State v. Druxinman

• Decision Date: 11 March 1904
• Citation: 75 P. 814,34 Wash. 257
• Parties: STATE v. DRUXINMAN.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

75 P. 814

34 Wash. 257

STATE v. DRUXINMAN.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 11, 1904

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; W. R. Bell, Judge.

Moses Druxinman was convicted of buying, receiving, and aiding in the concealment of stolen goods, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Ballinger, Ronald & Battle, for appellant.

W. T Scott and Elmer E. Todd, for the State.

DUNBAR J.

The defendant was convicted of buying, receiving, and aiding in the concealment of stolen goods, knowing the same to have been stolen. The following errors are assigned on appeal: (1) Error in overruling objection to the introduction of any evidence; (2) error in denying motion at the close of the state's case to instruct the jury to acquit; (3) error in overruling challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence interposed at the close of the case, and denying motion for an instructed verdict of acquittal; (4) error in admitting certain testimony in rebuttal; (5) error in instructions given to the jury; (6) error in overruling motion for a new trial; (7) error in overruling the motion for arrest of judgment; (8) error in rendering judgment.

The first assignment of error is based upon the alleged insufficiency of the information to state a cause of action. The information alleges that the defendant 'willfully unlawfully, and feloniously did buy, receive, and aid in the concealment of the following stolen property [describing property], then and there being the property of the Northern Pacific Railway Company, a corporation, and the said Moses Druxinman then and there having bought, received, and aided in the concealment of the same knowing that said property and all thereof, was stolen property.' It is insisted by the appellant that, unless the property was stolen, the defendant could be guilty of no crime, and hence the fact that the property was stolen is a material fact, and must be alleged as well as proved; and it is asserted that this information nowhere alleges or states the fact that the property was stolen; that the allegation that the defendant did buy and 'aid in the concealment of the following stolen property,' and the further allegation that the defendant bought, received, and aided in the concealment of the same, knowing that it was stolen property, is only the statement of an inference that the property was stolen, and that an inference is not sufficient in a criminal case, but that the fact must be alleged. It would seem that there could certainly be no room for any other inference from the language of the information than the inference that the property was stolen, and the language therefore is, in substance, the statement of a fact. The test of the validity of the information, so far as this question is concerned, is, does it enable a person of common understanding to know what was intended? There can be no doubt that the defendant was plainly informed by this information of the nature of the crime the commission of which he was charged with. We think the information was in all respects sufficient.

The second assignment raises the question of the sufficiency of the testimony to sustain the judgment. The testimony was conflicting, and, if the testimony...