State v. Dobrowski
| Decision Date | 18 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | DA 15–0479 |
| Citation | 382 P.3d 490,2016 MT 261,385 Mont. 179 |
| Parties | State of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Robert Lawrence Dobrowski, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: Penelope S. Strong, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana
For Appellee: Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Mardell Ployhar, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Wyatt A. Glade, Custer County Attorney, Miles City, Montana
E Wheat delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Judge Michael Hayworth of the Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Custer County, presided over the trial of Robert Lawrence Dobrowski (Dobrowski) for criminal production or manufacture of dangerous drugs. The jury returned a verdict of guilty. Dobrowski appeals, alleging numerous errors at trial.
¶2 We address the following issues on appeal:
¶3 In the fall of 2012, Dobrowski and his wife Traci Dobrowski (Traci) lived on property located in Custer County, Montana, owned by Michael Burk (Burk) and Geraldine Burk (Geraldine). Dobrowski, Burk, Traci, and Geraldine each had medical marijuana patient cards issued to them by the Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS), which allowed each individual to possess four mature plants, twelve submature plants, and one ounce of usable marijuana. Burk and Dobrowski began growing marijuana on the property. Dobrowski and Traci moved to Miles City, Montana, in December of 2012. In February 2013, Dobrowski applied for a medical marijuana provider license, listing Burk's property as the address where he would grow marijuana. His application was later denied.
¶4 On March 14, 2013, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant on Burk's property after a criminal investigation discovered evidence consistent with a marijuana cultivation operation. Officers discovered 66 mature plants and 22 submature plants. Officers spoke to Dobrowski after the search. He acknowledged that he had been growing marijuana on the property and helped to set up the building where the marijuana was found. On December 5, 2013, the State filed an Information charging Dobrowski with criminal production or manufacture of dangerous drugs. A jury convicted Dobrowski on February 27, 2016.
¶5 Other facts will be noted as necessary to discuss the issues raised on appeal.
¶6 We review a district court's decision regarding jury instructions for an abuse of discretion. State v. Lacey , 2012 MT 52, ¶ 15, 364 Mont. 291, 272 P.3d 1288
. “The standard of review of jury instructions in criminal cases is whether the instructions, as a whole, fully and fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case.” State v. Dunfee , 2005 MT 147, ¶ 20, 327 Mont. 335, 114 P.3d 217.
¶7 “District courts are vested with broad discretion in controlling the admission of evidence at trial.” Seltzer v. Morton , 2007 MT 62, ¶ 65, 336 Mont. 225, 154 P.3d 561
. We review a district court's admission of rebuttal evidence for abuse of discretion. State v. Weitzel , 2000 MT 86, ¶¶ 23–24, 299 Mont. 192, 998 P.2d 1154.
¶8 We review allegations of prosecutorial error de novo, considering the prosecutor's conduct in the context of the entire proceeding. State v. Labbe , 2012 MT 76, ¶ 11, 364 Mont. 415, 276 P.3d 848
(closing argument). We consider closing argument statements in the context of the entire argument and review a district court's rulings on objections to closing argument content for an abuse of discretion. State v. Chafee , 2014 MT 226, ¶ 12, 376 Mont. 267, 332 P.3d 240.
¶9 We review a district court's application of a statute for correctness. State v. Alden , 282 Mont. 45, 49, 934 P.2d 210, 213 (1997)
.
¶10 Issue one: Did the District Court abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on the theory of accountability when the State did not charge Dobrowski with accountability in the Information?
¶11 The State's information filed against Dobrowski did not include an accountability charge. Rather, the State sought jury instructions on the theory of accountability on the second day of trial. The District Court admitted two instructions on accountability over Dobrowski's objection. Dobrowski now asks us to revisit our prior case law, namely State v. Tellegen , 2013 MT 337, 372 Mont. 454, 314 P.3d 902
and State v. Tower , 267 Mont. 63, 881 P.2d 1317 (1994), arguing that the allowance of the accountability instruction violated Dobrowski's right to due process and his right to present a defense.
