE

AC 44701

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 8, 2022

Officially Released January 31, 2023

James B. Streeto, senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Linda F. Rubertone, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Margaret E. Kelley, state's attorney, and Howard S. Stein, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Alvord, Prescott and Moll, Js.

PRESCOTT, J.

The defendant, Marcus Hurdle, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following his entry of guilty pleas pursuant to the Alford doctrine,¹ of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (4) and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-134 (a). The defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) determined that it lacked the authority, in accordance with General Statutes § 18-98d, to award him presentence confinement credit, (2) accepted his guilty pleas and denied his subsequent motion for jail credit or to withdraw his pleas, despite his contention that there was never a "meeting of the minds" regarding the terms of his plea agreement with the state, and (3) violated his constitutional rights by failing to advise him during his plea canvass that his guilty pleas would operate as a waiver of his right to a trial by jury. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our consideration of the defendant's claims. On January 11, 2016, the defendant was sentenced in two criminal files factually unrelated to the present matter.² He received concurrent sentences of five years of incarceration, execution suspended after nine months, followed by three years of probation.

On July 20, 2018, the defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation and was released pending sentencing on a Garvin plea agreement (probation files).³

Less than one month later, on August 16, 2018, the defendant participated in a robbery in West Haven that led to the conviction now under review. Although the defendant and his coconspirators initially evaded the police following the robbery, the defendant was apprehended later that day by the New Haven police.⁴ Because of his actions during the arrest in New Haven, the defendant was charged in the judicial district of New Haven in Docket No. CR-18-0186768 with interfering with a police officer and with criminal possession of a pistol or revolver in violation of General Statutes § 53a-217c (pistol possession file). He was detained on bond on those charges.

Subsequently, on October 24, 2018, while still detained on bond in the pistol possession file, the defendant was arrested by warrant in connection with the West Haven robbery. He was charged in the judicial district of Ansonia-Milford in Docket No. CR-18-0097217 with home invasion in violation of General Statutes § 53a-100aa (a) (1), robbery in the first degree in violation of § 53a-134 (a) (4), conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of §§ 53a-48 and 53a-134 (a), and criminal possession of a firearm in violation of General Statutes § 53a-217 (a) (1) (robbery file). The state also filed a substitute part B information charging the defendant as a persistent dangerous felony offender under General Statutes § 53a-40 (a) (1). At his arraignment on the charges in the robbery file, the court set a $300,000 bond and also raised the defendant's bonds in his other files.

On October 26, 2018, the court appointed an attorney for the defendant and confirmed that bond had been set in the robbery and probation files. The defendant subsequently entered not guilty pleas in the robbery file and elected a jury trial. On December 19, 2018, the defendant posted bond and was released.

Sentencing with respect to the probation files initially was scheduled for February 20, 2019. The defendant, however, arrived late and was intoxicated. Accordingly, the court raised the defendant's bond and continued the matter. On February 26, 2019, the court terminated the defendant's probation and sentenced him in the probation files to concurrent terms of three and one-half years of incarceration. He began to serve those sentences while awaiting resolution of the charges in the robbery and pistol possession files.

On May 15, 2019, in the pistol possession file, the defendant pleaded guilty under the Alford doctrine to criminal possession of a pistol or revolver. Following a plea canvass, the court, Cradle, J ., sentenced the defendant to ten years of incarceration, two years of which were mandatory, execution suspended after three and one-half years, followed by three years of conditional discharge. The court, in response to a question by the defendant about jail credit, stated that the defendant could "get [his] jail credit for the time that [he had] been confined on bond on this matter." The order for jail credit was reflected on the mittimus.⁵

On October 29, 2020, as part of a plea agreement with the state and in order to resolve his remaining criminal charges on the robbery file, the defendant pleaded guilty under the Alford doctrine to robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree. As part of the plea agreement, the state agreed to enter a nolle prosequi on all remaining charges, including the charge of being a persistent dangerous felony offender. The court, Brown , J ., accepted the pleas following a thorough canvass during which the defendant repeatedly was advised of the terms of the agreed upon sentence, which was twelve years of incarceration, execution suspended after seven and one-half years, followed by five years of probation, which would run concurrently with all of the sentences he already was serving. On two separate occasions, following the court's recitation of the agreed upon sentence, the defendant verbally indicated that he understood the terms. During this proceeding, neither the defendant nor his counsel suggested that the plea agreement included a provision regarding jail credit. The matter was continued to January 28, 2021, for sentencing.

On that date, the defendant raised to the court, for the first time, his belief that he was entitled to certain presentence confinement credit in the present case. Specifically, after the court had given the defendant an opportunity to address the court, defense counsel indicated that he had a "few more comments." Counsel concluded those comments with the following: "The final thing that I would say is that there was discussion of making the sentence run with the other sentences. And I contacted records at [the Department of Correction (department)], and they instructed me that you can order a jail credit going back to those dates. And I have those dates for the court, if so inclined. The arrest date of August 17, 2018, through December 19, 2018, at which time [the defendant] bonded out. And then he was readmitted on February 20, 2019, and the jail credit can be ordered from then to [the present]." The prosecutor indicated in his response that presentence confinement credit "was not bargained for," meaning that the issue was not part of the plea agreement between the defendant and the state, and that the court's practice in the past had always been to "[defer] to the [department] with regard to the calculation of jail credit." The prosecutor also took the position that the defendant already had received "every single credit from ... every judge who has sentenced him with regard to his violations of probation [and] the gun charges he picked up ...."

The court indicated its intent to impose a sentence at that time, stating: "So, there is an agreed upon sentence. I am going to impose that agreed upon sentence. I am also going to allow the department to impose whatever presentence credit the department feels is appropriate. You're obviously entitled to presentence credit. I'm going to let them make that determination. ... I'm not going to do that on the record." At that time, the defendant interrupted and complained that he had been told that he would "receive all jail credit if [he] agree[d] to the [plea] deal." The prosecutor reiterated that the state had never made any representations regarding presentence confinement credit as part of the plea negotiations. At the request of defense counsel, the court continued the matter without imposing sentence to afford counsel additional time to consult with the defendant and to review his file.

The defendant subsequently filed a motion asking the court to order that presentence confinement credit be applied to the sentence imposed or, alternatively, to allow him to withdraw his pleas. On February 18, 2021, the court conducted a hearing on the defendant's motion. During that hearing, defense counsel made clear that, although he had indicated to the defendant that he would pursue any available presentence confinement credit, "I did not tell him there was an agreement for jail credit. There was not, and I can't represent that there was." The court denied the defendant's motion regarding presentence confinement credit, denied the defendant's request to withdraw his pleas, and sentenced the defendant, in accordance with the plea agreement, to a total effective term of twelve years of imprisonment, suspended after seven years and one-half years, and five years of probation to run concurrently with all other sentences the defendant was then serving. The defendant subsequently filed the present appeal.

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly determined that it lacked the authority to award him presentence confinement credit at sentencing pursuant to § 18-98d. The defendant argues that a sentencing court has both the inherent authority and broad discretion to structure its sentences within statutory limits, and that this authority necessarily must...