State v. Dickenson

• Decision Date: 18 December 1931
• Citation: 103 Fla. 907,138 So. 376
• Parties: STATE ex rel. LANDIS, Atty. Gen. v. DICKENSON, Clerk of Court, et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

138 So. 376

103 Fla. 907

STATE ex rel. LANDIS, Atty. Gen. v. DICKENSON, Clerk of Court, et al.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

December 18, 1931

Original proceeding in quo warranto by the State of Florida, on the relation of Cary B. Landis, Attorney General, against W. A Dickenson, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County and others. On demurrer to the alternative writ.

Demurrer sustained, and the proceeding dismissed.

COUNSEL

Cary D. Landis, Atty. Gen., and J. Tom Watson and A C. Brooks, both of Tampa, for relator.

Sutton, Tillman & Reaves and Whitaker Brothers, all of Tampa, for respondents.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This is a proceeding in quo warranto brought by the Attorney General of the state for the purpose of testing the validity of chapter 14663, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1931, which chapter purports to abolish the civil court of record in Hillsborough county. The respondents have demurred to the alternative writ, while the Attorney General moves for a judgment of ouster upon the return which has been made to it by the respondents.

Chapter 14663, supra, was introduced into the Legislature and passed as a so-called local or special bill. Notice of same was given as required by amended section 21 of article 3 of the Constitution, as appears by the official legislative journals. The text of the act is as follows:

'The Civil Court of Record in and for Hillsborough County, Florida, be and the same is hereby abolished and all cases pending in said Court on the dates of its abolishment shall be transferred by the Clerk of said Court to the Circuit Court of said County and there docketed by the Clerk of the said Circuit Court and said cases shall be tried and disposed of in said Circuit Court.'

The writ of quo warranto alleges that by authority of the act the clerk of the civil court of record of Hillsborough county, and the clerk of the circuit court of Hillsborough county, were, and still are, engaged in transferring cases pending in the civil court to a bench and bar docket of the circuit court, the cases only as have not been proceeded in to final judgment. It is asserted by the Attorney General that these duties are beyond the authority of the respondents and that they should be ousted from further performing them.

Assuming, but not deciding, that the writ of quo warranto is the proper remedy, we pass to a consideration of the merits of the controversy which must be determined by the validity, force, and effect of chapter 14663, supra. If that act be valid, the writ of quo warranto admittedly should not be issued, while, if it is invalid, the issuance of the writ will be harmless to the respondents.

Chapter 11357, Laws of Florida, was enacted by the Legislature in 1925 (Ex. Sess.). Under that act, civil courts of record were established in counties wherein such courts did not then exist having a population of more than one hundred thousand according to the last state census. Civil jurisdiction in common-law cases was given to such courts where the amounts in controversy were more than $500 and did not exceed $5,000. Chapter 11357 did not affect civil courts of record which were already in existence under chapter 8521, Acts of 1921.

The effect of the population classification made in the 1925 act was to create at that time civil courts of record in but two counties of the state, namely, Dade and Hillsborough counties. In 1925 these counties were the only counties having the required population to fall within the terms of the statutory classification there made. The 1931 act, if sustained, will have the effect of specifically abolishing the civil court of record in Hillsborough county, leaving still in full force, effect, and operation the system of civil courts of record created and provided for by said chapter 11357, supra, of which the civil court of record in Dade county would be the only one left to continue in existence.

It is therefore contended that because the 1931 act is a special and local law applicable only to Hillsborough county, it is unconstitutional and void under section 20 of article 3 of the State Constitution, even though it was properly advertised. The argument further is that the Legislature has no authority under section 1 of amended article 5 of the Constitution to create statutory courts by special or local laws and that for the same reasons the Legislature has no authority to abolish by special or local act any court that it has already properly created by general law.

Whatever may be the power of the Legislature to create and establish statutory courts under amended section 1 of article 5 of the Constitution by special or local acts enacted for that purpose, it does not necessarily follow that the Legislature has no authority to abolish any of such statutory courts authorized by that constitutional provision, even though it be done by an act special or local in character, and applying to only one county.

Under section 1 of article 5 of the Constitution, as amended in 1914, it has been heretofore held that the Legislature did have power to establish statutory courts in one or all of the counties of the state and to confer upon such statutory courts jurisdiction, powers, and duties that do not conflict with other organic provisions. See State ex rel. Johnson v. Quigg, 83 Fla. 1, 90 So. 695. It has also been held, under constitutional provisions of Alabama similar to ours, that where a court is of constitutional authorization, but not of constitutional creation, such court can be abolished at the will of the Legislature. State ex rel. Thomas v. Gunter, 170 Ala. 165, 54 So. 283.

The civil court of record of Hillsborough county is a creature of statutory law. Whether it is competent for the Legislature to establish such a court as this by special or local law or not, it is undoubtedly competent by statutory enactment to abolish such a court when once established. And this may be accomplished by the passage of any legislative act which is not unconstitutional and which plainly evidence the intent that such legislative abolition of the court shall follow.

All Acts of the Legislature which are duly enacted according to constitutional prerequisites and which are signed by the Governor, or become laws without his approval, are statutes of the state of Florida. And as statutes, all enactments by the Legislature should be given effect as such, whether general or special in character, unless they are unconstitutional.

The Constitution (section 20 of article 3) undoubtedly prohibits regulating the practice of courts of justice by special or local laws whether advertised or not, and this applies to special or local acts undertaking to regulate the practice of established courts of justice, whether statutory courts of constitutional authorization, or courts which are of constitutional creation. Because of provisions of the Constitution such as section 20 of...