State v. Dumas
Decision Date | 04 May 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 2000-K-0862.,2000-K-0862. |
Citation | 786 So.2d 80 |
Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Melvin DUMAS. |
Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Richard Phillip Ieyoub, Attorney General, Paul Carmouche, Dist. Attorney, Catherine Marion Estopinal, Brian Lee King, Assistant District Attorneys, for Applicant. Caddo Parish Indigent Defender Board, Diane Lee Foster, David R. McClatchey, for Respondent.
1
In this prosecution for possession of a firearm by a previously convicted felon, La.R.S. 14:95.1, respondent moved to suppress the .25 caliber automatic seized from his back pocket by officers of the Shreveport Police Department assigned to the "Weed and Seed" Program targeting the Highland/Stoner Hill area of the city. After the trial court denied the motion, respondent entered a conditional plea of guilty as charged and sought review of the adverse suppression ruling in the court of appeal. State v. Dumas, 32,925 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1/26/00), 750 So.2d 439 (Gaskins, J., dissenting). The Second Circuit agreed with the trial court that the police officers had reasonable grounds for an investigatory stop based on defendant's apparent violation of city ordinances which prohibit walking in a roadway. Dumas, 32,925 at 5, 750 So.2d at 443 (). However, the court of appeal disagreed with the lower court that the officers also possessed reasonable grounds for patting down respondent and thereby discovering the weapon concealed in his back pocket. The court of appeal "declin[ed] to hold that an officer's knowledge of a defendant's criminal history alone is adequate to justify a patdown," and specifically noted that "rather than offering evidence which would support a belief that they were in danger, both officers testified that they were not afraid of [him]." Dumas, 32,925 at 8-9, 750 So.2d at 445. The Second Circuit therefore concluded that the frisk of respondent was not justified and set aside his conviction and sentence on grounds that the trial court had erred in denying the motion to suppress. We granted the state's application to review the correctness of that decision and now reverse.
In upholding the validity of the initial investigatory stop, the court of appeal properly conducted an objective inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the encounter. State v. Kalie, 96-2650, p. 3 (La.9/19/97), 699 So.2d 879, 881 () (quoting State v. Flowers, 441 So.2d 707, 712 (La. 1983)). As the court of appeal concluded, the apparent violation of city ordinances under circumstances in which respondent was nearly struck in the middle of the street by a police cruiser transporting an arrested individual to the station house provided the requisite "`minimal level of objective justification'" for an investigatory stop. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1763, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984)).
However, in finding the subsequent pat down frisk of respondent unreasonable, the court of appeal erred in according substantial weight to the testimony of the officers at the suppression hearing that subjectively they were not afraid of respondent. The reasonableness of a frisk conducted as part of a lawful investigatory stop is also governed by an objective standard. The relevant question is not whether the police officer subjectively believes he is in danger, or whether he articulates that subjective belief in his testimony at a suppression hearing, but "whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). See United States v. Baker, 47 F.3d 691, 694 (5th Cir.1995) (); United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 502 (8th Cir.1990)("As we apply an objective standard of reasonableness to this determination [of a valid Terry search], our conclusion is not changed by [the officer's] testimony that he had no subjective fear that either Cummins or [his companion] were armed."); United States v. Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1976) () ; O'Hara v. State, 27 S.W.3d 548, 551 (Tex.Crim. App.2000) () (footnote omitted); 4 Warren R. La-Fave, Search and Seizure, § 9.5(a), p. 253 (3rd ed. 1996) () (footnotes omitted); see also United States v. Menard, 95 F.3d 9, 11 (8th Cir.1996); United States v. Bonds, 829 F.2d 1072, 1074-75 (11th Cir.1987); Com. v. Joe, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 499, 665 N.E.2d 1005, 1012, n. 13 (1996); State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 618 N.E.2d 162, 169-70 (1993); State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1986).
In the present case, both officers testified at the suppression hearing that while they were not "scared" of respondent they approached him with caution because they were aware that he was a convicted felon on probation for burglary. While we agree with the majority on the Second Circuit panel that an individual's prior felony record does not alone provide reasonable grounds either for stopping or searching him, "an officer's knowledge of a suspect's prior criminal activity in combination with other factors may lead to a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous." State v. Valentine, 134 N.J. 536, 636 A.2d 505, 511 (1994). We therefore concur with the dissenting views of Judge Gaskins in the present case that under the totality of the circumstances the officers had a reasonable, objective, and particularized basis for conducting a patdown frisk of respondent. Dumas, 32,925 at 1, 750 So.2d at 446 (Gaskins, J., dissenting). Officer Jackson, who conducted the frisk, knew about respondent's prior burglary conviction because he had arrested or questioned him on at least four prior occasions. One of those incidents had involved respondent's arrest as he emerged from a stolen vehicle in the company of an individual wanted by the police for an armed robbery. Jackson found on the transmission hump between the front seats of the vehicle a .357 magnum pistol which had been accessible to both men. See Valentine, 636 A.2d at 511 (); State v. Collins, 121 Wash.2d 168, 847 P.2d 919, 922-23 (1993) ( ). On another occasion, Jackson questioned responde...
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State v. Fields
...would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. See State v. Dumas, 00–0862, pp. 2–3 (La.5/4/01), 786 So.2d 80, 81–82. However, a recognized and close association exists between narcotics traffickers and weapons. State v. Wilson, 00–0178, p. 3 (La.12/3/00),......
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State v. Fields
...would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. See State v. Dumas, 00-0862, pp. 2-3 (La. 5/4/01), 786 So.2d 80, 81-82. However, a recognized and close association exists between narcotics traffickers and weapons. State v. Wilson, 00-0178, p. 3 (La. 12/3/00......
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State v. Boyer
... ... Having upheld the validity of the investigatory stop, we now determine whether the patdown of defendant's outer clothes was reasonable. The reasonableness of a frisk conducted as part of a lawful investigatory stop is governed by an objective standard. State v. Dumas, 2000-862, p. 2 (La.5/4/01), 786 So.2d 80, 81. The relevant question is not whether the police officer subjectively believes he is in danger, or whether he articulates that subjective belief in his testimony at a suppression hearing. Id. at pp. 2-3, 786 So.2d at 81-82. A police officer may frisk ... ...