State v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist.
Decision Date | 11 May 1908 |
Citation | 95 P. 593,37 Mont. 191 |
Parties | STATE ex rel. WEBB v. DISTRICT COURT OF SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT et al. |
Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Citation against John Webb, directing him to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for unlawfully interfering with the proceedings of the court by attempting to improperly influence certain jurors. A judgment was rendered for writs of supervisory control and certiorari. Application for writ Of supervisory control discharged, application dismissed, and judgment affirmed.
C. M Parr and John J. McHatton, for relator.
H. A Frank, for respondents.
On March 25, 1908, there were filed in the district court of Silver Bow county, in department 2 thereof, the Honorable George M. Bourquin being the presiding judge, the four several affidavits which follow:
Thereupon the court issued a citation requiring John Webb, the relator, to show cause why he should not be adjudged guilty of contempt for unlawfully and willfully interfering with the proceedings of the court by attempting to improperly influence Jurors Hickman and Wright, then in attendance upon the court. The relator, having appeared by his counsel at the appointed time, entered a plea of not guilty. After hearing the evidence, the court found him guilty, and sentenced him to imprisonment in the county jail for five days, and to pay a fine of $200, with additional imprisonment until the fine should be paid or satisfied. Thereupon application was made to this court for writs of supervisory control and certiorari to annul the judgment, the grounds of the application being (1) that the affidavits upon which the conviction is founded do not state sufficient facts to show a contempt; and (2), assuming that they do, that the evidence is insufficient to justify conviction. The theory upon which application was made for both writs is that, while upon certiorari the court may determine the question of jurisdiction arising upon the sufficiency of the allegations contained in the affidavits, it may not, upon the review afforded by this writ, examine the evidence to determine its sufficiency to sustain the finding and judgment. Hence, following the course pursued in State ex rel. Sutton v. District Court, 27 Mont. 128, 69 P. 988, the supervisory power of the court was invoked to determine this question, in case the conclusion was reached that the district court had jurisdiction.
Section 2170 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "The following acts or omissions, in respect to a court of justice, or proceeding therein, are contempts of the authority of the court." The first eight subdivisions of the section enumerate various specific things which are contempts. Some of these are direct, while others are indirect or constructive contempts. Subdivision 9 reads, "any other unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court." This includes acts other than those enumerated in the preceding subdivisions, whether done in the presence of the court or not. The acts charged here constitute an indirect contempt, for they did not occur in the presence of the court. It is said that the affidavits are not sufficient in form to state a contempt, in that nowhere in them is it alleged that the acts done were done with intent then and there unlawfully to interfere with the proceedings of the court. A sufficient answer to this contention is that the statute does not require the affidavit to be drawn in strict conformity with the rules of criminal pleading, as in case of informations or indictments. Section 2172 of the Code of Civil Procedure declares: "*** When the contempt is not committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, or judge at chambers, an affidavit shall be presented to the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt, or a statement of the facts by the referees or arbitrators or other judicial officer." This provision does not prescribe any form, nor require, any characterization, of the act charged as a contempt in order to confer jurisdiction. It merely requires a statement of the facts constituting the contempt. In the absence of some requirement of statute prescribing the form in which the charge must be presented a substantial and general statement will give the court jurisdiction to proceed. Jordan v. Circuit Court, 69 Iowa, 177, 28 N.W. 548; State ex rel. Fischer v. District Court, 65 Minn. 146, 67 N.W. 796. The particular act with the attendant circumstances furnishes its own characterization, if the statement be complete and substantial enough to justify a conclusive inference of knowledge and intent in the contemnor at the time the act is done.
It is said that a contempt proceeding is criminal or quasi...
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