State v. Dunlap
Citation | 346 S.C. 312,550 S.E.2d 889 |
Decision Date | 02 July 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 3365.,3365. |
Court | Court of Appeals of South Carolina |
Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Laterrance Ramone DUNLAP, Appellant. |
Stephen D. Schusterman, of Rock Hill, for Appellant.
Attorney General Charles M. Condon, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Robert E. Bogan and Assistant Attorney General Toyya Brawley Gray, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Thomas E. Pope, of York, for Respondent.
Laterrance Ramone Dunlap appeals his conviction for distribution of crack cocaine. Dunlap argues he was prejudiced by comments made by the Circuit Court judge who presided over qualification of the entire jury panel for the week. Dunlap additionally contends the trial judge erroneously admitted evidence of his prior convictions. We affirm.
On the evening of April 2, 1999, undercover police officers observed Dunlap outside his family's home engaged in a transaction with two individuals who had stopped by to visit with him. The police detained one of the visitors and found crack cocaine. The detainee informed police that Dunlap sold him the crack cocaine. Dunlap was arrested and charged with distribution of crack cocaine. A trial was held and Dunlap was convicted of the charge. The trial court sentenced Dunlap to nineteen years in prison and ordered him to pay a $100,000 fine.
Dunlap claims that comments made by the qualifying judge tainted the entire jury panel. He further alleges the trial judge erred in failing to dismiss the jury. We disagree.
Dunlap avers in his brief that the Circuit Court judge who qualified the entire jury panel for the week stated some defendants will enter a courtroom, take a look at "everything," including the prospective jurors, and decide "to fess up" and plead guilty. Dunlap asserts these remarks were prejudicial. He maintains:
This comment could certainly be interpreted by potential jurors that everyone that comes to court is, in fact, guilty of the crime they are charged with. It is a well known premise that many people believe that if someone is charged with a crime and brought to trial, they must be guilty. The role of the court should be to reject this popular assumption and explain the "innocent until proven guilty" theory. In the instant case, remarks made by the ... judge [who qualified the entire jury panel for the week] only reinforced the assumption that most, if not all, Defendants are guilty.
It is important to understand the qualification procedure of the entire jury panel for the week encompasses queries in regard to the general qualification of jurors. See S.C.Code Ann. §§ 14-7-810 to -870 (Supp.2000). Under our statute, certain individuals are disqualified or exempted from serving as a juror in any court. In State v. Hughey, 339 S.C. 439, 529 S.E.2d 721 (2000), the Supreme Court explained that South Carolina recognizes a difference between "exemptions" and "disqualifications" from jury duty:
An exemption from jury duty is not a disqualification to act as a juror, but is a personal privilege that the juror may claim or waive. 50A C.J.S. Juries § 304 (1955); see also 15A Words and Phrases Exempt; Exemption (1950)("A person exempted from jury services is not thereby disqualified to serve on a jury."). This Court has held an exemption from jury duty is not a disqualification. See State v. Matthews, 291 S.C. 339, 343, 353 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1986)
("An exemption under [S.C.Code Ann. § 14-7-850] is a privilege and not a disqualification."); State v. Toland, 36 S.C. 515, 521, 15 S.E. 599, 600 (1892)("exemption was a personal privilege which [jurors] might or might not claim, but it did not disqualify them as jurors.").
Hughey, 339 S.C. at 448-49,529 S.E.2d at 726.
The following is a list of persons disqualified from jury service:
The following is a list of persons exempted from jury service:
(3) If a student selected for jury service during the school term requests, his service must be postponed to a date that does not conflict with the school term. If a school employee selected for jury service during the school term requests, his service must be postponed to a date that does not conflict with the school term. S.C.Code Ann. § 14-7-845.
Ordinarily, the qualifying judge's comments to the jury panel involve general questions to determine if any members of the panel would be statutorily disqualified, exempted, or excused from service as a juror. The trial judge, on the other hand, poses a different set of questions to the jury panel concerning qualification to sit on a specific case.
In the instant case, the comments by the judge qualifying the entire jury panel for the week are at issue. We find the qualifying judge's comments to the general jury panel did not prejudice Dunlap. Here, there is no contest in regard to questions posed by the trial judge concerning juror qualification for the trial jury.
State v. Council, 335 S.C. 1, 515 S.E.2d 508 (1999), provides guidance in disposing of this issue. The Council Court determined "[t]he ultimate consideration [of the judge concerning juror qualification] is that the juror be unbiased, impartial and able to carry out the law as explained to him." Id. at 10, 515 S.E.2d at 513.
In the present case, before opening arguments began, the trial judge asked the trial jury pool several questions regarding their fairness and impartiality, including the succeeding questions:
No jury member responded in the affirmative to the trial judge's queries. The trial judge, convinced a fair and impartial jury was empaneled, permitted the trial to begin. In this circumstance, without evidence to the contrary, we must conclude the jury members followed the trial judge's instructions to notify him of bias or prejudice any of them possessed. See Foye v. State, 335 S.C. 586, 590 n. 1, 518 S.E.2d 265, 267 n. 1 (1999)("A jury is presumed to [have followed the trial judge's] instructions."). The record and Dunlap's brief are devoid of any evidence refuting the trial judge's conclusions. The trial judge, therefore, did not err by failing to dismiss the jury panel as previously qualified.
Quoting State v. Britt, 235 S.C. 395, 425, 111 S.E.2d 669, 685 (1959), overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991), Dunlap asserts he is entitled to reversal because "[w]hen it is made to appear that anything has occurred which may have improperly influenced the action of the jury, the accused should be granted a new trial, although he may appear to be ever so guilty, because it may be said that his guilt has not been ascertained in the manner prescribed by law." Dunlap incorrectly applies this proposition.
Britt was tried for murder...
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