State v. Drain
Decision Date | 06 March 1928 |
Docket Number | 39026 |
Citation | 218 N.W. 269,205 Iowa 581 |
Parties | STATE OF IOWA, Appellant, v. JOE DRAIN, Appellee |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Waterloo Municipal Court.--J. C. BEEM, Judge.
This was a prosecution of the defendant by information under the 1924 Code, Section 1936, for the illegal transportation of intoxicating liquors not properly marked or labeled. The court sustained a motion for a directed verdict on defendant's behalf, and the State appeals.
Affirmed.
John Fletcher, Attorney-general, F. W. Edwards, County Attorney and Ralph William Travis, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
C. J Rudolph, for appellee.
On the 29th day of September, 1927, in the municipal court below, there was filed against Joe Drain, appellee, as defendant, the following information:
To this a plea of "not guilty" was entered, and on October 3d the cause came on for trial, at which time the following evidence was introduced:
One Dosson had driven his automobile upon the streets, in such manner as to splash mud on the defendant, and the latter followed the driver and his machine to the Dosson home, a distance of two blocks. When the defendant arrived there, he attacked Dosson, struck, and knocked him down. While so doing, there fell from the defendant's inside coat pocket a half pint of whisky.
Thereupon, a motion was made, asking the court to direct a verdict in defendant's favor, for the reasons:
That contention was sustained, and about this the State complains.
Basis for reversal is founded upon these two propositions: First, the trial court wrongfully cast upon the State the burden of showing transportation of liquor, and this attitude of the court was incorrect, the State asserts, because the gist of the offense is not transportation, but the possession or keeping of liquor without proper marks or labels, as required by said section of the Code; and second, it erred in holding that there was no evidence of liquor transportation.
Those disputes will be considered in the order made.
I. A companion case, State v. Edwards, 205 Iowa 587, 218 N.W. 266, disposes of the State's first claim of error. In the Edwards case we said:
Such being true, it is quite impossible, in the case at bar, to separate the "possession or keeping of liquor not properly marked or labeled" from the "transportation." Restating the thought in another way, the "offense" includes: First, the transportation; and second, the lack of proper marks or labels.
No other conclusion is possible when consideration is given to the entire legislative enactment, as embodied in Sections 1934 to 1943, both inclusive.
II. Our attention will now be directed to the second assignment made by the State, relating to the "transportation."
The pleader narrowed the scope of his "information" to said Section 1936, which refers to transportation of intoxicating liquors in vessels or other packages containing such "* * * plainly and correctly labeled or marked." Manifestly, there is a distinction between Section 1936 and Section 2058 of the same Code. Different objects were aimed at through these separate and distinct legislative acts. Analysis will elucidate at this point. Section 2058 is:
"Any person, firm, or corporation, and any agent or employee thereof, who engages in the transportation of intoxicating liquors shall for each act of transportation be fined in a sum not exceeding one thousand dollars or be imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding one year or be punished by both such fine and imprisonment and pay the cost of prosecution, including a reasonable attorney fee to be taxed by the court."
Necessary to a complete understanding of this is the consideration of the next succeeding section, 2059, containing this language:
Interpretation of those provisions was made by us in State v. Casebolt, 201 Iowa 574, 207 N.W. 566. Less extensive in its sphere is Section 1936, for it is limited to the purposes expressed by its context and associate sections.
"Transportation" is defined by Webster's New International Dictionary as "act of transporting, or state of being transported; carriage; removal; conveyance." But that generalization will not suffice here, for the reason that we are confined to the particular act of "transportation" within the purview of Section 1936, which is, to a marked extent, more limited than Section 2058.
Returning again to the Edwards case, supra, we find these declarations:
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