State v. Duesterhoeft, 81-333.

• Decision Date: 06 November 1981
• Docket Number: No. 81-333.,81-333.
• Citation: 311 NW 2d 866
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Norman Ernst DUESTERHOEFT, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

311 N.W.2d 866 (1981)

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Norman Ernst DUESTERHOEFT, Appellant.

No. 81-333.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

November 6, 1981.

Gavin, Olson & Conkel and Terrence E. Conkel, Glencoe, for appellant.

Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Peter Kasal, County Atty., Glencoe, for respondent.

Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument.

SCOTT, Justice.

The sole issue on this appeal from judgment of conviction of aggravated driving while under the influence, Minn.Stat. § 169.129 (1980), is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress, a motion based on the contention that the stop which led to defendant's arrest was illegal. We affirm.

At 11:30 p. m. on November 13, 1980, Russel Pettis, a deputy sheriff for McLeod County, on routine patrol northwest of Stewart on County Road 28, spotted defendant's truck. A month earlier Pettis had learned that defendant was the owner of this truck and that defendant's driver's license was under suspension. When he spotted the truck on November 13, Pettis was unable to recheck the status of defendant's license because of a problem with the computer. However, believing that defendant's license was still under suspension, Pettis stopped the truck.

Defendant was unable to produce a license, and a subsequent check revealed that his license still was under suspension. Defendant also was uncooperative, scuffling with Pettis when Pettis tried to put him in the squad car. As Pettis scuffled with defendant, he smelled alcohol on defendant's breath.

Defendant was given citations for aggravated driving while under the influence, driving while under the influence, driving after revocation, and refusal to comply with a lawful police order. Subsequently he was charged by a substituted complaint with aggravated driving while under the influence and driving after revocation.

In order to avoid the time and expense of trial but yet preserve his right to appeal the ruling on the motion to suppress, defendant stipulated to the prosecutor's case. The trial court then found him guilty of the charge of aggravated driving while under the influence and dismissed the remaining charge of driving after revocation, even though the stipulation would have permitted a finding of guilty with respect to that charge also.

Defendant's jail sentence and fine have been stayed pending this appeal.

Defendant's suppression motion was based on the theory that the stop was illegal.

The district court, in rejecting this contention, relied upon City of St. Paul v. Vaughn, 306 Minn. 337, 237 N.W.2d 365 (1975). In that case two St. Paul police officers had information "a month or more old" that Frederick Vaughn was under a driver's license suspension. When they saw Dennis Vaughn, his brother, driving a vehicle they mistakenly believed that it was Frederick and stopped the car. Dennis, instead of waiting to talk to the officers, left the vehicle and ran into a store, where he abandoned some drugs, which the officers seized. In reversing the suppression order and upholding the stop, we stated in relevant part as follows:

Officer Zajac testified that he personally had run a license check on defendant\'s brother, Frederick Vaughn, approximately a month before this incident. Officer Patsy also testified that he had personal knowledge of Frederick Vaughn\'s suspension. However, it dated back to the preceding summer, a time span of 3 to 5 months.

A driver\'s license may be revoked for a period of 30 to 90 days for driving while under the influence, Minn.St. 169.121; for 6 months under our implied-consent law, § 169.123; and for longer periods under the general provisions for revocation, § 171.17, and suspension, § 171.18. Given those

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