State v. Durham, 20178
| Decision Date | 01 March 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 20178,20178 |
| Citation | 222 S.E.2d 768,266 S.C. 263 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Michael DURHAM, Appellant. |
Hemphill P. Pride, II, and Jesse Clark, Jenkins, Perry & Pride and Tom Turnipseed, Rothwell & Butler, Columbia, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, Asst. Atty. Gen. Richard P. Wilson and Sol. James C. Anders, Columbia, for respondent.
The appellant, Michael Durham, was charged with possessing 52 pounds of marihuana with intent to distribute. He was tried by a jury, found guilty, and sentenced by the judge. He has appealed, alleging several errors on the part of the trial court.
The record reveals that Lt. Galvin, of the Columbia City Police Department, obtained certain information from a reliable informant. He went before a ministerial recorder, Miss Booth, and made affidavit as a basis for procuring a search warrant, which was issued. That search warrant authorized a search of the premises known as 1531 Lily Street, for several drugs named in the search warrant, including marihuana.
Armed with this search warrant, Lt. Galvin and several officers went to the premises designated. Officer Keefe found the appellant in the yard near his Torino Ford automobile. Apparently in an effort to discourage a search of the house, the appellant blurted out a consent that the automobile be searched. The marihuana was found therein. One of the other officers, participating in the search, possessed the search warrant. A search of the entire premises followed. Among those items found in the house was a set of small, delicate scales, used to weigh very small amounts of chemicals, etc. Several law enforcement officers testified on behalf of the State and presented exhibits. The defense submitted no evidence.
One of the appellant's contentions in the court below, and here, is that the search warrant was invalid and that the marihuana was the fruit of the poisoned tree.
Counsel for the appellant knew who the confidential informant was. He was neither a participant nor a material witness. Counsel for the appellant sought to cross-examine Lt. Galvin relative to the confidential informant and especially to attack his credibility. Such cross-examination was permitted, but finally limited by the judge.
On this appeal, the first question submitted is as follows:
'Whether the Court committed constitutional and plain error of first magnitude in denying the Appellant's attorney the right to cross-examine police officers as to the credibility and reliability of the police's confidential informer, who allegedly supplied the sole basis of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant for number 1531 Lily Street, the Appellant's home?'
The defense of this case consisted largely of efforts to exclude evidence which the appellant had been found to possess. It is argued that the informant was not credible, that Lt. Galvin did not perform his duties, that the ministerial recorder was not qualified and did not give proper consideration to the application for a search warrant.
We have before us the affidavit, the search warrant, the return, and the testimony of witnesses relative thereto. We conclude that there was no error in the handling of the search warrant and that the same was valid for the purposes used. The cross-examination relative to the search warrant was conducted within the sphere of the judge's discretion. He found that the search for the marihuana in the automobile was consented to, and that the other items were properly seized under a valid search warrant. We agree.
Counsel next urges that the court committed prejudicial error in permitting the police officers to testify, over objection, that the seized scales were commonly used to weigh fine amounts of drugs. It is argued that the testimony was merely conclusions and opinions. The police officer was shown to be qualified to render such an opinion; as an experienced narcotics officer, he had information relative to such a scale not commonly within the knowledge of a juror. There was no error in admitting the testimony. It was clearly relevant on the issue of intent to distribute.
Appellant contends that law enforcement officers should not have been allowed to testify that the appellant blurted out that there was no need for the police to tear up the house looking for drugs, that he had the keys to the car in his hands and that the dope was in the trunk of the car. Counsel urges that no Miranda warnings had been given. Under the facts, we are of the opinion that Miranda warnings were not...
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State v. Cherry
...testimony opining that the residue indicated large shipment of marijuana had been transported in airplane); State v. Durham, 266 S.C. 263, 267-68, 222 S.E.2d 768, 769-70 (1976) (police seized fifty pounds of marijuana and delicate scales used to weigh small amounts of chemicals and police t......
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State v. Adams
...paraphernalia and the residue of controlled substances was sufficient to submit the case to the jury. Id; see also State v. Durham, 266 S.C. 263, 222 S.E.2d 768 (1976). This exception is without merit. Appellant contends he is entitled to a new trial because the trial judge erroneously char......
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State v. Goldsmith, 23230
...the controlled substance possessed is less than that specified in § 44-53-370(d)(3). State v. Adams, supra; see also State v. Durham, 266 S.C. 263, 222 S.E.2d 768 (1976) (evidence regarding scales in accused's possession relevant on issue of intent to Further, possession may be inferred fro......