State v. Doubek

• Decision Date: 30 March 2021
• Docket Number: DA 19-0320
• Citation: 483 P.3d 1095,403 Mont. 514,2021 MT 76
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Etta Koehler DOUBEK, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

403 Mont. 514

483 P.3d 1095

2021 MT 76

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.Etta Koehler DOUBEK, Defendant and Appellant.

DA 19-0320

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs: February 3, 2021

Decided: March 30, 2021

For Appellant: Ryan P. Archibald, Bitterroot Law, PLLC, Hamilton, Montana

For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Damon Martin, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Marcia Boris, Lincoln County Attorney, Libby, Montana

Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Defendant and Appellant Etta Koehler Doubek (Doubek) appeals from the April 4, 2019 Judgment and Sentence issued by the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, following her convictions after a jury trial for Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs (CPDD), a felony, and Criminal Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (CPDP), a misdemeanor. Relevant to the present appeal, the District Court sentenced Doubek to four years with the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC), with all four years suspended for the CPDD conviction.

¶2 We restate the issue on appeal as follows:

Whether the District Court abused its discretion by sentencing Doubek to a suspended sentence after determining the State presented sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of a deferred sentence under § 45-9-102(4), MCA (2017).

¶3 We reverse and remand.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶4 On February 22, 2018, deputies from the Lincoln County Sheriff's Office responded to a report of shots fired. Captain Boyd White¹ was the first to respond. Captain White made contact with the reporting party, Doubek's neighbor, who informed him she believed shots were fired at Doubek's residence. Deputy Brent Faulkner arrived shortly after Captain White, and the two of them proceeded to Doubek's residence. Doubek answered the front door, at which time the officers asked her how she was doing. She responded she was good, but reported a preoccupation with bugs in her house. Doubek tried to shut the door, but Captain White blocked her by putting his foot in the door. Captain White asked if anyone else was there, and Doubek said it was just her. Captain White then explained why he was there, telling Doubek there was a report of gunshots. Doubek denied any gunshots and turned away and walked into her residence. She picked up something off an end table and continued walking further into her house. Captain White followed her, grabbed Doubek by the arm, and Deputy Faulkner placed her in handcuffs.

¶5 Doubek continued to talk about the bugs in her house and attempted to show them to the officers. She told the officers they could search the house and that she had guns in a gun cabinet when asked if there were any firearms present. Captain White then read Doubek her Miranda rights² and questioned her about the situation. Captain White explained he saw Doubek grab the item from the end table and knew it was a methamphetamine pipe. Doubek admitted the item was a methamphetamine pipe, but denied the presence of any methamphetamine in the house outside of what would be found in the pipe. Doubek informed Captain White she had mental health issues. Doubek continued to focus on the bugs she believed were in her house and repeatedly denied any gunshots came from her house. Doubek was placed under arrest for possession of methamphetamine. No drugs (outside of the pipe) or weapons not disclosed by Doubek were found by the officers who searched her residence. Additionally, there was no evidence discovered which showed a gun had been fired or that anyone else was in the residence.

¶6 Deputy Faulkner transported Doubek to the Libby jail. While waiting for a female guard to arrive at the jail, Deputy Faulkner performed a pat down search of Doubek and discovered a small brown bottle with a crystalline substance in the pocket of Doubek's sweatshirt. This substance later tested positive for methamphetamine.

¶7 Doubek was charged by Information with one count of felony CPDD and one count of misdemeanor CPDP on March 1, 2018. After a two-day trial on January 15 and 16, 2019, the jury found Doubek guilty of both charges. The District Court held a sentencing hearing on April 1, 2019. At that hearing, Captain White testified to a couple law enforcement contacts with Doubek occurring before this incident wherein she had sought assistance from law enforcement for reported thefts and harassing phone calls. The only contact where he could recall any details related to an incident three years prior involving a 2015 911 call he responded to in which Doubek sought law enforcement assistance to remove her ex-husband from her residence and indicated she was going to shoot him. Captain White testified the ex-husband was not present at the time he arrived and, although Doubek had a rifle, she was cooperative and appropriately put the gun away or gave it to law enforcement.³ Doubek was not arrested or charged with anything in connection with this incident. Captain White also testified that between the time of trial and sentencing, Doubek had one additional contact with law enforcement where she sought assistance as she believed someone had gotten into her home and moved things around. Again, Doubek was not arrested or charged in connection with her seeking law enforcement assistance and had no further law enforcement contact between trial and sentencing. Prior to sentencing, Doubek submitted evidence showing she had been diagnosed with both bipolar disorder

