State v. Dewey
| Docket Number | 56852-7-II |
| Decision Date | 22 August 2023 |
| Parties | STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. SAMUEL JAMESON DEWEY, aka SAMUEL DEWEY, SAMUEL JAMISON DEWEY, SAMUEL J DEWEY, Appellant. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
After committing two unrelated crimes, Samuel Dewey was charged with two counts of first degree assault and one count of second degree assault involving domestic violence. The State offered Dewey a global resolution to both sets of charges. Dewey accepted the plea offer. As a part of Dewey's community custody, the superior court ordered Dewey to undergo a mental health evaluation and corresponding treatment. Finding Dewey indigent, the superior court also stated it would not impose discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs). The judgment and sentence included a mental health evaluation order and discretionary LFOs. Dewey appeals, arguing that the superior court erred by ordering a mental health evaluation without first finding him mentally ill, as required by RCW 9.94B.080, and by imposing community supervision fees when it stated it would not mandate discretionary LFOs. He also filed a statement of additional grounds for review (SAG), as well as a supplemental brief asking us to remand for the superior court to strike the $500 crime victim penalty assessment from his judgment and sentence.
We remand for the superior court to determine whether to order a mental health evaluation consistent with the statutory requirements. On remand, the superior court shall also strike the community supervision fees and the $500 crime victim penalty assessment from Dewey's judgment and sentence. We reject the claims of error in Dewey's SAG.
In March 2021, Samuel Dewey stabbed two convenience store employees after they asked him to leave the store. The State charged him with two counts of first degree assault, each with a deadly weapon enhancement. In August 2021, Dewey attacked another person whom he had been dating" 'on and off' for the past few years." Clerk's Papers (CP), State v. Dewey, No. 56852-7-II, at 1-2 (Wash Ct. App.). He tore the victim's "tank top, giving her multiple scratches on the chest and shoulders," and strangled her. Id. at 2. For this incident, the State charged him with one count of second degree assault - domestic violence.
The cases were addressed together before the superior court. Dewey was absent on the scheduled trial date because he had injured himself, was placed in a restraint chair, and was awaiting jail mental health services. Dewey had "cut his forearms" and "was slamming or banging his head against the wall [such] that he [ ] open[ed] up a laceration on his head." Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) (Mar. 31, 2022) at 5-6. "[T]here was a sufficient amount of blood associated with the head injury." Id. at 6. Despite the circumstances, Dewey's counsel told the court that he did not "have concerns about [his] client's competency," and responded affirmatively to the superior court's questions as to whether Dewey "appeared to be oriented," was "responsive to questions," and "knew his legal predicament." Id. at 7.
The trial date was reset for the following Monday. On that day, the court clerk informed the parties that the jail reported that Dewey was "harming himself again, hitting his head against the wall, punching the walls." VRP (Apr. 4, 2022), State v. Dewey, No. 56849-7-II, at 3 (Wash. Ct. App.). Dewey nevertheless appeared in court.
In a global resolution for both incidents, Dewey agreed to plead guilty to one count of first degree assault without a deadly weapon enhancement and to one count of second degree assault. In the statement of defendant on plea of guilty regarding the first degree assault, Dewey stated that he "did intentionally make harmful contact with [the victims] with an object likely to produce great bodily harm and with the intent to inflict great bodily harm." CP, No. 56849-7-II, at 31 (capitalization omitted). Regarding the second degree assault, Dewey instead allowed the court to review the police reports and/or the statement of probable cause to establish a factual basis for his plea.
At the plea hearing, Dewey said he understood the terms of the plea agreement and accepted the State's offer. Defense counsel stated that he and Dewey had "thoroughly gone through the statement of defendant on plea of guilty," including Dewey's initials "in the margins throughout the document" that "memorialize[d] those sections . . . that [they] went thoroughly through." VRP (Apr. 4, 2022), No. 56849-7-II, at 6-7. Dewey confirmed that he had reviewed the two statements of defendant on plea of guilty with his attorney, understood them, and did not have any questions about them. When asked by the court if he understood "every one of the[ ] rights [he was] giving up" by pleading guilty, Dewey said, "Yes, I do." Id. at 10-11. He also agreed that nobody had threatened, forced, or induced him into pleading guilty. The court found that there was a "factual basis for the plea, that the defendant underst[ood] the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea, and that it was a knowing, voluntary and intelligent plea" as to each cause number. Id. at 13.
