State v. Dulaney

Decision Date16 September 2013
Docket NumberNo. 11–12–04.,11–12–04.
Citation997 N.E.2d 560
PartiesSTATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Varaina C. DULANEY, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Peter R. Seibel, Defiance, for Appellant.

Joseph R. Burkard, Paulding, Matthew A. Miller, for Appellee.

OPINION

ROGERS, J.

{¶ 1} DefendantAppellant, Varaina Dulaney, appeals the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Paulding County convicting her of aggravated vehicular homicide and sentencing her to an 18–month prison term. On appeal, Dulaney argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a purportedly invalid search warrant. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court's judgment.

{¶ 2} On February 10, 2012, the Paulding County Grand Jury indicted Dulaney with aggravated vehicular assault in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(2), a felony of the fourth degree, and aggravated vehicular homicide in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2), a felony of the third degree. The indictment arose from a fatal automobile accident that occurred on November 27, 2011 in Paulding County. At approximately 2:30 a.m. that morning, Dulaney was driving an automobile containing her, Michael Breckler, and Dustin Coil. When Dulaney lost control of the vehicle, it rolled and Coil was ejected from the vehicle. Coil died from his injuries while Breckler suffered a fractured pelvis. Dulaney did not suffer any serious injuries.

{¶ 3} On April 23, 2012, Dulaney filed a motion to suppress any blood alcohol test results obtained from the seizure of samples of her blood. The basis for the motion was that the search and seizure was executed pursuant to an invalid warrant. The trial court subsequently conducted a suppression hearing on June 4, 2012. Due to a recording malfunction, we have no transcript from a portion of the suppression hearing that is relevant to this appeal. Under App.R. 9(E), the parties have filed a stipulation of facts to correct this deficiency and to supplement the record before this court.

{¶ 4} The search warrant for the seizure of Dulaney's blood samples was signed on November 30, 2011 by a judge of the Paulding County county court. 1 The warrant authorized the seizure of the samples from Defiance Regional Medical Center in Defiance County, Ohio. Before obtaining the warrant, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Alec Coil originally asked a judge of the Defiance Municipal Court to sign it on either November 28 or 29. However, the municipal court judge refused to sign the warrant because the accident occurred in Paulding County, Ohio, which is not within the territorial jurisdiction of Defiance Municipal Court. Trooper Coil executed the search warrant on November 30, 2011 in Defiance County and Dulaney's blood samples were tested for the presence of alcohol and other drugs.

{¶ 5} On June 8, 2012, the trial court issued a judgment entry denying Dulaney's motion to suppress. Although the trial court found that the State failed to comply with Crim.R. 41 when obtaining the search warrant, it nevertheless found that the State's failure did not violate Dulaney's Fourth Amendment rights.

{¶ 6} After the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress, the State dismissed the charge of aggravated vehicular assault and Dulaney entered a plea of no contest to the remaining charge of aggravated vehicular homicide. On October 25, 2012, the trial court sentenced Dulaney to 18 months in prison.

{¶ 7} Dulaney filed this timely appeal, presenting the following assignment of error for our review.

Assignment of Error
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE WHICH WAS SEIZED IN DEFIANCE COUNTY, OHIO ON A WARRANT WHICH HAD BEEN SIGNED BY A JUDGE IN PAULDING COUNTY, OHIO (OHIO RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE RULE 41).

{¶ 8} In her sole assignment of error, Dulaney argues that the trial court should have suppressed the blood alcohol test results obtained from the purportedly illegal seizure of her blood samples. We find that the trial court erroneously denied Dulaney's motion to suppress on the basis that there was no Fourth Amendment violation. As a result, we reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress insofar as it found that the State did not violate Dulaney's Fourth Amendment rights when it seized her blood samples pursuant to an invalid warrant. Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that suppression was the necessary remedy for the unconstitutional seizure. Rather, we remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings so that it can determine whether suppression of the blood samples is appropriate.

Standard of Review for Motions to Suppress

{¶ 9} “Appellate review of a decision on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. The trial court serves as the trier of fact and is the primary judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence presented. State v. Johnson, 137 Ohio App.3d 847, 850, 739 N.E.2d 1249 (12th Dist.2000). Therefore, when an appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, it must accept the trial court's findings of facts so long as they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 100. The appellate court must then review the application of the law to the facts de novo. Burnside at ¶ 8.

Crim.R. 41(A) and R.C. 2933.21

{¶ 10} Crim.R. 41(A) provides that [a] search warrant authorized by this rule may be issued by a judge of a court of record to search and seize property located within the court's territorial jurisdiction, upon the request of a prosecuting attorney or a law enforcement officer.” R.C. 2933.21 similarly provides that [a] judge of a court of record may, within his jurisdiction, issue warrants to search a house or place.” R.C. 2933.21. “Fundamental” violations of Crim.R. 41 and R.C. 2933.21 are those that implicate constitutional concerns, State v. Jacob, 185 Ohio App.3d 408, 2009-Ohio-7048, 924 N.E.2d 410, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.), and they occur where the warrant was either not based on probable cause or not issued by a neutral and detached judge, State v. Ridenour, 4th Dist. Meigs No. 09CA13, 2010-Ohio-3373, 2010 WL 2807926, ¶ 21. With these principles in mind, we turn to the issue around which this matter revolves: whether the Paulding County county court judge who issued the search warrant was a judge for Fourth Amendment purposes.

