State v. Douglass
| Decision Date | 02 January 1884 |
| Citation | 15 Mo.App. 1 |
| Parties | STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent, v. KATE DOUGLASS, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
APPEAL from the St. Louis Criminal Court, VAN WAGONER, J.
Affirmed.
SIMON S BASS, for the appellant.
THOS B. HARVEY, for the respondent.
Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree. The deceased was killed by a stab from a pocket knife, which penetrated the aorta and caused almost immediate death from internal hemorrhage. The wound was inflicted on a Sunday afternoon in summer, in front of a drinking house frequented by negro prostitutes, in an alley in St. Louis.
The testimony of the witnesses for the state, who were eye-witnesses of the transaction, and who were all colored persons frequenting the house in question, is to the effect that deceased and defendant were living together in concubinage; that deceased called defendant and some other colored women up to the bar of the house spoken of and drank with some of them, and then went off to the room of one of these women and stayed there a short time with her; that defendant, when this person and deceased came out into the alley, said that they had been having illicit intercourse with one another, and threatened to kill deceased before night; that she sought him in the bar-room and called him out; that they had some conversation outside in a low voice that deceased put his hand gently upon her and told her to go home or she would be arrested, and that she suddenly stabbed him in the side, before he could make a motion to prevent it. She was arrested within a quarter of an hour, and dropped the knife, which was then closed and bloody with fresh blood, on her way to the station-house.
Defendant, on her own behalf, testified, that she went to see the deceased to ask him for money for her child; that he had been absent for some weeks; that he told her to come back; that she had given him $20 of her own money to keep. He had a knife in his hand paring his nails. When defendant came back again, a woman present said he had given her $15 to buy a new dress. Defendant remonstrated with him for spending her money on other women. He then threatened to knock her head off. There was some talk of police coming, and she turned her head. Deceased then gave her a blow on the head and she fell. He had his knife out and cut her on the neck; he had his knees on her stomach, and threatened to murder her; she pushed him off. She did not intend to cut him, did not know she was cutting him, and did not know she was cut. She must have had the knife in her hand, it was in her hand when she got up. In answer to the direct question, on cross-examination, she said she supposed he must have fallen on the knife, but didn't know how the blade got turned up. There was no quarrel about women or anything else till she asked him for the money. The knife was closed when she picked it up; there was no blood on it; she peeled an apple for her child with it. She thinks she must have thrown him on the knife, but she did not do it intentionally. As to the blow from deceased, and her being knocked down, the defendant is corroborated by one witness, and contradicted by all the other witnesses who saw the occurrence. The policemen who arrested her both testify that she had no mark of being cut when they saw her, either on the neck or elsewhere, as far as they could see.
To constitute the crime of murder in the first degree, it is necessary that the killing should have been done feloniously, wilfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and with malice aforethought. If either of these elements is lacking, the crime is not murder in the first degree.
By the term ‘ feloniously,’ is meant wickedly, and against the solemn admonitions of the law.
By the term ‘ wilfully,’ is meant intentionally, and not by accident.
By the term ‘ deliberately,’ is meant in a cool state of the blood, not in a sudden passion engendered by a lawful, or some just, cause of provocation.
By the term ‘ premeditatedly,’ is meant thought of beforehand for any length of time, however short.
By the term ‘ malice aforethought,’ is meant an attempt to do a wrong act formed in and by the mind before the doing of the wrong act is commenced.
The court therefore instructs the jury, that, if from the evidence they believe and find, that the defendant at the city of St. Louis, and at any time prior to the finding of the indictment, did feloniously, wilfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and with malice aforethought, assault, cut, stab, strike, and kill Joseph Miller with a knife, as in the indictment is charged, you will find her guilty of murder in the first degree.
If you find her guilty of murder in the first degree, you will simply so state in your verdict.
The court has stated to you in these instructions, that, in order to constitute the crime of murder in the first degree, it is necessary that the killing should have been done feloniously, wilfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and with malice aforethought.
The court further states to you, and instructs you, that the crime of murder in the second degree differs from the crime of murder in the first degree only in this, that the killing was not done deliberately.
The court, therefore, instructs you further, that, if from the evidence you believe and find, that, at the city of St. Louis, and at any time prior to the finding of this indictment, the defendant did feloniously, wilfully, premeditatedly, and with malice aforethought, assault, cut, stab, strike, and kill Joseph Miller with a knife, as is charged in the indictment, and that such killing was not done deliberately, you will find the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree, and assess her punishment at an imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not less than ten years.
The court instructs the jury further, that, if they believe and find from the evidence, that, at the city of St. Louis, in the month of July, 1882, defendant did involuntarily assault, cut, stab, strike, and wound Joseph Miller with a knife, and that the said Joseph Miller did subsequently in the month of July, 1882, die from the effects of the said assault, cutting, striking, stabbing, and wounding, made upon him, the said Joseph Miller, by the defendant, and that such acts were done in the heat of passion, and that said homicide was not justifiable by defendant, you will find defendant guilty of manslaughter in the fourth degree, and assess her punishment at an imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of two years, or by imprisonment in the city jail not less than six months, or by a fine of not less than five hundred dollars, and imprisonment in the city jail not less than six months.
Positive and direct evidence of these constituent elements of murder as defined in these instructions is not required; they may be proved by circumstantial evidence alone, the facts proved must be wholly inconsistent with the innocence of defendant, and incapable of explanation upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of her guilt.
If the jury believe and find from the evidence that the defendant had reason to apprehend immediate danger of receiving great bodily harm at the hands of Joseph Miller, the law justifies her in using whatever force and violence that is necessary to protect herself, even to the extent of taking life, and such killing would be justifiable although it might turn out that such appearances of immediate danger were false, that is, if the jury believe from the evidence that defendant believed that there was reasonable grounds for believing such danger imminent, and acted upon appearances as they presented themselves at the time, then they should acquit defendant.
The court instructs the jury, homicide is deemed justifiable by the law of this state only when committed in resisting any attempt to murder the person killing, or to commit any felony on him or her, or in any dwelling house in which such person shall be, or when committed in the lawful defence of such person, or of his or her wife, parent, husband, child master, mistress, apprentice, or servant, when there shall be reasonable cause to apprehend a design to commit a...
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