State v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist., 85-171
| Decision Date | 04 March 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-171,85-171 |
| Citation | 715 P.2d 191 |
| Parties | The STATE of Wyoming, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT COURT OF the SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT, Respondent. |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
A.G. McClintock, Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Thomas A. Maurer, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Terrill R. Tharp, Big Horn Co. Atty., for petitioner.
Gerald R. Mason and Van Graham of Mason & Twichell, P.C., Pinedale, for respondent.
Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ.
The important issue which induced the court to grant a writ of certiorari in this case is whether there exists in the state of Wyoming a substantive right to be released on bail pending the appeal of a conviction in a criminal case. Contrary to the claim of the State of Wyoming that §§ 7-11-507 and 7-11-511, W.S.1977, have been superseded pursuant to Rule 56, W.R.Cr.P, the district court ruled that there does exist a substantive right to be released on bail while an appeal is prosecuted. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
The petitioner, the State of Wyoming, asserts the issues in this case to be:
The respondent, which is the District Court of the Second Judicial District, states the issues in this way:
John H. Story was convicted of six felony charges in the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District in Big Horn County. These convictions consisted of two counts of forcible rape in violation of § 6-63, W.S.1957; three counts of assault and battery with intent to commit rape in violation of § 6-64, W.S.1957; and one count of second degree sexual assault in violation of § 6-4-303(a)(vii), W.S.1977. Story was sentenced to 15 to 20 years on each of the two counts of forcible rape; 12 to 15 years on each of the three counts of assault and battery with intent to commit rape; and 10 to 15 years on the second degree sexual assault charge, with all sentences to run concurrently. Contemporaneously, the trial court denied Story's motion for bail pending appeal, and he then was remanded to the custody of the sheriff of Big Horn County to be transported to the Wyoming State Penitentiary at Rawlins in Carbon County.
Thereafter, Story filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the District Court of the Second Judicial District in Carbon County. Story claimed that his detention was illegal because he had been denied the right to bail while his appeal was pending. The State of Wyoming responded with an Answer and a Motion for Summary Judgment. In its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment the State contended that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is no right to be admitted to bail pending an appeal. The District Court of the Second Judicial District in Carbon County denied the Motion for Summary Judgment and subsequently entered an order finding that Story should be admitted to bail pending appeal and setting bail in the amount of $50,000 to be secured by cash or corporate surety. Upon the posting of a $50,000 certificate of deposit, Story was released on bail. On the same date that Story was released from the penitentiary, the State filed a Petition for a Writ of Prohibition or in the Alternative for Writ of Certiorari or Other Relief in this court. The court granted a Writ of Certiorari in this case, and the issues are before this court for review pursuant to that writ.
In this court, as in the District Court of the Second Judicial District, Story relies upon the provisions of §§ 7-11-507 and 7-11-511, W.S.1977. These statutes provide as follows:
The State of Wyoming relies upon the provisions of Rule 56, W.R.Cr.P., which was adopted on November 21, 1968 with an effective date of February 11, 1969. It provides:
Section 7-11-507, W.S.1977, was § 7-272, W.S.1957, and § 7-11-511 was § 7-276, W.S.1957. Relying upon the supersession of the statutory provisions, the State of Wyoming insists that Rule 8, W.R.Cr.P. controls the matter of bail. The rule provides in pertinent part as follows:
The State of Wyoming first contends that in order to have jurisdiction to proceed the District Court of the Second Judicial District had to find that the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District acted beyond the scope of its jurisdiction in denying bail pending appeal and that Story therefore was being illegally detained. The District Court of the Second Judicial District did not so find, but relied for its authority upon the provisions of Rule 8(h), W.R.Cr.P. This ruling by the District Court in the Second Judicial District was sound. Rule 8(h), W.R.Cr.P. provides clearly that an accused person aggrieved by the application of the rule may apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The writ of habeas corpus must be sought before the closest judge. § 1-27-104, W.S.1977. For one confined in the Wyoming State Penitentiary near Rawlins that is the District Court of the Second Judicial District. Without receding from the decisions of this court which are cited by the State in its brief in support of its position in this issue, we conclude that the function of the writ of habeas corpus has been expanded by the language of Rule 8(h), W.R.Cr.P., to afford to the District Court of the Second Judicial District the authority to proceed in connection with the issue of bail.
The next contention of the State is that the matter of bail following a conviction and pending the prosecution of an appeal is procedural in nature and governed by court rules pursuant to which a defendant may be denied bail. The State of Wyoming relies upon the rule-making power of this court to supersede the statutes upon which Story relies, and it contends that the rule is controlling because there is no substantive right to bail pending an appeal. The State argues, however, that because of prior decisions this court is committed to the position that the right to bail pending appeal is a procedural matter. The State supplements that argument by citing persuasive authority from other jurisdictions. The opposing contention of the District Court of the Second Judicial District is that the appropriate rule is found in State v. Hawkins, 140 Ariz. 88, 680 P.2d 522 (1984), in which the court concluded that any right to bail pending appeal is a matter of substance not procedure.
Neither party questions the right of this court to promulgate rules of...
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