State v. Duggan
| Decision Date | 16 October 1886 |
| Citation | 6 A. 787,15 R.I. 403 |
| Parties | STATE v. DUGGAN. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Edwin Metcalf, Atty. Gen., for the State.
Charles A. Ives, for defendant.
STINESS, J. Two complaints are brought before us charging Catherine Duggan with sales of intoxicating liquor, under Pub. Laws, cap. 596, § S. The defendant moved to quash the complaints in the district court upon the ground that the act is in conflict with the constitution of the state, and of the United States, whereupon they are certified to this court. The defendant specifically sets forth that sections 8 and 15 are unconstitutional. She does not say what particular clause of either constitution is violated by the law, but it is urged in argument that it is in conflict with the declarations in our constitution that "all laws should be made for the good of the whole," and "that no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land." It is contended that section 5, by prescribing for pharmacists violating sections 3 and 4 a penalty different from that contained in section 8, is legislation in favor of a class, which, in consequence, makes the penalty of section 8 unequal as to others, and contrary to the "law of the land" as that phrase is understood in judicial construction. In other words, it is claimed that there is, in the act, an attempt at class legislation, which vitiates the entire law.
Several cases are cited to show that laws which undertake to give special privilege, contrary to the "law of the land," are unconstitutional. It is to be remarked, however, that the cases cited are mainly those where acts have been passed to apply to individual cases, contrary to a general law; e. g., granting an appeal in special case, (Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326;) review in a particular suit, (Durham v. Lewiston, 4 Me. 140;) dismissing Indian reservation cases when prosecuted for use of another, (Wally v. Kennedy, 2 Yerg. 554;) creating special court for special cases, without appeal and trial by jury, (Bank v. Cooper, 2 Yerg. 599;) allowing prosecution of claim of deceased person without letters of administration, (Officer v. Young, 5 Yerg. 320;) directing sale of property against the will and consent of party in interest, (Ervine's Appeal, 16 Pat. S. 256;) suspending statute of limitations in special case, (Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396,) In Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 5 Sawy. 552, specially relied on by the defendants, the point decided was that the board of supervisors of San Francisco had no authority over the sanitary condition of the county jail. Hence an ordinance requiring a prisoner's hair to be clipped, whether as an additional penalty or a sanitary regulation, was an excess of authority. In Budd v. State, 3 Humph. 483, the indictment was held to be insufficient; the court adding that, if the offense had been properly charged, an act making it a felony for an officer or servant of a particular bank to embezzle its funds, and which did not apply to the officers and servants of all banking corporations, would be unconstitutional. The case of State v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342, involved an act excluding negroes from public schools, which was, to that extent, held to be in conflict with the fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States. In the remaining cases cited the acts considered were held not to be unconstitutional.
Very instructive remarks are found in many of the opinions, but we fail to find among them a case similar to or decisive of the question before us; and we do not know of any case which decides that, in a penal statute, there may not be special regulations for particular trades. Nor is it necessary, in our view of the case, that we should. The defendant's contention rests solely upon the ground that the penalty upon pharmacists is distinct and exclusive, and that they are thereby exempted from the provisions of section 8. If they are not thus exempted, there is no discrimination against the defendant, and the question of the constitutionality of section 5 does not arise until a case is brought under it.
The underlying and controlling question, then, is whether the penalty in section 5 is distinct and conclusive, or whether it is cumulative. If it is cumulative, it may be void as to those upon whom it bears unequally, without affecting section 8, which is general and equal. The two sections are not so interwoven that they cannot be separated. If section 5 be cumulative, we do not need to say what its effect upon the law would be if it were otherwise. It is an elementary proposition that courts only determine, by construction, the scope and intent of a law when the law itself is ambiguous or doubtful. If a law is plain, and within the legislative power, it declares itself, and nothing is left for interpretation. It is as binding upon the court as upon every citizen. To allow a court, in such a case, to say that the law must mean something different from the common import of its language, because the court may think that its penalties are unwise or harsh, would make the judicial superior to the legislative branch of the government, and practically invest it with the law-making power. The remedy for a harsh law is not in interpretation, but in amendment or repeal. It is also an elementary rule that, in the interpretation of statutes, a court must look to the language of the law. If this be plain, it must be followed, and in doing this the court does not assume that the legislature meant to enact incongruous and repugnant provisions.
The language of section 8 is so general and direct that we can neither disregard it, nor say that it is so ambiguous as to need interpretation.
It is: "If any person shall sell," etc., "in violation of any of the provisions of this act." This is broad enough to include, and by its terms does include, pharmacists and everybody else who shall violate the act in any way. It contains no exception. If we were to say that it does not include pharmacists, we should import an exception into the section contrary to its terms. We should turn aside from its broad terms to follow...
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