State v. Duval County

• Decision Date: 07 August 1918
• Parties: STATE ex rel. YOUNG et al. v. DUVAL COUNTY.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

79 So. 692

76 Fla. 180

STATE ex rel. YOUNG et al. v. DUVAL COUNTY.

Florida Supreme Court

August 7, 1918

Appeal from Circuit Court, Duval County; Daniel A. Simmons, Judge.

Proceeding to validate bonds by Duval County, Fla., against the State of Florida, on relation of Wm. B. Young and others. From an order validating the bonds, the defendants appeal. Order affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Chapter 7462, Acts of 1917, does not require the county commissioners to employ experts to furnish, or to otherwise acquire, any particular data or information on which to act in determining the amount of bonds that may be voted on under that statute an action taken pursuant to the statute will not be disturbed by the courts, in the absence of a clear showing of fraud or abuse of authority.

The lawmaking power of the Legislature of a state is subject only to the limitations provided in the state and federal Constitutions; and no duly enacted statute should be judicially declared to be inoperative on the ground that it violates organic law, unless it clearly appears beyond all reasonable doubt that, under any rational view that may be taken of the statute, it is in positive conflict with some identified or designated provision of constitutional law.

A statute should be so construed and applied as to make it valid and effective, if its language does not exclude such an interpretation.

Where a statute does not violate the federal or state Constitution the legislative will is supreme, and its policy is not subject to judicial review. The courts have no veto power and do not assume to regulate state policy, but they recognize and enforce the policy of the law as expressed in valid enactments, and decline to enforce statutes only when to do so would violate organic law.

The Constitution is the controlling law; and while, in appropriate proceedings properly taken, it may be the duty of the court to declare a legislative enactment to be inoperative in whole or in part, if it plainly violates the Constitution, yet, as under our system of government the lawmaking power of the Legislature is subject only to the limitations contained in the state and federal Constitutions the court should, in deference to the Legislature, take care to so interpret an enactment as to make it consistent with the Constitution, if it can be done upon any reasonable consideration of the legislative intent, as shown by a fair application of all the language used to the purpose designed to be accomplished by the enactment.

Neither the Constitution nor the common law defines the line of separation between the powers that shall be exercised directly by the Legislature and those that may be indirectly exercised through delegated authority.

Where the Legislature has authority to provide a governmental regulation, and the organic law does not prescribe the manner of adopting or providing it, and the nature of the regulation does not require that it be afforded by direct legislative act, such regulation may be provided, either directly by the Legislature, or indirectly by the legislative use of any appropriate instrumentality, where no provision or principle of organic law is thereby violated.

In order to justify the courts in declaring invalid as a delegation of legislative power a statute conferring particular duties or authority upon officers, it must clearly appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the duty or authority so conferred is a power that appertains exclusively to the legislative department under article 2 of the Constitution and the conferring of it is not warranted by other provisions of the Constitution.

The Legislature may not delegate the power to enact a law, or to declare what the law shall be, or to exercise an unrestricted discretion in applying a law; but it may enact a law complete in itself, designed to accomplish a general public purpose and may expressly authorize designated officials within definite limitations to provide rules and regulations for the complete operation and enforcement of the law within its expressed general purpose.

Authority to make rates, rules, and regulations to carry out an expressed legislative purpose, or for the complete operation and enforcement of a law within designated limitations, is not an exclusively legislative power, but it may be delegated by law to appropriate tribunals, to be performed as an administrative function.

The governmental powers that are divided into the legislative, executive, and judicial departments, and the exercise of which is forbidden to persons not properly belonging to the particular department, are those so defined by the Constitution, or such as are inherent or so recognized by immemorial governmental usage, and which involve the exercise of primary and independent will, discretion, and judgment, subject not to the control of another department, but only to the limitations imposed by the state and federal Constitutions.

All official duties, authority, and functions prescribed or contemplated by law are not necessarily 'governmental powers' within the meaning of the constitutional provisions separating the powers of government into departments.

The division of governmental powers into legislative, executive, and judicial is abstract and general, and is intended for practical purposes. There has been no complete and definite designation by a paramount authority of all the particular powers that appertain to each of the several departments. Perhaps there can be no absolute and complete separation of all the powers of a practical government.

A clear violation of the constitutional provisions dividing the powers of government into departments should be checked and remedied; but where a reasonable doubt exists as to the constitutionality of a statute conferring power, authority, and duties upon officers, the legislative will should be enforced by the courts to secure orderly government, and in deference to the Legislature whose action is presumed to be within its powers, and whose lawmaking discretion within its powers is not reviewable by the courts.

Where a duly enacted statute confers upon officials authority that is not in its nature exclusively and purely a legislative, executive, or judicial power, and it can fairly be done to accomplish a valid legislative purpose, such authority may be construed as an administrative duty rather than as a governmental power.

The terms 'legislative powers' and 'legislative authority,' as used in articles 2 and 3 of the state Constitution, mean the power or authority to enact laws, or to declare what the law shall be. Such 'powers' and 'authority' appertain exclusively to the legislative department, and they cannot lawfully be delegated.

Authority to perform functions that are not exclusively legislative, but are administrative in their nature, may be by statute conferred upon other officials.

While the Constitution provides that 'no person properly belonging to one of the departments shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the others, except in cases expressly provided for by this Constitution,' it does not forbid the performance by any officer, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, of administrative functions or duties when they are imposed by statute.

Where a statute defines the general outlines for its operation, and therein provides that stated persons, officers, or tribunals, shall, within designated limitations, perform acts or ascertain facts upon which the statute by its own force will operate to accomplish the lawmaking intent, the action by the persons, officers, or tribunals within the stated limitations may be administrative, and not exclusively legislative, executive, or judicial in its nature and essence. When the functions so assigned are administrative in their nature or are not exclusively legislative, executive, or judicial in character, the statute does not delegate legislative power or confer executive or judicial power and authority in violation of article 3. And the performance of such a duty by a 'person properly belonging to one of the departments' of the government is not the exercise of 'any powers appertaining to either of the others' in violation of article 2.

The fixing of tolls for the use of a bridge may be done directly by legislative enactment; but it is not a power that must be exclusively exercised by the Legislature. The fixing of such tolls may be regarded as an administrative function that may be delegated by the Legislature; and the Constitution does not forbid the performance of administrative functions by the courts.

While the courts may not without sanction of organic law prescribe rates for public charges, yet when the reasonableness of a rate is determined on existing facts duly admitted or proven, a statute under which such determination is made may by its own terms continue in force for future periods rates found to be fair and reasonable.

The statute, chapter 7462, Acts of 1917, provides for determining by an election whether a bridge should be built and whether it should be free or toll. It also provides that tolls shall be 'fair and reasonable.' This is the limitation; and neither the provision for fixing the tolls by the county commissioners nor that for the approval thereof by the circuit judge is clearly violative of the second and third articles of the state Constitution.

The provision of section 5, chapter 7462, Acts of 1917, that whenever the county commissioners shall fix any toll or charges for a county bridge under the act, such tolls and charges shall be reviewed by a circuit judge, who after hearing shall 'enter an order approving such tolls and charges in whole or in part, or increase or decrease the same as he shall...