State v. Dixon

• Decision Date: 28 October 1908
• Citation: 62 S.E. 615,149 N.C. 460
• Parties: STATE. v. DIXON.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

62 S.E. 615

149 N.C. 460

STATE.

v.DIXON.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Oct. 28, 1908.

1. Criminal Law (§ 804^*)—Trial—Instructions— Reading of Notes of Evidence to Jury.

Though a court is required, on request, to reduce to writing the charge as to the law of the case, it is permissible for the judge to read his notes of evidence to the jury.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1948, 1951; Dec. Dig. § 804.*]

2. Criminal Law (§ 789*) — Instructions — Misleading Instructions.

An instruction that a reasonable doubt implies that the jury must be satisfied to a moral certainty, and that, "if the state so satisfies you, you should return a verdict of guilty, " following a charge that if the jury, after having given all the evidence consideration, reach the conclusion that the guilt of accused is established, the jury would not, in contemplation of law, entertain a reasonable doubt, is not misleading as withdrawing from the jury consideration of the evidence offered by accused.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law. Cent. Dig. §§ 1847, 1904-1922; Dec. Dig. § 789.*]

3. Criminal Law (§> 786*)—Instructions—— Misleading Instructions.

An instruction that, in passing on the evidence of the accused, the jury should take into consideration the interest he has in the indictment, and should scrutinize his evidence closely, but that the jury would not be warranted in refusing to believe what accused said, because of the fact that he was under indictment, etc., was not misleading as expressing an opinion of the court, or as casting any suspicion on the testimony of accused.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1787, 1895-1901; Dec. Dig. § 786.*]

4. Receiving Stolen Goods (§ 8*)—Defenses —Value of Property.

On a trial in the superior court for receiving stolen property, consisting of 18 haras, 11 shoulders, and 8 sides of meat, the fact that the value thereof was under $20 was a matter of defense, and it was incumbent on accused to prove the value, before he could rely thereon in diminution of sentence.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Receiving Stolen Goods, Dec. Dig. § 8.*]

Appeal from Superior Court, Sampson County; Neal, Judge.

James Dixon was convicted of receiving stolen property, and he appeals. Affirmed.

The defendant, James Dixon was convicted under the second count in the bill for receiving, and sentenced to two years on the roads. From the judgment pronounced he appealed to the Supreme Court.

John D. Kerr, F. R. Cooper, and Stevens, Beasley & Weeks, for appellant.

Assistant Attorney General Clement and Faison & Wright, for the State.

BROWN, J. The evidence sent up with the record tends strongly to prove that on Friday night, March 6, 1908, the smokehouse of one Bruner, in the county of Sampson, was broken into, and a large number of hams, shoulders, and sides of meat were stolen therefrom, and that on the next night this meat was found in the smokehouse of defendant. The meat was identified by the owner, by private marks or holes he had made at the bone. The evidence of guilt not only justified his honor in submitting the matter to the jury, but it is plenary and convincing. There are a number of exceptions to the testimony, all of them without merit, and we find nothing in them which requires discussion.

In respect to the charge of the court, there are several assignments of error, some of which we will notice.

There is nothing appearing in the record to sustain the exception "that his honor, after having been requested to put the charge in writing, stated orally, at great length and with vigor, the contentions of the state, after having read the written charge; and the oral statement of the contentions of the state was error." The written charge is a full instruction, generally, as to the law bearingon the charge; and, although required, upon request, to be in writing as to the law of the case, it was entirely permissible for his honor to read his notes of evidence to the jury. There is nothing in the record indicating that the judge stated verbally "at great length and with vigor" the contentions of the state to the prejudice of the defendant.

The defendant excepts to that part of the charge relating to the oft-discussed subject of the reasonable doubt. Judge Pearson doubted if this common formula had ever been of any practical benefit in the administration of the criminal law. But we think whatever benefit a person charged with crime may get from it was more than given this defendant, when his honor stated substantially that a reasonable doubt implied that the jury must be satisfied to a moral certainty. His honor further told the jury in that connection: "If the state so satisfies you, you should return a verdict of guilty." It is earnestly contended that this last expression is prejudicial error, in that it withdraws from the jury any consideration of the evidence offered by the defendant. We think,...