State v. Duncan
| Decision Date | 17 February 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-0062.,04-0062. |
| Citation | 710 N.W.2d 34 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Harold Arthur DUNCAN, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and David Arthur Adams, Assistant
State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant Attorney General, Michael L. Zenor, County Attorney, and Michael J. Houchins, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
A jury convicted Harold Arthur Duncan of first-degree murder. The victim was his wife of forty-three years, Karen Kay Duncan. Following sentencing, Harold appealed, contending the district court erred when it admitted character and bad-acts evidence as improper rebuttal evidence. We transferred the case to the court of appeals, which affirmed. We granted Harold's application for further review. On our review, we affirm the court of appeals decision and the judgment of the district court.
Harold and Karen, known as Kay, were married in December 1959. The couple lived in a motor home parked at a trailer court in Spencer, Iowa. Harold was retired, and Kay worked as a manager in a Subway sandwich restaurant in Spencer.
On January 13, 2003, Kay did not report to work at Subway. Her co-workers became concerned, and one of them drove by the Duncans' home where she saw the couple's van parked at the residence. The co-worker called a second co-worker and they decided to ask the Duncans' landlord to check on Kay at the couple's residence. The landlord received no response to her knocks on the door, which prompted her to call the police.
After failing to get anyone to come to the door, a Spencer city police officer gained entrance through a window. He found Harold and Kay sprawled out on their bed; Harold was face up and Kay was face down. Kay had been shot twice, once to the front of her body, and once to her back. She was pronounced dead at the scene. Harold appeared to have a serious wound to the face but was alive. Police found a shotgun in the hallway of the motor home. In the cockpit area of the motor home, the police found an open box of 12-gauge shotgun shells.
Harold was taken to a local hospital and then to a hospital in Sioux City where a Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) agent interviewed him. Harold admitted shooting Kay twice and admitted shooting himself.
Later in the day, Harold was transferred to a hospital in Omaha where another DCI agent interviewed him. During this interview, Harold gave conflicting stories. In the first version, Harold said he and Kay had argued about her work schedule at the restaurant. He got the shotgun out and as the argument got out of control, he shot her in the chest and then as she turned around to retreat to the back of the motor home, he shot her in the back. In the second version, Harold related that Kay had gotten the shotgun out of a closet in the back of the motor home and he took it away from her. He then shot her in the chest and as she retreated towards the back of the motor home, he shot her in the back. The third version was the same as the first. Harold also told the agent that his wife was not "going to hold the answer to the argument" and admitted that he had attempted to kill himself.
On January 29, 2003, the State charged Harold with first-degree murder in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.1 and 707.2 (2001). Later, Harold filed a notice of diminished responsibility and a notice of self-defense.
Before trial, Harold filed a stipulation with the court in which he stated that on January 13, 2003, he fired two shots from a 12-gauge shotgun resulting in the death of his wife, Kay. He fired one shot to her chest and one shot to her back.
At trial, the stipulation was read to the jury. Additionally, the jury heard testimony regarding Harold's admissions to the DCI agents. Testimony also revealed that Harold had a sixth-grade education and functioned at a range between mental retardation and below-average intelligence.
Harold testified as follows. Kay called him into their bedroom and told him she wanted a divorce. At the time, Kay was lying on the bed and pulled out a shotgun. He grabbed the shotgun and took it away. He then grabbed her and she slid off the bed, and, as he characterized it, "[t]hat's when everything went wrong." He had no recollection of what happened after that.
Following trial, a jury found Harold guilty of first-degree murder. The court later sentenced Harold to life in prison.
Harold appealed, and we transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed. We granted Harold's application for further review.
On appeal, Harold raised the following issue: Whether the district court erred in admitting evidence of the defendant's character and prior bad acts as improper rebuttal evidence.
A. The challenged evidence. The issue revolves around the cross-examination of Harold and the subsequent rebuttal testimony of one of his daughters. On direct examination, Harold testified about going to the bank several days before the shooting so that Kay could open accounts in her name and remove her name from the accounts that she jointly held with him. Harold also testified about Kay's discussion of divorce.
On cross-examination of Harold, the following exchange took place without objection:
Q. And isn't it true that you were shaking violently when you were at Northwest Federal? A. What is violently?
Q. Shaking? A. Well, yeah. They were shaking pretty good. We sat there in the chair, Kay and I did, together.
Q. And that's because you were upset and angry with Kay because she was opening up her own account? A. No, sir. Mother could have any account she wanted. My three daughters are out here in the crowd. They could tell you.
Later, during the cross-examination, the prosecutor focused on the relationship between Harold and Kay, again without objection:
Q. You talked about your relationship with your wife, Kay? A. Yes, sir.
Q. That was an abusive relationship, wasn't it? A. I got three daughters out there. I don't think so, and I don't think they'll tell you that either. We had a wonderful time. We had a great big boat. We went to Lake Superior. I named the boat Lady Kay and we always got fish. We hunted together. My wife road hunt, so she would load the gun and handed it to me when we went out, and I would slide it out of the case and walk the ditches. We were together, her and I.
Harold was then asked about hitting Kay, calling her names (such as fat and stupid), and belittling her. He admitted striking Kay once that left bruises, but did not recall any other time that he hit her. He denied the name calling and belittling.
The State presented the following rebuttal evidence, consisting of the testimony of the Duncans' youngest daughter:
Q. You've been present during the testimony during this trial. Correct? A. Correct.
Q. When your father was testifying, he said it was—that he was a good father, he was a good husband, and that we should just ask his daughters whether he was such. And you're one of his daughters? A. Correct.
. . . .
Q. Okay. I'm going to ask you then what type of father was the defendant? A. My father—
It was at this point that the defense counsel made his first objection:
Q. What type of father was the defendant, Harold Duncan?
The daughter then testified about Harold being an abusive alcoholic. She said the children were abused, hit, and pushed through doors. The prosecutor also asked the daughter how Harold treated Kay. The daughter replied:
My father abused my mother very badly. Many times to get us children to behave he would take it out on my mom if we did something wrong. There [were] points where there [were] incidents where one time we were out boating and he threatened to push her over the boat and told us kids when he accomplished that that we would be next.
It was at this point that the defense counsel lodged his second objection:
The daughter testified further that an officer had explained the change in domestic abuse laws to her father. The daughter admitted that, after a period of time, the physical abuse stopped.
The prosecutor then sought testimony from the daughter concerning the more recent state of affairs between Harold and Kay:
Q. I want to move to the more current situation between your father and your mother. Let's move to the last three or four years, two or three years prior to her death. A. Okay.
Q. How would you describe their marital relationship? A. My father was very controlling of my mother. My mother was not allowed to drive anywhere. She did hold a driver's license but it was for identification purposes only. Dad did drive her to and from work, not that that was really a choice, you know. My father was very belittling of my mother. When they would come to visit, he would not allow us the time alone together for fear of what we would talk about. He controlled the keys. He would hold the keys. If she wanted to go out to the van or motor home, she would have to ask him for the keys and return them to him as soon as she returned.
. . . .
Q. Were there times where the defendant actually threatened your mother's life? A. Yes, there were. The boat incident I...
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