State v. Dodson
| Decision Date | 21 February 1882 |
| Docket Number | CASE 1143. |
| Citation | 16 S.C. 453 |
| Parties | STATE v. DODSON. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
1. A motion for continuance is addressed solely to the discretion of the Circuit judge, and his ruling thereon is not appealable.
2. Whether a juror is indifferent in a cause is a matter of fact to be finally determined by the Circuit Court. As matter of law, a juror is not incompetent who has formed an opinion from what he has read in the newspapers, or heard, but whose mind would not be thereby influenced— who is not sensible of any bias or prejudice, and who would be governed by the evidence.
3. A prisoner cannot, in this court, object to the ruling of the Circuit judge that a juror was competent, when such juror was challenged by defendant, and he obtained his jury without exhausting his peremptory challenges.
4. The wife of a prisoner, on trial, is an incompetent witness in his behalf. State v. Workman , (5) 15 S. C. 541, approved.
5. The confession of one of the defendants implicating himself and others, is competent evidence against himself, and should be proved as made, including the names of his confederates as stated by him, the jury being instructed that it is evidence only against the party who made the confession. State v. Workman , (4) 15 S. C. 541, approved.
6. A party convicted of infamous crimes, and who has served out his sentence, is restored to his competency as a witness by a pardon afterwards granted.
7. While defendants' counsel were portraying to the jury the effect of a conviction, the trial judge, interrupting cautioned the jury that their duty was to pass upon the facts regardless of the consequences of their verdict. Held , no error.
8. In an arson case, where no mitigating circumstances appeared in the evidence, this court will not grant a new trial, because that the Circuit judge neglected to charge the jury that the prisoners might be recommended to mercy under the act of 1878 (16 Stat. 631), and their punishment thereby mitigated— no request so to charge having been made of him.
9. The indictment charged the offense to have been committed by Rich Bates, and the verdict found Richard Bates guilty. Held , an immaterial variance.
10. Insufficiency of evidence is a ground of appeal which this court cannot consider in a criminal case.
Before HUDSON, J., Greenville, July, 1881.
This was an indictment against William Dodson, Pleasant Adams Joseph Burton, Rich Bates and Fletcher Maddox, for arson, in burning a large building in the city of Greenville known as the Academy of Music, during one of the nights of 1879, the same being, at the time, occupied in part as a sleeping apartment. At the first trial, Fletcher Maddox pleaded guilty and was sentenced to be hung. The others were convicted and sentenced, but appealed to this court and obtained a reversal of the judgment. On their second trial they were again convicted and sentenced, and again they appealed.
Omitting its statement of facts bearing upon grounds of appeal based upon the insufficiency of evidence in certain particulars, the report of the presiding judge was as follows:
An effort was made in behalf of defendants to have the case continued because of the absence of several (two) witnesses alleged to be material. These witnesses were shown by the return of the sheriff and by other evidence, to be absent from the State or not to be found, and one of them to be incompetent. The witnesses being without the jurisdiction of the court, in view of all the surrounding circumstances, I deemed it my duty, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to order the trial to proceed. From the information derived from the statements and argument of counsel, I then thought, and still think, that no injury was done the defendants in refusing this motion— which I could not have granted consistently with the rules of sound discretion, in view of the long time this charge had been pending, its previous tedious trial and the great uncertainty of ever obtaining the attendance of the witnesses.
The organization of the jury was greatly delayed and rendered very tedious by lengthy examinations and cross-examinations of each juror on his voir dire before being presented, and by the exercise of the right of challenge by each defendant separately. A number of persons stated on their voir dire that they had formed an opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of the prisoners, were biased by such opinion and felt that they could not stand indifferent in the case. The challenge for cause against them was of course sustained. Others stated that they had formed an opinion, but stated further that such opinion arose from what they had heard of the case or from the report of newspapers, which, however, would not in the least influence their minds as jurors if sworn in the case. They stated that they were sensible of no bias or prejudice whatever, for or against the defendants or either of them, and would stand entirely indifferent and be governed alone by the evidence to be adduced. Answering thus, they were presented, but in every instance were challenged peremptorily, and no juror was empaneled except those who, on their voir dire , swore that they were without opinion in regard to the guilt or innocence of the accused— were entirely free from bias, and stood indifferent between the State and the prisoners at the bar. Such boni et legales hominès and none others, were sworn as jurors in this case.
**2 In the progress of the trial, the State's counsel offered in evidence the written statement and confession of the defendant, William Dodson; to this the defendants' counsel objected, because the said Dodson had been previously convicted of two infamous offenses and had suffered punishment therefor. The court ruled that in no event could the confession of Dodson be evidence except as against himself, and its admissibility was not destroyed by reason of his infamy. If freely and voluntarily made, it should be admitted for what it might be, in the opinion of the jury, worth, as against Dodson and no other. It appearing to have been freely and voluntarily made by Dodson, and reduced to writing by another and signed by Dodson, the statement was admitted to be read by the jury, they being duly cautioned that it should not and must not be at all weighed by them, save only as against Dodson.
Fletcher Maddox, who had been jointly indicted with the other defendants, and pleaded guilty at the first trial, and against whom sentence of death had been pronounced, was tendered by the State as a witness for the prosecution. The counsel for the defendants objected that this witness not only had been sentenced to be hanged for this arson, but had been twice previously convicted of larceny, once for grand larceny, in 1879, and, subsequently, for petit larceny, for both of which offenses he had suffered the penalty of the law. To this the counsel for the State replied by producing a pardon in due form by the executive of the State for each of the crimes, and also a general pardon for all past offenses against the laws of the State. No allegation nor proof was made of any offense save these crimes for which he held specific pardons.
I held that these pardons restored the competency of Maddox as a witness in our courts, but not his credibility. He stood as a competent witness, but whose credibility was impaired by infamy; but how far he was to be believed was a question for the jury. I remember no contest over the competency of any other witness offered by the State, and the exceptions and grounds of appeal make mention of no other.
On behalf of the defendants, Hattie Burton, wife of the defendant Joseph Burton, was offered as a witness, but objected to by counsel for the State. I held her incompetent. Joseph Burton being jointly indicted with the others, his wife, who is clearly incompetent to testify in his behalf, is, also, by the rules of evidence, excluded from testifying in behalf of his confederates and co-defendants.
The case is one of great importance; it excited, as is usual, great interest in the community, and brought forth the warmest zeal and highest powers of intellect of learned counsel for the State and defendants. A large number of witnesses appeared on the stand, and the voluminous testimony consumed much time in development. At the close of the argument I proceeded to deliver my charge to the jury. To them I carefully defined the crime of arson, and, in doing so, read the statutes of the State defining the offense. I earnestly cautioned them not to consider the statement and confession of Dodson, except as against himself, and that as against him, even, it was for them to say what weight they should attach to it.
**3 In speaking of the witness Maddox, I told the jury, as I have stated above, that his testimony was before them as that of an infamous man and as an accomplice in this grave charge. It was for them to say what credit should be given to his testimony; and it was my duty to tell them, that whilst it is lawful to convict upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, yet it is unsafe to do so, and that they should seek for facts and circumstances, established by credible witnesses, in corroboration of Maddox before believing him. In my entire charge, I rigidly confined myself to my strict duty in expounding the law, avoiding comment on the testimony, and leaving the facts of the case entirely to the jury. No exception at the time was taken to my charge by either side, nor did the counsel for the defendants make any request to charge any legal proposition; nor was I requested to call the attention of the jury to any statute prescribing the punishment for the offense.
The jury rendered a verdict of guilty against each defendant on trial,...
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