State v. Dodge
| Decision Date | 27 December 1960 |
| Citation | 103 N.H. 131,166 A.2d 467 |
| Parties | STATE v. Richard DODGE. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Louis C. Wyman, Atty. Gen., and William J. O'Neil, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
William D. Tribble, Manchester, for defendant.
RSA 262:15-a (supp) makes it a misdemeanor to operate a motor vehicle 'in a grossly careless or grossly negligent manner which said operation does not constitute reckless operation of a motor vehicle and which does not result in the death of any person * * * Grossly careless or grossly negligent operation, for the purposes of this section shall be, that manner of operation of a motor vehicle which, although short of wilful and intentional wrong, is marked by more want of care than simple inadvertence and is carelessness substantially and appreciably higher in magnitude than ordinary negligence or carelessness, or a high degree of indifference to the operator's duty.'
Previous to the enactment of this section (Laws 1955, c. 109, § 1) the prohibition against operating a motor vehicle in a grossly careless or grossly negligent manner was part of RSA 262:15 which also prohibits anyone from operating a vehicle recklessly, or so that the lives or safety of the public shall be endangered.
It is relatively easy to distinguish between a 'wilful and intentional wrong' and 'simple inadvertence' or ordinary negligence. In the former the actor seeks a certain forbidden end and he directs his conduct toward that end or knows that it is very likely to occur. The negligent actor, on the other hand, is inadvertent to the dangerousness of his behavior although actually it unreasonably increases the risk of the occurrence of a prescribed harm.
'Reckless operation,' in our opinion, approaches intentional misconduct, in that the actor is or can be found award that his conduct creates a risk that a forbidden harm will probably result, but is consciously indifferent to that risk. It differs from willful and intentional misconduct in that he does not deliberately intend that the harm shall result, or seek to cause it. State v. Soucy, 97 N.H. 233, 234, 84 A.2d 838; see Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law, 215-236 (1947).
The greatest difficulty arises when negligent or careless conduct is to be characterized as gross but not constituting recklessness. For the purposes of RSA 262:15-a (supp) grossly negligent or grossly careless operation is the operation, of a motor vehicle in...
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State v. Etzweiler
...created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of some forbidden harm but was consciously indifferent to that risk. State v. Dodge, 103 N.H. 131, 133, 166 A.2d 467, 468 (1960); State v. Soucy, 97 N.H. 233, 234, 84 A.2d 838, 840 (1951) (vehicle must be operated to show a reckless disregard of ......
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Sargent v. Ross
...unreasonable risk of harm which foreseeably results in an injury. Quint v. Porietis, 107 N.H. 463, 225 A.2d 179 (1966); State v. Dodge, 103 N.H. 131, 166 A.2d 467 (1960); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 282 (1965). But, except in certain instances, landlords are immune from these simple rul......
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State v. Thurston
...State v. Houde, 150 Me. 469, 470, 114 A.2d 366, 367 (1950); Bacheller v. State, 3 Md.App. 626, 240 A.2d 623 (1968); see State v. Dodge, 103 N.H. 131, 166 A.2d 467 (1960); State v. Picillo, 105 R.I. 364, 252 A.2d 191 (1969); cf. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.......
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State v. Jahn
...less than reckless driving but more serious than ordinary negligent conduct. State v. Turgeon, 101 N.H. 300, 141 A.2d 881; State v. Dodge, 103 N.H. 131, 166 A.2d 467; State v. Hazzard, 104 N.H. 94, 179 A.2d 282. It is clear, however, that although unreasonable speed may be a factor in deter......