and ADHD. Doubek's presentence investigation showed she had no previous criminal history and the CPDD conviction was her first felony. Doubek testified at sentencing expressing her shame and embarrassment around the incident. She testified that since her arrest she was seeing her psychiatrist, Dr. Hicks, on a regular basis. She reported to changes in her medication resulting in positive changes—"like somebody turned the lights on ... I feel like the best mentally I have felt in years ... I have better control over my thought process and decision-making." She related an intention to continue to engage in mental health treatment to build on the gains she had already made.

¶8 At sentencing, the State argued Doubek should be committed to DOC for a period of five years, with two years suspended. The State recommended this sentence purportedly for "public safety," noting law enforcement was initially called to Doubek's residence on the night of her arrest after a report of gunshots, though no evidence existed that Doubek was involved with shooting a gun that night. Doubek asked for a deferred imposition of sentence as she had no previous criminal history and was presumed to be entitled to a deferred imposition of sentence pursuant to § 45-9-102(4), MCA (2017). Doubek's counsel argued this offense was typical of a myriad of other drug possession cases where defendants routinely receive deferrals. She argued the only difference here was that Doubek exercised her right to go to trial and that the State was now seeking to penalize her for doing so. The District Court then sentenced her to a four-year DOC commitment, with all four years suspended, and emphasized the benefit Doubek would receive from long-term supervision. Doubek appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶9 An offender who is not sentenced to a term of one year or more of actual incarceration is statutorily ineligible for sentence review by the Sentence Review Division. Section 46-18-903(1), MCA. In such a case, we first review the sentence for legality to determine whether it falls within statutory parameters and, if so, we then examine whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in imposing the sentence. State v. Hinkle , 2008 MT 217, ¶ 10, 344 Mont. 236, 186 P.3d 1279 (citing State v. Armstrong , 2006 MT 334, ¶ 8, 335 Mont. 131, 151 P.3d 46 ). "A district court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily without the employment of conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason, resulting in a substantial injustice." State v. Reams , 2020 MT 326, ¶ 9, 402 Mont. 366, 477 P.3d 1118 (citing State v. Webber , 2019 MT 216, ¶ 8, 397 Mont. 239, 448 P.3d 1091 ).

DISCUSSION

¶10 Whether the District Court abused its discretion by sentencing Doubek to a suspended sentence after determining the State presented sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of a deferred sentence under § 45-9-102(4), MCA (2017).

¶11 After Doubek was convicted of CPDD and CPDP at trial, the District Court sentenced her to a four-year suspended sentence on the CPDD charge. Since the sentence imposed does not contain at least one year of actual incarceration, we review it for both legality and abuse of discretion. Hinkle , ¶ 10.

¶12 To begin, Doubek does not appear to argue a four-year suspended sentence for CPDD is not a legal sentence. Indeed, the 2017 CPDD statute provided for a possible five-year maximum sentence for methamphetamine possession such as Doubek's: "A person convicted of criminal possession of dangerous drugs ... shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a term not to exceed 5 years or be fined an amount not to exceed $ 5,000, or both." Section 45-9-102(3), MCA (2017).⁴ "A sentence is legal if it falls within statutory parameters." State v. Brave , 2016 MT 178, ¶ 5, 384 Mont. 169, 376 P.3d 139 (citing State v. McCaslin , 2011 MT 221, ¶ 6, 362 Mont. 47, 260 P.3d 403 ). Because Doubek's four-year suspended sentence falls within statutory parameters, it is legal. Brave , ¶ 5.

¶13 Since Doubek's sentence is legal, we turn now to whether it was an abuse of discretion. Armstrong , ¶ 8. An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court acts arbitrarily without the employment of conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason, resulting in a substantial injustice. Webber , ¶ 8. Doubek asserts she was presumed to be entitled to a deferred imposition of sentence and the State did not present sufficient evidence to overcome that presumption. The State responds it...