State v. Dougherty
| Decision Date | 22 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 43583 |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. WILLIAM PATRICK DOUGHERTY, III, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Benewah County. Hon. John T. Mitchell, District Judge.
Order withholding judgment, reversed and case remanded.
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Erik R. Lehtinen, Chief Appellate Unit, Boise, for appellant. Erik R. Lehtinen argued.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
____________________
William Patrick Dougherty, III, appeals from the order withholding judgment following his conviction for felony eluding. We reverse and remand.
Dougherty was arrested after leading several law enforcement officers on a high-speed chase. The State charged Dougherty with a single count of felony eluding a police officer, Idaho Code § 49-1404(1), (2)(a), and/or (c). At Dougherty's first appearance, the presiding magistrate offered to consider appointing an attorney to represent Dougherty, but he refused to complete the application for court-appointed counsel. Instead, Dougherty asked the court for an "interpreter" who could assist him in navigating the legal process. At his arraignment, the district court also asked Dougherty if he wanted a court-appointed public defender to represent him. Dougherty replied by asking for the "assistance of counsel." Again, Dougherty characterized his request as a request for an interpreter to assist him in effectively communicating with the court because he did not speak "legal English." The court entered a not guilty plea on Dougherty's behalf and set the case for trial.
At a motion hearing that took place after his arraignment, Dougherty explained to the court that he could not be represented by an attorney due to his religious beliefs. Consequently, the court granted Dougherty's request for "assistance of counsel" by appointing a public defender to assist Dougherty. However, before trial, Dougherty's father hired a private attorney who then substituted in for the public defender in order to give a second opinion on Dougherty's case. Dougherty claimed he did not know the private attorney was going to be assisting on the case and moved for his withdrawal. The district court granted the motion to withdraw but did not reappoint a public defender.
Nearly six months after the private attorney's withdrawal, Dougherty appeared pro se at trial and moved to postpone because he did not have the assistance of counsel. The court denied Dougherty's motion, and the trial proceeded. Dougherty refused to participate in any aspect of the trial. He refused to question the jury panel at voir dire, make an opening statement, conduct cross-examination of the State's witnesses, or present a defense. Throughout the trial, Dougherty repeated his objection to the proceedings and continually demanded the "Sixth Amendment assistance of counsel." Ultimately, the jury found Dougherty guilty.
Dougherty appeared pro se at sentencing and again raised his ongoing objection to the proceedings arguing that he did not have the assistance of counsel. The court withheld judgment for a two-year period, placed Dougherty on supervised probation, gave Dougherty credit for the twenty-four days he spent in jail, and imposed the mandatory one-year suspension of driving privileges. Dougherty timely appeals.
Dougherty asserts his conviction should be vacated because the district court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by: (1) failing to ensure that he was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving his right to counsel and affirmatively choosing to represent himself; and(2) failing to administer an adequate Faretta1 warning before leaving him without the assistance of counsel at trial and sentencing. Dougherty also asserts the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial.
When reviewing a lower court's determination regarding the waiver of a constitutional right, we accept the trial court's findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence; however, we freely review the court's application of constitutional requirements to the facts as found. State v. Hoffman, 116 Idaho 689, 691, 778 P.2d 811, 813 (Ct. App. 1989). A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963); State v. Blevins, 108 Idaho 239, 241-42, 697 P.2d 1253, 1255-56 (Ct. App. 1985). An accused also has the right to waive the assistance of counsel and to represent himself or herself. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975); State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 879, 885, 136 P.3d 350, 356 (Ct. App. 2006). A waiver of the right to counsel is valid only if it was effected knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Averett, 142 Idaho at 885, 136 P.3d at 356. The burden is upon the State to show that the waiver satisfied this standard. State v. Hunnel, 125 Idaho 623, 625, 873 P.2d 877, 879 (1994). If there was a deprivation of the right to counsel through the trial court's acceptance of an invalid waiver, the error is fundamental and therefore necessitates our independent review although the claim was not raised below. Id.; State v. Blevins, 108 Idaho 239, 243, 697 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Ct. App. 1985).
There is no uniformity in American courts as to the precise requirements for a valid waiver of the right to counsel or even whether a specific judicial admonition regarding the risks of self-representation is necessary in all situations. See State v. Jackson, 140 Idaho 636, 639, 97 P.3d 1025, 1028 (Ct. App. 2004). Idaho courts examine the totality of the circumstances in determining if a waiver of the right to counsel was valid. State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 64, 90 P.3d 278, 289 (2003); King, 131 Idaho at 376, 957 P.2d at 354. The analysis of whether a defendant's waiver is valid rests upon the individual facts of the case. Hunnel, 125 Idaho at 625, 873 P.2d at 879; see also King, 131 Idaho at 376, 957 P.2d at 354 (). For a waiver to be knowing and intelligent, the defendant must be aware of the nature of the charges filed against him or her, thepenalties that may result from those charges, and the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. See Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 64, 90 P.3d 278, 289; State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 865, 781 P.2d 197, 202 (1989); see also United States v. Harris, 683 F.2d 322, 324-25 (9th Cir. 1982).
Dougherty argues the State cannot meet its burden to prove that he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Dougherty also argues that he never expressed a desire to represent himself. To the contrary, he argues his persistent requests for the assistance of counsel throughout the proceedings below were requests for hybrid representation2 and not requests to proceed to trial and sentencing pro se. According to Dougherty, the district court failed to make even a basic inquiry into whether he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel or whether he wanted to represent himself.
The State argues that Dougherty knowingly and intelligently waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel as he had repeatedly and emphatically stated that he could not accept representation by counsel. According to the State, Dougherty's statements rejecting representation by counsel amount to a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Additionally, the State argues the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee criminal defendants a right to hybrid representation, and thus Dougherty's argument that he did not wish to represent himself fails.
The record reveals that Dougherty did not validly waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because his waiver was not effected knowingly and intelligently. Dougherty has a fundamental misunderstanding of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and thus was not fully aware of the true nature of his Sixth Amendment rights or the consequences of the decision to abandon the right to counsel.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the right to the "Assistance of Counsel for his defence." United States Const. Amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel guarantees indigent criminal defendants the right to be represented by a court-appointed attorney. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 343; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932); Jackson, 140 Idaho at 639, 97 P.3d at 1028. Under the Sixth Amendment indigent criminal defendants may reject representation by court-appointed counsel and elect to represent themselves. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 806 (1975). The decision to reject representation by a court-appointed attorney and proceed pro se amounts to a waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel and must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. See State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 897, 606 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1980).
When a criminal defendant waives the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel and elects to represent himself, he may still request the appointment of hybrid counsel. State v. Williams, 163 Idaho 285, 297, 411 P.3d 1186, 1198 (Ct. App. 2018); see also Averett, 142 Idaho at 885, 136 P.3d at 356 (). However, indigent criminal defendants do not have a constitutional right to court-appointed hybrid counsel. Williams, 163 Idaho at 297, 411 P.3d at 1198. The decision to appoint counsel in any capacity other than constitutionally-protected representation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, including hybrid or...
To continue reading
Request your trial