State v. Drane
| Decision Date | 12 June 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,No. 52259,52259,1 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. James Russell DRANE, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Norman H. Anderson, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Richard G. Altobelli, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Louis, for respondent.
Stewart & Bruntrager, Raymond A. Bruntrager, Joseph G. Stewart, St. Louis, for appellant.
HOUSER, Commissioner.
James Russell Drane was charged with driving, operating and using a Cadillac motor vehicle, without the permission of the owner thereof, Forrest Leasing Company, 'in the care and custody of James B. Hill,' § 560.175, V.A.M.S. Convicted by a jury, he was sentenced to 3 months' imprisonment in the workhouse of the City of St. Louis and fined $100, and has appealed from the judgment of conviction.
The state's case tended to show that the Cadillac was leased by Forrest Leasing Company to James B. Hill and Company, a corporation; that lessee's president, James B. Hill, had possession and custody of the vehicle, which disappeared from the place where it was parked on the street in front of Mr. Hill's apartment in St. Louis; that no one but Mr. Hill had permission to use or operate the Cadillac and that Mr. Hill had not given defendant permission to do so; that the Cadillac was thereafter found in the possession of defendant, who had been driving, operating and using it for several days prior to his arrest.
Drane's defense to the charge was based on the theory that he had in good faith purchased the Cadillac from Lindberg Cadillac Company and that he had legal title to the automobile. He testified that he went to the Lindberg auto agency, looked at numerous vehicles there offered for sale; that as he was leaving he was met by a well-dressed man who appeared to be, acted like and said that he was a salesman for Lindberg Cadillac Company; that the man showed him the Cadillac in question, invited him to take a demonstration ride; that he became interested in buying it; that the 'salesman' first asked $5,200 for the automobile; that defendant pointed out that the car had 16,000 miles on it and that the leather on the front seat was badly worn; that the 'salesman' said that he would go inside and 'talk to his boss about it, and see what he could do' for him; that the 'salesman' went into the company office and came back saying that if there was no trade-in he could let defendant have it for $4,200; that defendant agreed and paid the man $600 in cash, for which defendant received a receipt; that the 'salesman' wrote defendant's name and address on a clipboard he was carrying and told him to wait while he went inside and had the cashier type up the papers; that the 'salesman' returned to the lot saying that the cashier was 'pretty busy' and that he would have the papers typed and bring them and the car to defendant's house the next day; that the next day the 'salesman' brought the automobile to defendant's home, delivered to him a form of application for Missouri certificate of title and license, and that defendant paid him the balance of $3,600 in cash and took possession of the automobile. The typed-in form recited that Lindberg Cadillac Company was the legal owner of the vehicle. The seller's signature ('Lindberg Cadillac Co.') was typed in, and underneath the typing there was a name in handwriting, together with the purported certificate and seal of Pearl R. Scott, described therein as a notary public, showing that the document had been subscribed and sworn to before the notary. Based on this paper the Director of Revenue of the State of Missouri issued to defendant a certificate of title to the Cadillac, and defendant paid the state $126 sales tax, $22.92 license fee and $1 title fee. On these facts defendant claimed that he was the true owner of the Cadillac.
It is indicated that the Cadillac had not been the property of Lindberg Cadillac Company; that there was no such salesman in its employ; that there was no such notary registered in St. Louis, and it appears that if defendant's story is true he is not guilty of the charge and that he was bilked out of $4,200.
The case was submitted to the jury under an instruction authorizing a verdict of guilty upon a finding that defendant unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously did drive, use and operate a certain 1964 Cadillac automobile, the property of Forrest Leasing Company, Incorporated, a corporation, without the permission of the leasing company so to do, 'in the care and custody of James B. Hill,' and authorizing an acquittal unless the jury so found all the facts to be. No instruction was offered or given recognizing the defense of driving and operating an automobile in good faith in the honest belief that the defendant had good legal title by purchase.
Defendant makes the point that the court erred in giving the foregoing instruction because it ignored his defense, and that the court thereby failed to instruct upon all questions of law arising in the case, as required by Criminal Rule 26.02, V.A.M.R. and § 546.070(4), V.A.M.S. This contention must be sustained.
Criminal Rule 26.02 requires the court to instruct the jury upon 'all questions of law necessary for their guidance in returning their verdict.' An instruction which purports to cover the whole case but which entirely ignores a defense supported by evidence is erroneous...
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State v. Davis
...the jury on all the law of the case. Compare State v. Powers, Mo., 442 S.W.2d 4; State v. Tate, Mo., 436 S.W.2d 716 and State v. Drane, Mo., 416 S.W.2d 105. Also in this factual background is the assertion that the appellant 'was arrested without a warrant and without probable cause' and th......
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Smith v. Wyrick, 81-1060-CV-W-1.
...Instructions which ignore the defense are plain error. State v. Meeks, 619 S.W.2d 830 (Mo.App.W.Mo.1981); State v. Drane, 416 S.W.2d 105 (Mo.). 2. It was plain error for the trial counsel and appeal counsel to fail to raise the issue that appellant-petitioner was entitled to discharge when ......
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State v. Humphrey
...element the cause is not an instance of the verdict-directing instructions ignoring a supported defense as was the case in State v. Drane, Mo., 416 S.W.2d 105, and State v. Tate, Mo., 436 S.W.2d 716. In the latter case the court concluded 'There was no instruction recognizing the defense of......
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State v. Pruett
... ... Winn, Mo., 324 S.W.2d 637, 640--641(1); State v. Dougherty, 358 Mo. 734, 216 S.W.2d 467, 474(13); State v. Drane, Mo., 416 S.W.2d 105, 107(1, 2); but that rule does not help this appellant because Instruction No. 1 did not ignore his defense of alibi ... The defense of alibi is that even if the offense was committed as charged, the accused, at the time of commission, was at another and ... ...