At the sentencing hearing, Dewey asked to withdraw his plea and for new counsel. He stated that he "[felt] like [he] was under duress, and [his] only option was to take a ten-year deal because [he was] so afraid of losing such a significant amount of [his] life" in prison. VRP (Apr. 8, 2022) at 24. The court considered but denied his requests because Dewey had not "described any other pressure other than [his counsel] apparently offering the opinion that [Dewey was] unlikely to succeed at trial." Id. at 27. The court said that the feeling of pressure as a criminal defendant was normal, "unless [the defendant] just completely detach[ed] from reality." Id. at 24. Dewey "seem[ed] completely in touch with reality, so [the court had] no concerns there." Id.
Dewey was sentenced to 120 months for the first degree assault and 17 months for the second degree assault, to be served concurrently, with 54 months of community custody total, and ordered to have no contact with the victims. The court also ordered Dewey to undergo a "mental health evaluation as part of his community custody and . . . any follow-up treatment." Id. at 39. The court found Dewey indigent, stating that it would "not impose any other legal financial obligations" aside from the crime victim penalty assessment and biological testing fee. Id. However, the judgment and sentence for each cause number provides that Dewey must pay supervision and community placement fees as determined by the Department of Corrections. The court also imposed the $500 crime victim penalty assessment.
Dewey appeals the superior court's mental health evaluation order and imposition of discretionary supervision fees. He also filed a statement of additional grounds (SAG) for our review on appeal.[1] In a supplemental brief, Dewey relies on recent statutory amendments in requesting that we remand for the superior court to strike the $500 crime victim penalty assessment from his judgment and sentence.
A superior court may impose crime-related community custody conditions on a defendant. State v. Brooks, 142 Wn.App. 842, 850, 176 P.3d 549 (2008). We review imposed community custody conditions for an abuse of discretion. Id.; State v. Johnson, 184 Wn.App. 777, 779, 340 P.3d 230 (2014). An abuse of discretion occurs if the superior court's decision is "manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds." Johnson, 184 Wn.App. at 779.
Dewey asks us to remand for the superior court to strike the mental health evaluation from his judgment and sentence. He argues that to order a mental health evaluation, the superior court should have first found that Dewey was mentally ill, as required by RCW 9.94B.080. The State concedes that the superior court failed to make the findings required by RCW 9.94B.080, but argues that the correct remedy is to remand for the superior court to determine whether a mental health evaluation should be ordered rather than directing the superior court to strike the mental condition. We agree with the State.
RCW 9.94B.080 provides:
The court may order an offender whose sentence includes community placement or community supervision to undergo a mental status evaluation and to participate in available outpatient mental health treatment, if the court finds that reasonable grounds exist to believe that the offender is a mentally ill person as defined in RCW 71.24.025, and that this condition is likely to have influenced the offense.
The mental health evaluation order may be "based on a presentence report and . . . mental status evaluations that have been filed with the court." Id.; see also State v. Shelton, 194 Wn.App. 660, 676 n.11, 378 P.3d 230 (2016).
In State v. Jones, 118 Wn.App. 199, 208-11, 76 P.3d 258 (2003), we concluded that the superior court erred in imposing a mental health treatment and counseling order without following the requirements of RCW 9.94A.505(9) recodified as RCW 9.94B.080 (Laws of 2008, ch. 231, § 53). During a plea hearing, the defendant's "attorney explained that [the defendant] was bipolar [and] that [the defendant] was off his medications . . . [and] using methamphetamine at the time of his crimes." Id. at 202. However, the superior court "did not obtain or consider a presentence report or mental status evaluation[,] [n]or did [it] make a finding that [the defendant] was a person whose mental illness had contributed to his crimes." Id. at 209. We remanded, instructing the superior...
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