¶12 Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant has the right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation” brought against him. U.S. Const. amend. VI
. To this end, § 46–11–401(1), MCA, requires charging documents to state the name of the offense and, for each count, to state “the official or customary citation of the statute, rule, regulation, or other provision of law that the defendant is alleged to have violated.”
, provides, in relevant part:
We have repeatedly held that “accountability is not a separate or different offense from the one charged, but rather, is ‘merely a conduit by which to find a person criminally liable for the acts of another.’ ” Tellegen , ¶ 9
(quoting State v. Maetche , 2008 MT 184, ¶ 16, 343 Mont. 464, 185 P.3d 980 ; State v. Abe , 1998 MT 206, ¶ 31, 290 Mont. 393, 965 P.2d 882 ; Tower , 267 Mont. at 67–68, 881 P.2d at 1320 ). Stare decisis “is of fundamental and central importance to the rule of law,” which “reflects our concerns for stability, predictability, and equal treatment.” State v. Gatts , 279 Mont. 42, 51, 928 P.2d 114, 119 (1996). As such, we decline to reconsider our prior holdings in Tower and Tellegen. Given our well-established principle of law regarding the theory of accountability, a defendant should be able to predict and plan for the possibility that the State may request an accountability instruction during trial. Tellegen , ¶ 9 (citing Tower , 267 Mont. at 68, 881 P.2d at 1320
).
, we found unpersuasive a defendant's claim that he was surprised by an accountability instruction given that he was provided all the evidence the State intended to present at trial. Tower , 267 Mont. at 68, 881 P.2d at 1320. We concluded that “[i]n light of the defense's knowledge of the State's case, and the consistent history of the law of accountability in Montana, there was every reason to anticipate an accountability instruction.” Tower , 267 Mont. at 68, 881 P.2d at 1320. Likewise, in Tellegen, we held that a defendant had sufficient notice of a possible accountability instruction when the State presented evidence at trial that she assisted others in committing the crime for which she was charged. Tellegen , ¶¶ 9–10.
¶15 The facts in this case are similar to the facts in Tower
and Tellegen. One week after the search of Burk's property, Dobrowski admitted to officers that he was cooperatively growing marijuana on the property and helped to set up one of the buildings where the plants were found. The State then charged Dobrowski with criminal production or manufacture of dangerous drugs. During trial, the prosecution elicited testimony from Dobrowski that sought to establish his participation in the growing operation on Burk's property. Dobrowski testified that he previously taught Burk to grow marijuana and told officers that he and Burk had a cooperative grow on the property. In short, Dobrowski was charged for his participation in the growing operation, and Dobrowski himself testified that he was involved in the operation. The facts underlying Dobrowski's case and the State's presentation of evidence at trial, which sought to establish that he did not act alone in growing marijuana on Burk's property, put him on notice that the State could potentially request an accountability jury instruction.
¶16 Dobrowski attempts to rely on State v. Spotted Eagle , 2010 MT 222, 358 Mont. 22, 243 P.3d 402
. In Spotted Eagle, the State initially charged the defendant under § 45–5–206(1)(a), MCA, then later sought to instruct the jury under § 45–5–206(1)(c), MCA. Spotted Eagle , ¶ 11. Since this changed the essential elements of the charge against Spotted Eagle, the Court held that the district court abused its discretion in allowing an instruction on the separate and distinct offense not charged in the State's information. Spotted Eagle , ¶¶ 11–12, 16. As in this case, the defendant in Tellegen also attempted to rely on Spotted Eagle to contend that, like the statutory subsections in that case, the statute on accountability is a separate and distinct offense requiring express notice from the prosecution. Tellegen , ¶¶ 13–14.
However, we distinguished Spotted Eagle
from Montana's case law on accountability, holding that “[a]ccountability is not a separate or different offense from the one charged, it is merely a theory to establish criminal liability for the charged offense” and “does not constitute a substantive shift in the charge.” Tellegen , ¶ 14. Thus, as we previously held in Tellegen, Spotted Eagle does not apply to the case at bar. We...
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