The Issuing Judge's Authority to Issue Search Warrants

{¶ 11} One of the “defining features” of a constitutionally executed search warrant is that it was “issued by a judicial officer.” United States v. Kone, 591 F.Supp.2d 593, 605 (S.D.N.Y.2008). The United States Supreme Court “frequently * * * employ[s] the term ‘magistrate’ to denote those public officials who may issue warrants.” 2Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 348, 92 S.Ct. 2119, 32 L.Ed.2d 783 (1972). The Court has defined “magistrate” as “a public civil officer, possessing such power—legislative, executive, or judicial—as the government appointing him may ordain.” Compton v. Alabama, 214 U.S. 1, 7, 29 S.Ct. 605, 53 L.Ed. 885 (1909). As such, a judge/magistrate for Fourth Amendment purposes is an individual who is a “public officer authorized by law to issue search warrants.” State v. Hardy, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 16964, 1998 WL 543368 (Aug. 2, 1998) (Fain, J., concurring); accord United States v. Griffin, E.D.Wis. No. 11–CA–30, 2011 WL 3348027, *6 (Aug. 2, 2011) (stating that a requirement for qualification as a judge under the Fourth Amendment is “that the issuing official has some cognizable authority under state law to issue warrants”); see also United States v. Bansal, 663 F.3d 634, 662 (3d Cir.2011) (finding no constitutional violation where magistrate in Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued warrant for search and seizure of property located in California because federal statute authorized the magistrate to issue warrants for disclosure of electronic communications located outside of the court's jurisdiction so long as the offense under investigation was within the court's jurisdiction); Ciano v. State, 105 Ohio St. 229, 233, 137 N.E. 11 (1922) (“Although [a previous form of R.C. 2933.21] confers authority upon common pleas judges, along with other officials therein named, to issue search warrants upon the filing of an affidavit * * * common pleas judges were not so authorized at the time such action was taken in this case, and in the absence of such statutory authority the search warrant issued by the common pleas judge was unwarranted and invalid”). Based on these principles, federal courts have previously found that both municipal court clerks, Shadwick at 347–48, 92 S.Ct. 2119, 32 L.Ed.2d 783, and circuit court commissioners, Griffin, supra, that are vested with authority under state law to issue search warrants are judges for Fourth Amendment purposes.

{¶ 12} This matter is unlike Shadwick and Griffin since the Paulding County county court judge who signed the warrant for Dulaney's blood samples was not authorized under Ohio law to issue warrants for searches and seizure of property in Defiance County.3R.C. 2933.21; Crim.R. 41(A). Rather, this matter is analogous to the facts addressed in United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236 (6th Cir.2010). There, the defendant's residence was in Coffee County, Tennessee. Police officers searched the defendant's residence after a Franklin County, Tennessee general sessions judge issued a warrant. Tennessee law, however, only granted the issuing judge the authority to sign warrants for the searches of property located in Franklin County. Id. at 238. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that since Tennessee law did not provide the issuing judge with the requisite authority to issue the warrant at issue, the warrant was void ab initio. Consequently, the resulting...

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4 cases
  • State v. Miller
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • November 10, 2014
    ...and venue. We recognize that, generally, courts of common pleas are vested with statewide jurisdiction. State v. Dulaney, 3d Dist., 2013-Ohio-3985, 997 N.E.2d 560, ¶ 14; Article IV, Section 4(A), Ohio Constitution ; R.C. 2901.11. Further, R.C. 2931.03 gives the court of common pleas origina......
  • State v. Foster
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • August 24, 2015
    ...give rise to suppression of the evidence illegally obtained." State v. Dulaney, 3d Dist. Paulding No. 11-12-04, 2013-Ohio-3985 ¶ 21, 997 N.E.2d 560. The trial court in this case held that the evidence was admissible because of the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. "Th......
  • State v. Wyley
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • March 17, 2016
    ...courts of common pleas have statewide jurisdiction. See Ohio Constitution Article IV, Section 4(A); R.C. 2901.11; State v. Dulaney, 2013-Ohio-3985, 997 N.E.2d 560, ¶ 14 (3d Dist.). And in accordance with R.C. 2931.03, the court of common pleas has original jurisdiction "of all crimes and of......
  • State v. Thompson
    • United States
    • Ohio Court of Appeals
    • November 25, 2019
    ...related solely to jurisdiction, we find no error in his issuance of the warrant. This is not the case, such as in State v. Dulaney, 2013-Ohio-3985, 997 N.E.2d 560 (3d Dist.), cited by Thompson, where a judge issued a warrant for property located "in a foreign county, outside of [his] jurisd......

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