State v. Dickson
| Citation | 78 Mo. 438 |
| Parties | THE STATE v. DICKSON, Appellant. |
| Decision Date | 31 October 1883 |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Stoddard Circuit Court.--HON. R. P. OWEN, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
The instructions following were asked and given on behalf of the State:
1. If the jury believe from the evidence that, on or about the 11th day of March, 1880, at the county of Stoddard and State of Missouri, the defendant, Thomas T. Dickson, willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly and of his malice aforethought, killed James McNab with any instrument or weapon whatever, they will find the defendant, Thomas T. Dickson, guilty of murder in the first degree, and so state in their verdict. Willfully, as used in this instruction, means intentionally, that is, not accidentally; therefore, if defendant intended to kill, such killing is willful. ful. Deliberately means done in a cool state of the blood, that is, not in a heated state of the blood caused by a lawful provocation; if, therefore, in such state, the defendant, Thomas T. Dickson, formed a design to kill, and did kill, the act was deliberately done. Premeditatedly, as here used, means thought of beforehand, for any length of time however short. Malice, as used in this instruction, signifies a condition of the mind void of social duty and fatally bent on mischief, or an unlawful intention to kill, or do some great bodily harm to another, without just cause or excuse. Aforethought means thought of beforehand, for any length of time however short, for a moment as well as for a day or month.
2. If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant, Thomas T. Dickson, made any statement after the commission of the homicide or killing in relation to what had become of James McNab, the jury must consider all he said together, and what he said against himself the law presumes to be true, because against himself; what he said for himself, the jury are not bound to believe, because said in a conversation or conversations proved by the State, but they may believe or disbelieve it as shown to be true or false from all the evidence in the case.
3. The court further instructs the jury that he who willfully, that is intentionally, uses upon another, at some vital part, a deadly weapon of any kind, must, in the absence of qualifying facts, be presumed to know that the effect is likely to be death, and knowing this must be presumed to intend death, which is the probable and ordinary consequence of such an act; and if such deadly weapon is used without just cause, he must be presumed to do it wickedly, or from a bad heart. If, therefore, the jury believe from the evidence in this case that the defendant took the life of James McNab by cutting or striking him in a vital part with any deadly weapon whatever, with a manifest design to use such weapon upon him, and with sufficient time to deliberate and fully form the conscious purpose to kill, and without sufficient reason or cause or extenuation, then such killing is murder in the first degree, and while it devolves on the State to prove the willfulness, de eration, premeditation and malice aforethought, all of which are necessary to constitute murder in the first degree, yet these need not be proven by direct evidence, but may be deduced from all the facts and circumstances attending the killing; and if the jury can satisfactorily and reasonably infer them from all the evidence, they will be warranted in finding the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, and should so find in their verdict.
4. Evidence is of two kinds, direct and circumstantial. Direct is where a witness testifies directly of his own knowledge of the main fact or facts to be proven. Circumstantial evidence is the proof of certain facts and circumstances in a given case, from which the jury may infer other connected facts which usually and reasonably follow according to the common experience of mankind. If, therefore, the jury believe from the evidence in this case that such facts and circumstances have been proven as to satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly and of his malice aforethought kill James McNab, as defined by the first instruction given herein, the jury are warranted in finding the defendant guilty as charged, though no witness has testified of his own knowledge as to the actual fact of such killing.
5. Before the jury can convict the defendant of murder in the first degree in this case, they must believe from all the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is guilty as charged; but a doubt, to authorize an acquittal, must be a real substantial doubt, arising from a fair view of all the evidence in the case, and not a mere possibility of his innocence.
The instructions following were asked and given on behalf of the defendant.
1. To justify a conviction in this case, the State must prove all the material facts alleged in the indictment against the defendant, beyond reasonable doubt, by evidence entitled to a fair and reasonable degree of credit, and unless the State has so proven the guilt of the accused, the jury ought to acquit.
2. Before the jury would be justified in convicting the defendant of murder in the first degree, the State must prove that he killed the deceased deliberately, premeditatedly and with malice aforethought, and unless the prosecution has so established his guilt, they ought not to convict.
5. Where the State seeks, as in this case, to convict upon circumstantial evidence only, the inculpatory or criminative facts must, to justify a conviction, be not only consistent with guilt, but should be inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence; and before the jury should convict, they ought to be satisfied from the evidence and facts proven, beyond reasonable doubt, that his guilt has been so established, and, if not so established, you ought to acquit, although you may believe the probabilities of guilt greater than the probabilities of innocence.
7. Before the jury should convict the defendant, they should be satisfied, from the evidence, that the State has established, beyond reasonable doubt, that James McNab is dead, that the body found has been fully identified and proven to be his dead body, that he came to his death by criminal violence, and that the defendant in flicted the violenceintentionally, that caused his death, in Stoddard county, Missouri, under such circumstances as to constitute some legal offense, that is, that he was killed by defendant under such circumstances as to be neither justifiable or excusable, and unless you believe from the evidence that the State has so established his guilt, you ought to acquit.
8. The jury are the sole judges of the weight and value of the evidence in the case, and the credit to be given to the testimony of the several persons who have given evidence upon this trial; and in deciding that credit ought to be given to the testimony of any witness, it will be proper to consider the appearance of the witness, the promptness or reluctance with which he gave his answer, his candor or want of candor, the probabilities or improbabilities of his statements when contrasted with reasonable and known facts, and if from any one or all of these you doubt or disbelieve any portion of the evidence to be true, you are at liberty to disregard and reject all or so much of his testimony as is inconsistent with known and reasonable facts within the common experience of daily life.
The instructions following were asked on behalf of defendant, but refused by the court:
3. If the jury believe from the evidence that the State has proven all the facts to fully establish that the defendant did kill James McNab; yet if the State has failed to establish the mode and manner of the killing, beyond the fact that he killed him with a deadly weapon in some way unknown, the law presumes the death to have been caused by a wound intentionally inflicted with a deadly weapon, and nothing further appearing, that the offense is murder in the second degree.
4. Before you should convict the defendant of murder in the second degree, the State must establish that the defendant killed the deceased with malice aforethought and with premeditation.
6. No inference of any fact is entitled to credit, which is itself drawn from premises which are uncertain; and where circumstantial evidence is alone relied on to establish guilt, the inculpatory circumstances must be proven and not presumed. Presumptions, which the jury are required to make, are not circumstances in proof, and can afford no proper foundation for a further presumption, there being no visible or natural connection between the fact or facts out of which the first presumption arises and the ultimate fact sought to be established. A presumption is an inference of a fact, drawn from other known or admitted facts, and is entitled to credit only when the inference is drawn from such known facts.
9. Defendant asks the court to instruct the jury upon the law of murder in the second degree and the several grades of manslaughter and justifiable homicide.
S. M. Chapman for appellant.
D. H. McIntyre, Attorney General, for the State.
The indictment in this case charged the defendant, Thomas T. Dickson, with murder in the first degree, for killing James McNab, and the trial resulted in the defendant's conviction of that degree of homicide. The evidence, for the most part, was circumstantial. The errors assigned may be grouped under three heads: 1st, The failure of the evidence to establish the guilt of the defendant. 2nd, The giving of improper instructions on the part of the State, and the refusal to give proper instructions on the part of the defendant. 3rd, The conduct of the counsel for the State in argument of the cause to the jury. We will consider these points in the order presented.
And first as to the evidence and the sufficiency thereof. In December, 1879, Dickson and McNab rented a farm...
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