State v. Perley

• Decision Date: 29 May 1804
• Citation: 30 A. 74,86 Me. 427
• Parties: STATE v. PERLEY et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

30 A. 74

86 Me. 427

STATE

v. PERLEY et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

May 29, 1804.

(Official.)

Exceptions from supreme judicial court, Penobscot county.

Prank Perley and James H. Goodwin were convicted of robbery, and except Exceptions overruled.

The following was the indictment:

"The jurors for the state aforesaid, upon their oath, present that Prank Perley and James H. Goodwin, of Bangor, in the county of Penobscot, on the 30th day of August, in the year of our Lord 1892, at Bangor, in the county of Penobscot, aforesaid, in and upon one John H. Emerson, feloniously an assault did make, and him, the said John H. Emerson, did then feloniously put in fear, and with force and violence did then feloniously steal, take, and carry away from the person of him, the said John H. Emerson, certain money of the said John H. Emerson, and one silver watch and one watch chain of the goods and chattels of the said John H. Emerson, against the peace of said state, and contrary to the statute in such case made and provided."

The defendants moved in arrest of judgment as follows:

"And now, after a general verdict of guilty, and before judgment, in the above-entitled cause, the respondents, the said Frank Perley and James H. Goodwin, come and move the court that judgment in said cause be arrested, and that they be discharged and allowed to go without day, for the following reasons, to wit:

"First Because said indictment does not, with sufficient certainty, precision, and particularity, allege and set forth any crime.

"Second. Because said indictment does not, with sufficient certainty, precision, and particularity, set forth and allege the crime intended to be charged by the grand jury, and which the jury who tried the case meant to convict the respondents of, to wit, robbery.

"Third. Because the money and goods and chattels alleged in said indictment to have been stolen, taken, and carried away from the person of John H. Emerson are not set forth and described with sufficient certainty, precision, and particularity.

"Fourth. Because the money alleged in said indictment to have been stolen from the person of said John H. Emerson is not described at all, and there is no allegation of how much it amounted to, or that it had any value, and there is no allegation in the aforesaid indictment that the watch and chain, the only other property named in the indictment, was of any value whatever, and no reason is stated in said indictment why the said money is not therein described or its amount given, or why its value is not stated, if it had value, nor is any reason given in said indictment why, if said watch and chain had value, that value is not stated therein.

"Fifth. Because said indictment is in other respects informal, insufficient and not valid."

The motion was overruled by the court, and an exception was taken thereto.

The defendants also took exceptions as follows :

"The judge presiding did not inform the jury that they could find a verdict against the respondents for any offense less than robbery, and no request to that effect was made by counsel, and no allusion was made to the point by counsel on either side during the trial; and no contention was set up at the trial that the respondents might be guilty of any less offense, if guilty at all. All that was said by the judge on that subject is embraced in the following extract from the charge: 'The two respondents are accused by the indictment of the crime of robbery. The punishment for the crime may be as high as imprisonment for life, and it may be as low as any term of years, which might be two.' On the subject of value of property taken, the judge made the following remarks: 'It is not necessary for the government to prove that all the articles alleged were taken from him, in order to constitute robbery.' It is sufficient if they were all taken, or any of them were taken, or any part of them were taken, or the least of them were taken. No matter how successful or unsuccessful in amount of property taken', if any was taken from the complainant's person by violence, feloniously, the offense is established as having been committed by somebody.'

"To the order of the court overruling the motion, and to the above instructions of the judge, and to his omission to instruct the jury that they could find the respondents guilty of any offense less than robbery, the respondents except by their attorneys."

C. A. Bailey, Co. Arty., for the State.

Jasper Hutchings and P. H. Gillin, for defendants.

WHITEHOUSE, J. The defendants were found guilty of the crime of robbery on an indictment under chapter 250 of the statute of 1889, entitled, "An act to define robbery and its punishment," which reads as follows: "Whoever by force and violence or by putting in fear, feloniously steals and takes from the person of another property that is the subject of larceny, is guilty of robbery, and shall be punished by imprisonment for life or for any term of years." This act of 1889, however, did not modify the definition of robbery, as found in Rev. St c. 118, § 16, but only changed and simplified the provisions of that section respecting the punishment.

It is charged in the indictment that the respondents "feloniously an assault did make, and him, the said John H. Emerson, did then feloniously put in fear, and with force and violence did then feloniously steal, take, and carry away from the person of him, the said John H. Emerson, certain money of the said John H. Emerson, and one silver watch and one watch chain of the goods and chattels of the said John H. Emerson."

After the verdict the defendants filed a motion in arrest of judgment, based on four specifications; but the only ground now relied upon is that the indictment contains no allegation that the money or the watch and chain therein mentioned had any value.

It is a principle of natural justice, which was early recognized as a fundamental rule of the common law, now incorporated into our constitution as a guaranty of protection to individual rights, that in all criminal prosecutions the accused is entitled to "demand the nature and cause of the accusation" against him. Const. art. 1. No person can De held to answer to a criminal charge until it is "fully, plainly, substantially, and formally de scribed to him." Every material fact which serves to constitute the offense must be expressed with reasonable fullness, directness, and precision. The purpose of this rule is sufficiently obvious. It is to inform the accused of the exact charge against him, and enable the court to determine whether the facts alleged constitute a crime, and, on proof of them, to render such appropriate judgment as will be a bar to any future prosecution for the same offense. 3 Starkie, Ev. 1527; Com. v. Pray, 13 Pick. 359. "The doctrine of the court," says Mr. Bishop, "is identical with that of reason, viz. that the indictment must contain an allegation of every fact which is legally essential to the punishment to be inflicted.' 1 Bish. Cr. Proc. § 81. It is plain, however, that much of the useless tautology and wearisome prolixity which characterized indictments in the early period of criminal procedure can...