State v. Dobson, 45339
| Citation | 303 S.W.2d 650 |
| Decision Date | 10 June 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 45339,No. 1,45339,1 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Freddie Eugene DOBSON and Maebelle Miller, Appellants |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
No attorney for appellants.
John M. Dalton, Atty. Gen., and Richard W. Dahms, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
COIL, Commissioner.
Defendants were convicted of larceny of a motor vehicle. Dobson was sentenced to 15 years, and Maebelle Miller to 5 years, in the penitentiary. Defendants were represented by counsel in the trial court, but here defendant Dobson has briefed the case pro se and for his co-defendant, Maebelle Miller. Defendants' separate motions for new trial each preserved only one point for review, viz., whether the trial court erred in failing to sustain their motions for judgments of acquittal at the close of all the evidence. Defendants adduced no evidence in their behalf. The state's evidence, viewed most favorably from its standpoint, justified the jury in finding the facts to be as they appear in this statement.
Walter Hogan, a resident of Indianapolis, Indiana, owned a 2-door 1954 blue Chevrolet automobile which was stolen while parked in front of his home on October 31, 1954. The automobile was returned to Hogan about seven weeks later. In November 1954, the last day of the deer season, defendants engaged a tourist cottage on Highway 67 in Butler County, Missouri, under the names of Mr. and Mrs. Eugene Hogan. They arrived in, and kept there, Walter Hogan's automobile. About three weeks later, defendants were arrested by a highway patrol sergeant who recovered from them Walter Hogan's Chevrolet. Indiana had advised Missouri authorities that Dobson was wanted for grand larceny and for parole violation and they had a pick-up order on the Indiana license plate which was on the Chevrolet automobile which was in possession of defendants and also a pick-up order for Dobson, who was, the report said, driving the car with that license plate.
The foregoing evidence was clearly sufficient to sustain the conviction of defendants for the larceny of a motor vehicle under the provisions of Section 560.165 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. (repealed, effective 90 days after May 31, 1955). There was direct testimony that the automobile recovered from defendants was the same automobile stolen from Mr. Hogan, and defendants' recent, exclusive, and unexplained possession of that stolen automobile was sufficient to sustain their conviction. State v. Denison, 352 Mo. 572, 576-580, 178 S.W.2d 449, 452-454; State v. Abbott, Mo., 265 S.W.2d 316, 320.
Defendant contend that there was a fatal variance between the charge in the information and the proof adduced. The information averred that the 1954 Chevrolet automobile was the property of Wilford Hogan, while the proof showed that the Chevrolet was the property of Walter Hogan. Section 546.080 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., provides in part: 'Whenever on the trial of any felony or misdemeanor, there shall appear to be any variance between the statement in the indictment or information and the evidence offered in proof thereof, in the christian name or surname, or both the christian name and surname, * * * or in the ownership of any property named or described therein, such variance shall not be deemed grounds for an acquittal of the defendant, unless the court before which the trial shall be had shall find that such variance is material to the merits of the case and prejudicial to the defense of the defendant.' By the express provision of the foregoing statute, the instant variance between the information and proof was cured unless the trial court found (subject to appellate review) that such variance was material to the merits of the case and prejudicial to the defendants' defense. The trial court not only did not so find in the instant case, but defendants' present contention was not asserted in the trial court. It cannot be successfully urged here for the first time. The trial court's ruling on the question was necessary to preserve it for appellate review. State v. Barker, 64 Mo. 282, 285; State v. Myers, Mo., 147 S.W.2d 444, 446[2, 3]; State v. Long, 278 Mo. 379, 386, 213 S.W....
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State v. Ballard
...it, applies to the accusation made at the trial, as well as that stated in the information or indictment. The cited case of State v. Dobson, Mo., 303 S.W.2d 650, certiorari denied 355 U.S. 964, 78 S.Ct. 554, 2 L.Ed.2d 539, is inapplicable here because that prosecution involved the theft of ......
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State v. Hayes
...while an unexplained possession of recently stolen property can give rise to an inference that the possessor is the thief (State v. Dobson, 303 S.W.2d 650 (Mo.1957)), an inference cannot be drawn that the possessor of stolen goods received the property from another (State v. Armstrong, 555 ......
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State v. Montgomery, 10981
...W)hile an unexplained possession of recently stolen property can give rise to an inference that the possessor is the thief (State v. Dobson, 303 S.W.2d 650 (Mo.1957)), an inference cannot be drawn that the possessor of stolen goods received the property from another (State v. Armstrong, 555......
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State v. Knicker, 48852
...was one of the thieves. State v. Denison, 352 Mo. 572, 178 S.W.2d 449, 453; State v. Hite, Mo., 298 S.W.2d 411, 412; State v. Dobson, Mo., 303 S.W.2d 650, 651. Furthermore, the fact that the jury did not find defendant guilty of burglary did not strates that it was not prejudiced against hi......