State v. Drexel M., 20-0322
| Decision Date | 23 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 20-0322,20-0322 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | State of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Respondent v. Drexel M. Defendant Below, Petitioner |
Petitioner Drexel M., by counsel Steven Nanners, appeals the Circuit Court of Nicholas County's March 9, 2020, sentencing order following his convictions for six counts of first-degree sexual abuse and six counts of sexual abuse by a guardian or custodian.1 The State of West Virginia, by counsel Holly M. Flanigan, filed a response in support of the circuit court's order. Petitioner filed a reply.
This Court has considered the parties' briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the order of the circuit court is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Petitioner was initially indicted by a Nicholas County grand jury in May of 2002, and he was charged with one count of first-degree sexual assault of J.B., one count of first-degree sexual abuse of J.B., and nine counts of first-degree sexual abuse of F.B.2 In November of 2002, the circuit court dismissed the 2002 indictment, without prejudice, after petitioner successfully challenged the admissibility of his statement to law enforcement. As to the statement, the circuit court found that law enforcement took petitioner's statement in violation of his Sixth Amendmentright to counsel. When the State noted that the suppressed statement "was a big basis of our indictment[,]" the circuit court dismissed the indictment without prejudice.
Petitioner was indicted again in May of 2017. As to J.B., petitioner was indicted on one count of first-degree sexual assault, one count of first-degree sexual abuse, and one count of sexual abuse by a parent, guardian, or custodian. As to F.B., petitioner was charged with four counts of first-degree sexual abuse and four counts of sexual abuse by a parent, guardian, or custodian.
During the 2017 grand jury proceedings, Deputy Jared Bennett was asked by a member of the grand jury about why it had taken so long for presentment of the indictment since the crimes alleged had occurred so long ago. Deputy Bennett replied:
He [the defendant] was interviewed by Deputy Paul O'Dell and Tpr. Mankins back in 2000. His attorney got up and left during the interview, which attorneys can't do that- - so, when he left, they threw out his statement that he had given them, and the case was dismissed without prejudice, which that means that it can be brought back any time, but what I think is - It just, you know, kind of fell under the - wayside and was forgotten - so that's - that's why the case was never taken to trial.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the 2017 charges, arguing that the delay between the 2002 dismissal and the 2017 indictment violated the three-term rule. The circuit court denied petitioner's motion finding that there was no violation of the three-term rule.
An unsigned memorandum from the prosecuting attorney in the 2002 case was revealed during a discovery conference on the 2017 charges, which provided that the victims' mother had initiated charges of molestation or abuse against four men. Two of these individuals died prior to petitioner's trial on the 2017 indictment. Additionally, two other individuals who allegedly overheard the victims' mother say that she intended to extort money from petitioner in 2002, died before the trial on the 2017 charges.
Petitioner was tried in 2020, and the jury found him guilty of six counts of first-degree sexual abuse and six counts of sexual abuse by a guardian or custodian. Petitioner filed a post-trial motion and again raised the issue of a speedy trial violation. After considering the motion, the circuit court reaffirmed its ruling that no speedy trial violation occurred in petitioner's case.
The circuit court entered its sentencing order on March 9, 2020. Petitioner then filed this appeal.
In challenging his convictions and claiming entitlement to a new trial, petitioner raises twenty assignments of error. Our general standard of review is as follows:
In reviewing challenges to findings and rulings made by a circuit court, we apply a two-pronged deferential standard of review. We review the rulings of the circuit court concerning a new trial and its conclusion as to the existence of reversible error under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review the circuit court's underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo review.
Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Vance, 207 W. Va. 640, 535 S.E.2d 484 (2000). Where specific standards are necessary to address petitioner's assignments of error, they are provided below.
Of petitioner's twenty assignments of error, his first four concern the circuit court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment, and the remainder concern various trial and post-trial rulings. In arguing that the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment, petitioner first argues that the circuit court's failure to dismiss the 2017 indictment resulted in a violation of his right to a speedy trial. Respondent maintains that petitioner's speedy trial rights were not implicated where the initial indictment was dismissed. Upon a review of the record and our jurisprudence on this issue, we agree with respondent.
West Virginia Code § 62-3-21 provides:
Every person charged by presentment or indictment with a felony or misdemeanor, and remanded to a court of competent jurisdiction for trial, shall be forever discharged from prosecution for the offense, if there be three regular terms of such court, after the presentment is made or the indictment is found against him, without a trial, unless the failure to try him was caused by his insanity; or by the witnesses for the State being enticed or kept away, or prevented from attending by sickness or inevitable accident; or by a continuance granted on the motion of the accused; or by reason of his escaping from jail, or failing to appear according to his recognizance, or of the inability of the jury to agree in their verdict; and every person charged with a misdemeanor before a justice of the peace, city police judge, or any other inferior tribunal, and who has therein been found guilty and has appealed his conviction of guilt and sentence to a court of record, shall be forever discharged from further prosecution for the offense set forth in the warrant against him, if after his having appealed such conviction and sentence, there be three regular terms of such court without a trial, unless the failure to try him was for one of the causes hereinabove set forth relating to proceedings on indictment.
Thus, a person who is charged with a felony shall be discharged from prosecution for that felony if three terms of court pass without trial after the presentment or indictment. While the prosecution is required to provide a trial without unreasonable delay, the accused may not count in his favor "any term of the court which occurred in part during the time he was without jurisdiction of the court." State v. Foddrell, 165 W. Va. 540, 545, 269 S.E.2d 854, 858 (1980) (citation omitted).
Excluding the terms of court where there were no charges pending against petitioner comports with the purpose of the speedy trial provision. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "the Speedy Trial Clause's core concern is impairment of liberty." United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 312 (1986).
The speedy trial guarantee is designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.
United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982). "Once criminal charges are dismissed, the speedy trial guarantee is no longer applicable." Id.
Petitioner relies on State v. Carrico, 189 W. Va. 40, 427 S.E.2d 474 (1993), and State v. Crawford, 83 W. Va. 556, 98 S.E. 615 (1919), in support of his assertion that dismissal of the 2002 indictment did not toll or restart the running of the three terms of court as contemplated by West Virginia Code § 62-3-21. However, Carrico and Crawford are both nolle prosequi cases, and therefore are fundamentally different than the case presently before this Court.3 Here, unlike Crawford and Carrico, the State did not enter a nolle prosequi following petitioner's 2002 charges. Instead, the State dismissed petitioner's 2002 case for cause, thereby terminating the criminal prosecution and restoring petitioner's personal liberty.4 Since the initial indictment was dismissed, the 2002 indictment is not included in a speedy trial analysis. Accordingly, we find that the circuit court did not err when it ruled that petitioner's speedy trial rights were not violated.
Next, petitioner maintains that he was prejudiced by the preindictment delay and the circuit court abused its discretion and when it failed to dismiss the 2017 indictment. Petitioner maintains that the prosecuting attorney can offer no reason why he was not indicted between November 2002 and 2017, noting that no evidence of consequence was gathered during the fifteen-year delay andthat several witnesses died during the period of preindictment delay. Respondent contends that the circuit court properly and repeatedly found that this claim was meritless because petitioner failed to show actual prejudice from the delay in prosecution. In this regard, we agree with respondent.
To continue reading
Request your trial