State v. Domanski

• Decision Date: 16 March 1937
• Docket Number: No. 600.,600.
• Parties: STATE v. DOMANSKI et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

190 A. 854

STATE

v. DOMANSKI et al.

No. 600.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 16, 1937.

Certified from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties.

Frank S. Domanski and others were indicted for robbery. On constitutional question certified from Superior Court.

Answers certified and cause remanded for further proceedings.

John P. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., and John J. Cooney, 2nd Asst. Atty. Gen., of Providence, for the State.

Kirshenbaum & Kirshenbaum and Lester T. Murphy, all of Providence, for defendant.

CAPOTOSTO, Justice.

In this case a constitutional question is certified to us under General Laws 1923, c. 348, § 1. The defendants contend that the form for robbery set out in Public Laws 1932, c. 1954, § 1, cl. 5, which the indictment in the instant case follows, is unconstitutional in that it fails to inform them of the nature and cause of the accusation, in violation of article 1, section 10, of the Constitution of Rhode Island.

The above-cited clause reads as follows: "The following forms may be used in the cases in which they are applicable: * * * Robbery.—A. B. robbed C. D." The indictment charges that these defendants on June 1, 1936, in Central Falls, "did rob one William J. Wilbek." Section 1, clause 4, of the statute in question provides that: "The indictment or complaint may charge, and is valid and sufficient if it charges, the offense for which the defendant is being prosecuted in one or more of the following ways: (a) By using the name given to the offense by the common law or by a statute."

The common-law crime of robbery consists in the "felonious taking of money or goods of any value from the person of another, or in his presence, against his will, by violence, or putting him in fear." 2 East, P.C. 707; 4 Black. 243; 1 Hale 532. The gist of the crime of robbery is the taking by force and fear. The nature and value of the property is immaterial, so long as it is property which may be the subject of larceny. State v. Denby, 143 Wash. 288, 255 P. 141; Wesley v. State, 61 Ala. 282, 287; State v. Burke, 73 N.C 83; State v. Howerton, 58 Mo. 581; People v. Nolan, 250 Ill. 351, 95 N.E. 140, 34 L.R.A.(N.S.) 301, Ann.Cas.1912B, 401; State v. Perley, 86 Me. 427, 30 A. 74, 41 Am.St.Rep. 564. The common-law definition of the word "robbery" includes both the nature and cause of the offense. The manner in which that crime must be committed indicates its nature, and the kind of property that must be taken identifies the cause.

A word may acquire a specific meaning and become a word of art through constant and unmistakable usage. At common law, the term "robbery" or "to rob" has but a single meaning. When used in criminal proceedings or in connection with legal matters, these words have a technical meaning and, unless otherwise defined by statute, they include within themselves all the elements of the common-law crime of robbery. We cite the following rather old cases to illustrate the sole meaning that for years has been impressed by the courts upon the words "robbery" and "to rob" in the general field of the law:

In De Rothschild v. The Royal Steam Packet, 7 Exch. 734, the defendant was sued for the theft of boxes of gold dust, while in transit from Panama to London, under a bill of lading which excepted loss by "robbers." Looking at the nature of the contract and the circumstances under which it was made, the court agreed with counsel for the defendants "that the word 'robbers' ought not to be construed in the technical sense given to the word 'rob' by the English law writers, and by some of the English statutes (1 Vict. c. 87, s. 2, for instance) where it means the felonious taking from the person or in the presence of another, of money or goods, against his will, by force, as putting him in fear," but the court nevertheless held the defendants liable on the ground that the gold dust was stolen and not "taken by force by a vis major." The statute cited by the court provides a penalty for "whosoever shall rob any Person" and at the time "of such Robbery" shall cut, stab, or wound him.

In Tomlinson v. Brittlebank, 4 Barn. & Adol. 630, the declaration in an action for slander alleged that the defendant said of the plaintiff: "He robbed John White, thereby meaning that the said plaintiff had been and was guilty of an offense punishable by law." There being no allegation of special damage, counsel for the defendant contended that the word "rob" was of equivocal import and that, therefore, the suit could not be maintained without such an allegation. The court overruled this contention and, at page 632 of the opinion, says: "Almost any words may be used in more than one sense. But the word to 'rob' gives a sufficient description of an offense punishable by law in the very terms of the statute 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 29. It has but one legal sense."

In Tyson v. United States, 7 Okl.Cr. 433, 122 P. 733, the defendant was indicted in the words of the statute for an "assault with intent to rob." The court sustained the indictment and, 7 Okl.Cr. 433, at page 434, 122 P. 733, says: "The term 'rob' is used therein in its common-law sense and has a well-defined meaning." The case of Robinson v. State, 11 Tex.App. 309, is to the same effect. In Acker v. Commonwealth, 94 Pa. 284, the indictment for robbery failed to charge that the property was taken from the person and against the will of the prosecutor. The defendant filed motions to quash the indictment and in arrest of judgment on the ground that the indictment did not charge any offense known to the law. These motions were overruled and, at page 286 of the opinion, the court says: "It is not necessary that all the circumstances which enter into the definition of robbery at common law should be particularly averred in the indictment. The word rob, which is used ex vi termini, includes all those circumstances, and it sufficiently appears that a taking from the person of the prosecutor and against his will, that being the legal definition of robbery, was substantially charged in the indictment."

The common-law meaning of the word "robbery" was well established in this state...