State v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist.

• Decision Date: 21 July 1902
• Citation: 69 P. 988,27 Mont. 128
• Parties: STATE ex rel. SUTTON v. DISTRICT COURT OF SECOND JUDICIAL DIST. et al.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

69 P. 988

27 Mont. 128

STATE ex rel. SUTTON v. DISTRICT COURT OF SECOND JUDICIAL DIST. et al.

Supreme Court of Montana

July 21, 1902

Writ of supervisory control, on the relation of Wakeman Sutton, to the district court of the Second judicial district, and William Clancy, a judge thereof.

McBride & McBride, for relator.

McHatton & Cotter, for respondents.

PIGOTT J.

Wakeman Sutton was adjudged guilty of a constructive contempt of the district court of Silver Bow county. One of the penalties imposed by the judgment was a fine of $200, with imprisonment until paid or satisfied. At his instance, a writ of habeas corpus, aided by writ of certiorari, was issued by a justice of this court. After a hearing, the writs were quashed, and the proceeding was dismissed on the ground that the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties. We held that the supreme court could not, upon such proceedings in habeas corpus or certiorari, or both, examine the evidence received at the hearing on the charge of contempt. In the matter of the petition of Wakeman Sutton for writ of habeas corpus; and, in aid thereof, State v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist., 26 Mont.--,69 P. 1131. Thereafter, the present application was made by means of a verified petition containing copies of all the proceedings including the evidence adduced in the district court. The applicant asks for a writ of supervisory control commanding the defendants district court and judge to vacate the judgment.

The jurisdiction of the supreme court to entertain the petition is challenged by a motion to dismiss the proceedings, the defendants insisting that the only means by which a judgment of contempt can be brought up for review is by certiorari as providedin section 2183 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that, unless annulled or modified on certiorari, such a judgments is absolutely Final and conclusive, and therefore beyond the power of this court to consider. In short, the contention of the defendants is that section 2183 prescribes the only means whereby judicial relief may be obtained against judgments of contempt. That section reads "Section 2183. The judgment and orders of the court or judge, made in cases of contempt, are final and judge of the county in which such justice or judge of such inferior court resides."

Do these provisions preclude the supreme court from employing any means, other than certiorari, to review the integrity of judgments in contempt proceedings? We think they do not. Sections 2 and 3 of article 8 of the constitution contain three several and distinct grants to the supreme court: (1) The grant of appellate jurisdiction in all cases at law and in equity, subject to such limitations and regulations as the legislative assembly may prescribe, together with the incidental power to issue, hear, and determine all such original and remedial writs as may be necessary or proper to the complete exercise of such jurisdiction; (2) the grant of original jurisdiction to issue and to hear and determine certain enumerated writs; and (3) the grant (contained in section 2) of a general supervisory control over all inferior courts, under such regulations and limitations as may be prescribed by statue. State v. District Court, 24 Mont, 539, 63 P. 395; Finlen v. Heinze, 69 P. 829. Now it must be at once conceded that contempt proceedings are not, within the meaning of the constitution, cases at law or in equity which, in the absence of legislative action authorizing it, may be reviewed by appeal (In ReBoyle, 26 Mont. 365, 68 P. 409); and in State v. District Court, 26 Mont. 224, 68 P. 470, we have held that, on certiorari, the question wwhether there was evidence in support of a judgment for contempt cannot be determined. Is a person, then, remedieless whenever a district or justice's court of competent jurisdiction adjudges him guilty of constructive contempt without evidence to support the charge? Must he suffer such a judgment to be executed against his person and property or either? If any judicial relief can be obtained, it must be through the exercise, by this court, of its constitutional power of supervisory control. Tothis court has been confided and intrusted the ultimate and supreme judicial power of supervisory control over all the inferior courts within the state. It is a power liable to abuse, and should be exercised with discretion caution, sparingly, and onlyin exigent cases, to protect a manifest right or to redress a palpable wrong. We have just decided in Finlen v. Heinze, supra, that the appellate jurisdiction with which the organic law has clothed the supreme court cannot be taken away or diminished by the legislative assembly. Limitations and regulations may properly be prescribed, provided the right of effective appeal be not denied or substantially invaded. The same rule seems applicable to the present matter. The power to exercise a general supervisory control over district courts, being conferred by a constitutional grant, cannot be...