State v. Dewitt, 19093

• Decision Date: 05 August 1970
• Docket Number: No. 19093,19093
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Charlie DEWITT, Jr., Appellant.

Page 143

176 S.E.2d 143

254 S.C. 527

The STATE, Respondent, v. Charlie DEWITT, Jr., Appellant.

No. 19093.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Aug. 5, 1970.

Holland Smith, Hampton, Otis Carter, Bamberg, for appellant.

Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Atty. Gen. C. Pinckney Roberts, Columbia, Sol. L. A. Williamson, Aiken, for respondent.

LEWIS, Justice.

Appellant was convicted of grand larceny in the Court of General Sessions for Bamberg County. The subject of the larceny was a John Deere grain drill, the property of one Carroll Hiers. The grain drill was taken from the farm of Mr. Hiers in Bamberg County on September 27th or 28th, 1968 and subsequently found on November 22, 1968, about two months later, in the possession of appellant on his farm in Hampton County, about twenty mailes away. There was no direct evidence of the identity of the thief and the State relied upon the principle that one found in the possession of recently stolen goods is presumed to have stolen them. Appellant submits three questions for determination, to wit:

(1) Was the evidence, under the foregoing presumption, sufficient to sustain conviction (2) Was Bamberg County the proper venue; and

(3) Was the verdict of the jury influenced by passion and prejudice?

It is undisputed that the property involved was stolen from the owner and found in the possession of appellant about two months later. Appellant contends however that the evidence was insufficient to support an inference of guilt in this case because (1) the explanation by appellant of his possession completely rebutted the inference and (2) the discovery of the goods in his possession two months later did not satisfy the requirement that they be Recently stolen.

The principle has long been recognized in this State that, where one is found in possession of recently stolen property, a rebuttable inference or presumption of fact arises that he is the thief. State v. Roof, 196 S.C. 204, 12 S.E.2d 705.

The foregoing inference is one of fact and not of law. It is evidentiary in nature and not conclusive. Upon the proof of possession of recently stolen goods, the law permits the inference of guilt unless the jury finds a reasonable explanation of such possession from all of the evidence presented at the trial. As stated in Roof, supra, 'this presumption is to be considered by the jury merely as an evidential fact, along with the other evidence in the case, in determining whether the State has carried the burden of satisfying the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.'

Some of our cases contain the statement that the burden is upon a defendant to explain how he came into possession of recently stolen goods and has resulted in instructions to the jury to that effect. We do not think such an instruction entirely correct. First, it is susceptible, standing alone, of the construction that the defendant is personally required to give explanatory testimony at the trial to overcome the inference of guilt. He, of course, may testify, but is not required to do so. In addition, if the instruction is given that such burden is upon the defendant, the inference of guilt might be regarded as conclusive in the absence of an explanation by him. As previously pointed out, the presumption may authorize a conviction, but such result is not required. The presumption or inference of guilt from possession of recently stolen goods is simply an evidentiary fact to be taken into consideration by the jury, along with the other evidence in the case, and to be given such weight as the jury determines it should receive.

We therefore suggest to the trial bench that, regardless of prior statements in our decisions indicating to the contrary, the jury should Not be instructed that the burden or duty is upon a defendant to explain possession in such cases, lest the jury draw the conclusion that either (1) a defendant is required to personally give explanatory testimony or (2), in the absence of explanation by the defendant, the inference is to be considered conclusive of guilt. The force and weight to be accorded the inference should be left to the jury to determine under all of the facts and circumstances in evidence, the burden resting upon the State throughout the trial to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Reliance by appellant upon the Florida case of Young v. State, Fla.App., 203 So.2d 650, is misplaced. The differences in the Florida rule and that in force in this State make the principle announced in Young inapplicable. See article in 20 S.C.L.R. 457.

Appellant contends that the evidence showed a reasonable explanation of his possession and that the inference of guilt was thereby conclusively rebutted. When the officers found the grain drill in appellant's possession, they informed him that it was stolen property and also understandingly explained to him his right to counsel and to remain silent. He thereafter told them that he had purchased it, along with a tractor cultivator attachment and a disc harrow on October 2, 1968, from a Negro man whom he had seen transacting business with his father on numerous occasions and with whom appellant had dealt once or twice. Although appellant claimed to have been acquainted with the Negro man for a long time, he did not know his name and, after ample opportunity to do so, could never produce him. He said that he paid $275.00 for the grain drill, cultivator, and disc harrow. It is inferable that one of the other items was stolen property and that the amount allegedly paid was considerably less than their value. He stated that he paid for the equipment in cash and did not receive a bill of sale or a receipt for the cash paid. The officers were told that the unknown Negro man brought the equipment to appellant's home in the daytime, driving a two-ton, black, chevrolet truck, with one of the items loaded and the other two pulled behind. Appellant further informed the officers that the Negro man lived in a community about fourteen miles...