State v. Dugar
Decision Date | 29 June 1977 |
Docket Number | No. B-6249,B-6249 |
Citation | 553 S.W.2d 102 |
Parties | The STATE of Texas, Petitioner, v. Rudolph DUGAR, Respondent. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Ronald L. Wilson, Crim. Dist. Atty., Michael J. Guarino II, Asst. Crim. Dist. Atty., Galveston, for petitioner.
Philip E. Hosey, Galveston, for respondent.
At issue in this case is whether the district court exceeded its authority under Article 18.18, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 1 in ordering $7,692.39 of respondent Dugar's funds forfeited to the State as gambling proceeds. No statement of facts was brought forward. Having only the transcript before us, we must assume that any necessary fact issues were properly decided against Dugar.
The funds in question were seized from Dugar on December 6, 1974, during a gambling raid. On December 16, 1974, the criminal district attorney of Galveston County, acting on behalf of the State of Texas, filed suit in the Tenth District Court to have the money forfeited as gambling proceeds. The district judge set the matter for a hearing and directed that notice be mailed to Dugar. On March 18, 1975, Dugar was convicted in the 122nd District Court of "Gambling Promotion: Operating a Gambling Place." This conviction was based on the arrest of Dugar made during the December 6 raid.
Subsequently, on February 12, 1976, the judge of the Tenth District Court, after reciting the conviction in the 122nd District Court, rendered judgment ordering the funds seized from Dugar at the raid to be forfeited to the State. Dugar appealed the forfeiture judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals, which held that Section (a) of Article 18.18 did not give the Tenth District Court the authority to order the forfeiture, first, because Section (a) required that the court entering the judgment of conviction must also be the court ordering forfeiture, and secondly, because Dugar had not been convicted of any offense listed in Section (a). The Court of Civil Appeals therefore reversed the forfeiture judgment and rendered judgment that Dugar's money be returned to him. 538 S.W.2d 852. We agree with that portion of the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals which holds that the Section (a) was inapplicable but find that the forfeiture was properly made under Sections (b)-(f) of Article 18.18. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Article 18.18 provides in part as follows:
Since the conviction of Dugar was for an offense not listed under Section (a), we hold that Section (b) et seq. are applicable. Obviously the words "no prosecution or conviction following seizure" refer to prosecutions or convictions for one of the offenses enumerated in Section (a). Although the Court of Civil Appeals held that the and the notice and hearing procedures applicable thereto, it did not write on the validity of the forfeiture under Section (b), having previously held Sections (b)-(f) to be unconstitutional in Rumfolo v. State, 535 S.W.2d 16 (Tex.Civ.App.1976). We reversed the Rumfolo decision, 545 S.W.2d 752 (Tex.1976), and held Sections (b)-(f) constitutional after the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals in the instant case had been handed down but prior to oral argument in this Court.
It has been suggested that since Dugar was convicted of a gambling offense, this negates the applicability of Section (b), which is conditioned on the absence of prosecution or conviction. Such a reading is too narrow. We have interpreted Section (a) as applying to situations where there is a conviction for the listed offenses only. If we now interpret Sections (b)-(f) to apply to situations where there is no conviction for any offense as the literal language of the statute indicates, funds that are clearly gambling proceeds could not be forfeited solely because the State obtained a conviction of an offense that was not among those listed in Section (a). To construe the statute in such a manner would be contrary to the basic premise of an in rem forfeiture proceeding that, while the possessor may not be guilty of any criminal offense, the property seized is of such a nature that it should be destroyed or confiscated by the State. Williams v. State of Texas, 283 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.Civ.App.1955, writ ref'd). Therefore, we believe that the Legislature must have intended that Sections (b)-(f) provide the authority for...
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