State v. Dixon
| Decision Date | 30 June 1876 |
| Citation | 75 N.C. 275 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. GEORGE DIXON. |
A Judge is not justified in expressing to the jury his opinion that the defendant is guilty or not guilty upon the evidence adduced.
One may oppose another attempting the perpetration of a felony, if need be, to the taking of a felon's life; as in the case of a person attacked by another, intending to murder him, who thereupon kills his assailant. He is under no obligation to fly.
But if the assault is without any felonious intent, the person assaulted may not stand his ground and kill his adversary, if there be any way of escape open to him, though he is allowed to repel force by force and give blow for blow. The character of such assault, with its attending circumstances, should be submitted to the jury, with instructions as to the legal effect of their finding upon it.
( State v. Harris, 1 Jones, 190; Roane's case, 2 Dev., 58; Scott's case, 4 Ired., 409; State v. Floyd, 6 Jones, 392; Massager's case, 65 N. C. Rep., 480; and State v. Yancey, 74 N. C. Rep., 244, cited and approved.)
INDICTMENT for Manslaughter, tried before MOORE, J., at January Term, 1876, of EDGECOMBE Superior Court.
The facts, necessary to an understanding of the case, as decided, are fully set out in the opinion of the Court.
There was a verdict of guilty, and judgment thereupon. The prisoner appealed.
Attorney General Hargrove, for the State .
Howard & Perry and Phillips, for the prisoner .
The prisoner is indicted for manslaughter. The testimony of several witnesses was introduced in his behalf, and at the conclusion of the evidence, the Court asked the counsel of the prisoner what they had to say. The counsel replied: “We shall take the ground that it was in self defence.” His Honor: and he so directed, and the verdict was so entered.
Rev. Code, chap. 31, sec. 130, provides that “no Judge, in delivering a charge to the petit jury, shall give an opinion, whether a fact is fully or sufficiently proved, such matter being the true office and province of the jury.” This statute is but in affirmance of the Constitution, Art. 1, secs. 13-17, and the well settled principles of the common law, as set forth in magna charta. The jury must not only unanimously concur in the verdict, but must be left free to act according to the dictates of their own judgment. The final decision upon the facts rests with them, and any interference by the Court, tending to influence them into a verdict against their convictions, is irregular and without the warrant of law. The Judge is not justified in expressing to the jury his opinion that the defendant is guilty upon the evidence adduced. Experience has demonstrated that few juries are found firm enough to render a verdict in opposition to the declared opinion of the Judge, upon the bench, whose abilities, learning and high position give his opinion the force of a command upon a body timid from inexperience and misdirected by the authority, constituted for their instruction and guidance, both as to their rights and their duties. And seldom would a lawyer argue his case to the jury, when he knew that the Judge had already declared against him and pre-occupied the minds of the jury adversely to his cause. Cooley Const. Lim., 320, and notes; State v. Harris, 1 Jones, 190. If, in the case before us, the evidence had made a clear case of guilt against the prisoner, still its credibility was for the jury, and it should have been so submitted to them by the Court, for they must say whether they believe or disbelieve it.
But, assuming that his Honor meant to charge the jury and they understood him to charge, that if they believed the testimony, the prisoner was guilty, and they should so find, did the evidence warrant such an instruction? Certainly not, if the testimony was fairly susceptible of any construction consistent with the prisoner's innocence. How is that? The witness, Sherrod, for the prisoner, testified that on Sunday, the deceased and a large number of other persons were in the store, which was also the dwelling-house of the prisoner; that the prisoner said, “all get out of here, I want to go to the baptizing;” that he repeated the order to get out several times; that the crowd moved slowly. When near the door, the prisoner “shoved” the deceased, who, it appears, was one of the hindmost. The deceased asked, “what he shoved him for?” and the prisoner replied, “I must protect my house;” that when the deceased got out, he pulled off his coat, got a club, admitted to be a deadly weapon, and advanced towards the door, where the prisoner was; that the prisoner told him to go away, presenting a pistol; that the deceased cried out, “shoot, I don't value your pistol;” that the deceased had his stick drawn back and was advancing to the door and was in one or two feet of it, and the prisoner about three feet inside of the door, when the pistol was fired by him.
C. Neal, a witness for the State, presents another version. He does not appear to have seen any “shove,” but testified, that when the crowd got out, the deceased pulled off his coat, got the club, and started for the door; that the prisoner asked him, “are you mad?” and the deceased replied, “I am;” prisoner, ““you can't help yourself;” deceased, “I will smash every bone in your body;” that the deceased was then advancing to the door; that the witness caught the prisoner by the arm, and being swung around by him, the hat of the witness fell off, and while he stooped to pick it up, the pistol was fired.
Mayo, a witness for the prisoner, does not appear to have seen any “shove,” but heard the prisoner tell the crowd seven or eight times to go out; that when out, the deceased pulled off his coat and started for a stick; that Daniel Broadnax broke a leg out of a bench, witness describing it and pitched it to him, saying, “isn't he a brave boy;” that this made him worse; that Broadnax, himself, took another leg of the bench, and Bob White had a stick, but none of them did anything except the deceased; that prisoner told the deceased if he did not go away, he would shoot him; that the deceased advanced, and the prisoner shot him.
The innocence of the prisoner depends upon whether, from the whole testimony or from that of any witness, he himself at the time...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Bridges
...or false, and what is proves if it be true. State v. Hill, 141 N.C. 769, 53 S.E. 311; State v. Riley, 113 N.C. 648, 18 S.E. 168; State v. Dixon, 75 N.C. 275. The prisoner could admit or confess away the presumption that he was innocent, or waive the constitutional necessity for having the i......
-
State v. Holland
... ... sufficient to justify the taking of the life of a human ... being, but there must be reasonable ground for the belief or ... apprehension-an honest and well-founded belief or ... apprehension at the time the homicide is committed. State ... v. Dixon, 75 N.C. 275; State v. Turpin, 77 N.C ... 473, 24 Am. Rep. 455; State v. Barrett, 132 N.C ... 1005, 43 S.E. 832; State v. Lipscomb, 134 N.C. 689, ... 47 S.E. 44; State v. Garland, 138 N.C. 675, 50 S.E ... 853; State v. Lilliston, 141 N.C. 857, 54 S.E. 427, ... 115 Am. St. Rep. 705; State v ... ...
-
State v. Clark
...it, we are now content to refer to what we then said as applicable to the particular instruction of the court in this case. State v. Dixon, 75 N.C. 275. It said, though, to be a complete answer to those exceptions that the defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree, and could no......
-
State v. Howard
... ... held to mean that the judge shall state the evidence fairly ... and impartially, and that he shall express no opinion on the ... weight of the evidence. This construction, in the last ... particular, goes beyond the words of the act, but it is ... accepted as a proper one." In State v. Dixon, ... 75 N.C. 275, this court has said: "This statute is but ... in affirmance of the constitution (article 1, §§ 13-17), and ... the well-settled principles of the common law as set forth in ... Magna Charta. The jury must not only unanimously concur in ... the verdict, but must be left ... ...