State v. Duckett
| Decision Date | 01 September 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 50,50 |
| Citation | 306 Md. 503,510 A.2d 253 |
| Parties | STATE of Maryland v. Marvin Nathaniel DUCKETT. , |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Jillyn K. Schulze, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.
Mark Colvin, Asst. Public Defender (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee.
Argued before MURPHY, C.J., SMITH, ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, COUCH and McAULIFFE, JJ.
We shall decide in this case whether a prior conviction for assault and battery is admissible to impeach the credibility of a witness.
The facts stipulated by the parties pursuant to Maryland Rule 828 g are as follows. In the early morning hours of March 27, 1983, outside a bar in Malcolm, Maryland, Marvin Nathaniel Duckett shot Charles Savoy. Duckett was charged with assault with intent to maim, assault, and carrying a weapon openly with intent to injure. He was tried by a jury in the Circuit Court for Charles County.
The State's evidence at trial indicated that the shooting was unprovoked. Duckett, on the other hand, testified that he was being verbally abused by Savoy and members of Savoy's family, and that Savoy was armed with a knife. Duckett averred that he knew that Savoy had once stabbed his own brother seriously enough to require thirty-two stitches. Duckett testified further that he told Savoy to put his knife away but that Savoy advanced on him; that he retreated and fired a warning shot in the air; that he again warned Savoy; that he did not want to injure Savoy; and that he shot Savoy once in the leg only after Savoy continued to advance toward him.
During the State's cross-examination of Duckett, the following colloquy occurred:
Q. Mr. Duckett, are you the same Marvin Nathaniel Duckett being over eighteen years of age and represented by an attorney convicted of assault and battery, Criminal 7665, in the Circuit Court for Charles County?
BY Mr. MORELAND:
Q. Are you the same Marvin Nathaniel Duckett while being over eighteen years of age and being represented by counsel who was convicted of assault and battery under Criminal No. 7665 in the Circuit Court for Charles County?
A. You asked me was I convicted of assault and battery?
Q. Yes?
A. I wouldn't say I was convicted. I took a plea bargain, which I should never have. I would like to state that, too.
I entered a plea of guilty. Yes. But I was not convicted.
Q. You just indicated you regret doing that?
A limiting instruction with regard to the prior conviction for assault and battery was neither requested by Duckett nor given by the court.
Duckett was acquitted of assault with intent to maim but convicted of assault and carrying a weapon openly with intent to injure. He was sentenced to four years imprisonment. On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, that court reversed the conviction in Duckett v. State, 61 Md.App. 151, 485 A.2d 691 (1985). Thereafter, we granted the State's petition for certiorari.
The stipulated facts make evident that the jury's resolution of this case turned upon whom they should believe--Duckett or the State's witnesses. In its attempt to convince the jury that Duckett's version of the facts was not the correct one, the State attempted to discredit Duckett's testimony by eliciting from him that he had once been convicted of assault and battery. The State argues that the trial court is vested with discretion to admit a conviction for assault and battery to impeach a witness, and that the trial court here did not abuse its discretion in allowing the cross-examination. Appellee argues, on the other hand, that a prior conviction for assault and battery is inadmissible to impeach a witness and that the trial court has no discretion to allow this evidence. Appellee also posits that even if the judge is vested with discretion to allow the evidence of the prior conviction for assault and battery, the judge abused his discretion here because any probative value of the conviction was outweighed by prejudice to appellant.
We thoroughly reviewed the admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment in Ricketts v. State, 291 Md. 701, 436 A.2d 906 (1981), and our analysis there sets the framework for any determination of whether a conviction is admissible to impeach. Ricketts involved the question of whether indecent exposure was admissible to impeach the credibility of the defendant. In resolving the issue, we first pointed out that what is now Maryland Code (1974, 1984 Repl.Vol.), § 10-905 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides that "[e]vidence is admissible to prove ... the fact of [a witness's] conviction of an infamous crime." We noted that an "infamous crime" had been defined generally by our cases to mean "such crime as involved moral turpitude, or such as rendered the offender incompetent as a witness in court, upon the theory that a person would not commit so heinous a crime unless he was so depraved as to be unworthy of credit." 291 Md. at 706, 436 A.2d 909 quoting State v. Bixler, 62 Md. 354, 360 (1884). We also cited Garitee v. Bond, 102 Md. 379, 62 A. 631 (1905) for the proposition that:
The crimes which the common law regarded as infamous because of their moral turpitude were treason, felony, perjury, forgery and those other offenses, classified generally as crimen falsi, which impressed upon their perpetrator such a moral taint that to permit him to testify in legal proceedings would injuriously affect the public administration of justice.
291 Md. at 706-07, 436 A.2d at 909 (quoting Garitee v. Bond, supra, 102 Md. at 383, 62 A. at 633). We noted further in Ricketts that Ricketts, 291 Md. at 707, 436 A.2d at 909. We also pointed out in Ricketts that our cases recognize an even broader base for the use of prior convictions to impeach:
It has been held by this court that evidence of the accused's previous conviction of crime need not be restricted to infamous crimes or those involving moral turpitude, provided the violation of law may have some tendency to show that the person charged is not to be believed under oath.
Ricketts, Id. at 707, 436 A.2d at 909-10 ().
Thus, in Ricketts we reiterated the law in Maryland that to be admissible for impeachment, the crime must be an infamous crime, one involving moral turpitude, or a lesser crime tending to show that the person charged should not be believed. The crux of our decision in Ricketts, however, centers upon the principle which we recognized must guide a court in the determination of whether a crime may be classified in any one impeaching category. Namely, to be classified as an infamous crime, one involving moral turpitude, or a lesser crime affecting veracity, the crime itself must clearly identify the prior conduct of the witness which tends to show that he is unworthy of belief.
Thus, in determining whether indecent exposure was an infamous crime, we stressed in Ricketts that:
an indecent exposure conviction, without more, says little about the conduct for which the person was convicted. Because the offense requires only a general intent, the gamut of offenses and circumstances that fall within the ambit of the crime are so widely varied that, while one person may indeed have shown a moral depravity sufficient to impact upon his credibility, another may have committed a very minor infraction indicative of nothing more than momentary poor judgment perhaps dictated by necessity....
It is the vagueness or uncertainty in the nature of the offense that makes it difficult to classify indecent exposure as infamous or something less. As we have noted, the crimes that are normally associated with the term "infamous because of their moral turpitude [are] treason, felony, perjury, forgery and those other offenses, classified generally as crimen falsi," Garitee v. Bond, supra, 102 Md. at 383, 62 A. [at 633]. They leave no doubt as to the type of conduct committed and condemned. The courts, legislature, and society have made the determination that such crimes, because they show such a lack of regard for societal norms and values, are relevant in assessing the credibility of one who has been convicted of those offenses. It is our view that the wide spectrum of conduct and degrees of depravity associated with indecent exposure make it clear that it does not conform with those offenses regarded as infamous. [291 Md. at 711, 436 A.2d at 911-12.]
In determining whether the crime of indecent exposure was a crime of moral turpitude, we concluded Indecent exposure is a general intent crime that includes within its scope an innumerable variety of offenses, including acts that are reckless and negligent. As such, its meaning is entirely too unspecific to warrant the appellation of a crime of moral...
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