State v. Dooley
| Decision Date | 10 April 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 57,57 |
| Citation | 203 S.E.2d 815,285 N.C. 158 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. William J. 'Bill' DOOLEY. |
Harris & Bumgardner by Don H. Bumgardner, Gastonia, for defendant appellant.
Defendant brings forward fourteen assignments of error designated as Exceptions Nos. I to XIV. We first consider Exception No. XIV, which defendant states in his brief as follows:
'The defendant objects and excepts in the record to the failure of the court to charge the jury in his mandates to the jury the following proposition: 'Or, if you are satisfied that the defendant acted in self-defense, then it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty."
G.S. 1--180 requires that the trial judge fully instruct the jury as to the law based on the evidence in the case. It is the duty of the court to charge the jury on all substantial features of the case arising on the evidence without special request therefor. State v. Todd, 264 N.C. 524, 142 S.E.2d 154 (1965); State v. Spencer, 256 N.C. 487, 124 S.E.2d 175 (1962); State v. Jones, 254 N.C. 450, 119 S.E.2d 213 (1961); State v. Faust, 254 N.C. 101, 118 S.E.2d 769 (1961), cert. den. 368 U.S. 851, 82 S.Ct. 85, 7 L.Ed.2d 49 (1961). And all defenses presented by defendant's evidence are substantial features of the case. State v. Faust, supra. See also State v. Sherian, 234 N.C. 30, 65 S.E.2d 331 (1951).
Where there is evidence that defendant acted in self-defense, the court must charge on this aspect even though there is contradictory evidence by the State or discrepancies in defendant's evidence. State v. Hipp, 245 N.C. 205, 95 S.E.2d 452 (1956); State v. Sherian, supra; State v. Riddle, 228 N.C. 251, 45 S.E.2d 366 (1947).
At the outset of the charge the trial judge explained that defendant was presumed to be innocent and that the burden rested with the State to satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt before they could convict him. After general instructions and a review of the evidence of the State and of defendant, instructions were given as to the elements of In the final mandate to the jury the court stated:
second degree murder and of manslaughter. The court then charged the jury in substance that the intentional use of a deadly weapon as a weapon when death proximately results from such use gives rise to the presumptions (1) that the killing was unlawful, and (2) that it was done with malice, and that an unlawful killing with malice is murder in the second degree. The trial judge further charged that in such event it would be incumbent upon defendant to satisfy the jury of facts sufficient to mitigate the killing and reduce it to manslaughter or to excuse it altogether on the ground of self-defense. The court then gave a general statement as to the law of self-defense and as to what the defendant must satisfy the jury in order to mitigate the [285 N.C. 164] killing and reduce it to manslaughter or to excuse it altogether on the ground of self-defense.
'So, I charge you, members of the jury, that if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on this 18 day of January, 1973, the defendant intentionally and with malice and without justification or excuse, shot the deceased, Thomas, with a pistol as has been offered in evidence here as State's Exhibit 3, thereby proximately causing Thomas' death, nothing else appearing, it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree.
'However, if you do not so find, or have a reasonable doubt as to one or more of these things, it would be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty of murder in the second degree; or, if, in a fair and impartial consideration of all the facts and circumstances in the case, there should arise in your minds a reasonable doubt as to either element of the offense of murder in the second degree, it would be your duty to give the defendant the benefit of that doubt, and to acquit him on the count of murder in the second degree.
'So, the court instructs you, members of the jury, if you find the defendant not guilty of murder in the second degree, but you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 18 day of January, 1973, the defendant intentionally shot Thomas with a deadly weapon, that is, the pistol offered in evidence here as State's Exhibit 3, thereby proximately causing Thomas' death, but you are satisfied that the defendant killed Thomas without malice, or that he killed him in the heat of a sudden passion, and that in doing so, that he used excessive force in the exercise of self-defense, it would be your duty...
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State v. Vinson, 48
...the evidence even absent a special request for such instruction. State v. Deck, 285 N.C. 209, 203 S.E.2d 830 (1974); State v. Dooley, 285 N.C. 158, 203 S.E.2d 815 (1974). Conversely, when the trial court has aptly instructed on all substantial features of the case, a defendant desiring a mo......
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State v. Corbett
...aspect even though there is contradictory evidence by the State or discrepancies in [the] defendant's evidence." State v. Dooley , 285 N.C. 158, 163, 203 S.E.2d 815, 818 (1974) ; see also Lee , 370 N.C. at 677, 811 S.E.2d at 568 (Martin, C.J., concurring) (asserting that the principle artic......
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State v. Hankerson
...failed to reiterate and specify that self-defense was a possible theory of acquittal. Defendant contends that under State v. Dooley, 285 N.C. 158, 203 S.E.2d 815 (1974) this is reversible error. After the jury had been deliberating approximately forty-five minutes, however, they returned to......
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State v. Harvey
...is evidence of self-defense or imperfect self-defense, when taken in the light most favorable to defendant. See State v. Dooley , 285 N.C. 158, 163, 203 S.E.2d 815, 818 (1974) ("Where there is evidence that defendant acted in self-defense, the court must charge on this aspect even though th......