State v. Dunn
| Decision Date | 31 July 1853 |
| Parties | THE STATE, Respondent, v. DUNN, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
1. What is a sufficient provocation to mitigate a homicide from murder to manslaughter, is a question of law.
2. Every deliberate and intentional killing is murder in the first degree, within the meaning of our statute, although the design to kill was formed but a moment before it was executed.
3. It is error for a court to comment on the evidence in a criminal case, unless requested to do so by the prosecuting attorney and the defendant.
4. A court is not required to select each fact constituting an offence, and instruct the jury to acquit if they have a reasonable doubt of that fact. A general instruction to acquit the accused, if they have a reasonable doubt of his guilt on the whole case, is sufficient.
Appeal from Newton Circuit Court.
The defendant was indicted, and convicted of murder in the first degree, for killing one Henry Knowl.
At the trial, Uriah Carroll, a witness for the State, testified that he was working in the field of the defendant, his uncle, on the day Knowl received the injuries of which he died. When he returned home to his uncle's house at sundown, he found the prisoner and Knowl there, both considerably intoxicated. After making a fire and bringing a bucket of water, witness went out to feed the stock. While thus engaged, a difficulty commenced in the house. He heard the defendant utter an oath as if in anger, and heard blows struck, after which the noise ceased. After he had finished feeding the stock, he went towards the house and through the open door saw Knowl lying on the floor. Witness did not go into the house, but passed toward the wood pile, as he thought, unobserved by the defendant. While there, he saw the defendant take Knowl on his back and carry him out to the fence and throw him over. Witness then commenced cutting wood, when defendant came out and told him to drag off “the d--d old son of a bitch.” Witness took hold of Knowl and dragged him a distance, and returned to cutting wood. When he went into the house sometime afterwards, Dunn asked him if Knowl still lived, and on being informed that he did told witness to go and bring him into the house. Witness did so Knowl was able to walk by being supported, but was much bruised and bloody in the face, and stated that his ribs were broken. When they reached the house, Knowl sank down in a helpless condition, and remained there and was kindly treated by the defendant, for two or three days, when he was removed to another house, where he shortly after wards died. Witness stated that when he first went into the house after the difficulty, he saw no weapon but the shovel, the handle of which was much bent. Witness further testified that before Knowl died, Dunn told him (witness) that he had put some blood at a particular spot in the field which he pointed out, and requested him to swear that he found Know there, which he, through fear of the defendant promised to do.
Wills, a physician, testified to the extent of Knowl's injuries and gave it as his opinion that they caused his death. He also testified to the statements of Knowl, made three or four days before his death, when he said he knew he could not live long.
Knowl stated that he being a German and Dunn an Irishman, they were talking about the old countries when suddenly Dunn picked up a piece of iron, or a chisel, and struck him first on side of the head and then on the other, until he was knocked down in a senseless condition; that when he became conscious, Dunn had a hatchet, and said that, “as he had done that much, he must kill him to keep him from informing against him;” that thereupon Dunn struck at him with the hatchet, but Dunn's wife caught him and prevented the blow; and that Dunn then carried him out and threw him over the fence.
The statements of Knowl were objected to by the defendant, but admitted.
The court gave the following instructions for the State.
The court instructs the jury that, if they believe from the evidence, that James Dunn beat Henry Knowl with a shovel, chisel and hatchet, or either of them, and that they were deadly weapons, and that the beating was done in a cruel and barbarous manner, and that it was done without sufficient or considerable provocation, and that he (Dunn) took Knowl and carried him and threw him over the fence, and told Uriah Carroll to drag the d--d old son of a bitch off, and that said Knowl died from said beating and barbarous treatment, the jury may infer from all these circumstances that said Dunn inflicted such beating and barbarous treatment upon said Knowl wilfully, feloniously, deliberately, premeditatedly, on purpose and of his malice aforethought, with intent to kill said Henry Knowl, and if they do so find from all the evidence, they ought to find him guilty of murder in the first degree.
2. Malice, in a legal sense, means a condition of mind void of social duty, and fatally bent on mischief.
3. The word “wilfull,” as used in the statute, means that the act must be done intentionally.
4. The word “premeditatedly,” as used in the statute, means that the act must be thought of, some time, however short, before the mortal blow or blows were struck.
5. The court instructs the jury that, if Dunn made use of a weapon or weapons, likely to kill, and used them on Knowl, that he made preparations for concealing the body, that before the death, he laid a train of circumstances tending to ward off suspicion, such evidence goes a great way to fix the grade of homicide at murder in the first degree.
The defendant excepted to the giving of these instructions, and asked the court to instruct the jury that an intention to kill, and malice “matured by premeditation and deliberation, before the unlawful act,” were necessary to constitute the crime of murder in the first degree, under our statute; and that if they had a rational doubt either of the intention to kill or of the malice, they could not find the defendant guilty of that degree of crime. The defendant also asked several other instructions, among which was one that the jury could not convict of murder in the second degree, if they entertained a rational...
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