State v. Earlenbaugh

• Decision Date: 19 June 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-1087,84-1087
• Citation: 18 OBR 16,18 Ohio St.3d 19,479 N.E.2d 846
• Parties: , 52 A.L.R.4th 1153, 18 O.B.R. 16 The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. EARLENBAUGH, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 19

18 Ohio St.3d 19

479 N.E.2d 846, 52 A.L.R.4th 1153, 18 O.B.R. 16

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. EARLENBAUGH, Appellee.

No. 84-1087.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

June 19, 1985.

Syllabus by the Court

Ohio's reckless operation statute, R.C. 4511.20, is sufficiently definite to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of the conduct proscribed therein and, thus, such statute is not unconstitutionally vague, indefinite, or uncertain.

On April 22, 1983, at approximately 11:50 p.m., appellee, Leo R. Earlenbaugh, was operating a semi-tractor-trailer on northbound Interstate 71. At that time, Trooper Joe L. Anderson of the Ohio Highway Patrol had stopped to assist Trooper Harvey on a routine traffic matter. Anderson's cruiser was positioned behind Harvey's cruiser and was off the traveled portion of the highway some one and one-half feet from the solid white edge or berm line of northbound I-71. Both cruisers had their lights and flashers activated.

While Anderson was standing beside Harvey's cruiser, between that cruiser and the berm line of the northbound I-71 lanes, the appellee approached the parked vehicles in his semi-tractor-trailer. Anderson testified that appellee's rig began moving closer to the right edge of the lane nearest the berm. In order to avoid the oncoming rig, Anderson positioned himself flatly up against Harvey's cruiser. Anderson further testified that the appellee deliberately passed over the berm line with his tractor-trailer, to within six inches of Anderson and his cruiser, "in an apparent attempt to see how close he could get to me."

The appellee testified that he reduced his speed when he saw Anderson and the stopped vehicles. He agreed that Anderson positioned himself closely against Harvey's cruiser, but contended that he did not cross over the berm line with any portion of his truck.

Anderson then pursued the appellee for some four to five minutes, over a distance of six to seven miles, stopped him, and charged him with reckless operation in violation of R.C. 4511.20.

The Wadsworth Municipal Court found that appellee's rig crossed over the white berm line and passed within six inches of Anderson. The court concluded that "the act of crossing the line was in wanton disregard of the safety of Trooper Anderson and his vehicle" in contravention of R.C. 4511.20. The court made no finding that appellee was guilty of willful misconduct.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals for Medina County, the appellee raised the following assignment of error: "The trial court erred in finding the defendant guilty of reckless operation in violation of section 4511.20 of the Ohio Revised Code in that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." The court of appeals, while purporting to address the assigned error, held essentially that R.C. 4511.20 was unconstitutionally defective as applied to the facts of this case, and reversed. The court based this determination upon its conclusion that "[a]s the trial court herein was unable to find the defendant guilty of willful disregard, it follows he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of willful disregard of another's safety." The court of appeals, however, did not evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's finding that the appellee acted in wanton disregard of the safety of Trooper Anderson.

The cause is now before the court pursuant to the allowance of a motion for leave to appeal.

Norman E. Brague, Director of Law, Wadsworth, for appellant.

Ellis B. Brannon and Patricia Walker, Sharon Center, for appellee.

WRIGHT, Justice.

R.C. 4511.20 provides, in its entirety, that: "No person shall operate a vehicle, trackless trolley, or streetcar on any street or highway in willful or wanton disregard of the safety of persons or property."

The instant case presents essentially a single issue involving the interpretation and application of this statutory provision: whether a person may be convicted of violating R.C. 4511.20 based upon a finding that he operated a vehicle in wanton disregard of the safety of others without further concluding that such operation was also in willful disregard of the safety of others. The court of appeals held that operating a vehicle in wanton disregard of the safety of others, standing alone, did not constitute a violation of R.C. 4511.20, absent a corresponding finding of willful disregard. The court of appeals premised this holding upon its determination that R.C. 4511.20 was impermissibly indefinite and incapable of uniform application in violation of both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. We now reverse.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that the language of a criminal statute must be sufficiently definite "to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute." United States v. Harriss (1954), 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 811, 98 L.Ed. 989; Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville (1972), 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 110. The Due Process Clause prohibits the states from holding an individual "criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed." United States v. Harriss, supra, 347 U.S. at 617, 74 S.Ct. at 843, Wainwright v. Stone (1973), 414 U.S. 21, 22, 94 S.Ct. 190, 192, 38 L.Ed.2d 179; Rose v. Locke (1975), 423 U.S. 48, 49, 96 S.Ct. 243, 243, 46 L.Ed.2d 185. The constitutional requirement of definiteness, however, does not invalidate every statute which a reviewing court believes could have been drafted with greater precision. Many statutes contain some inherent vagueness. As noted by the Supreme Court of the United States, " '[i]n most English words and phrases there lurk uncertainties.' * * * Even trained lawyers may find it necessary to consult legal dictionaries, treatises, and judicial opinions before they may say with any certainty what some statutes may compel or forbid. * * * All the Due Process Clause requires is that the law give sufficient warning that men may conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden." Rose v. Locke, supra, at 50, 96 S.Ct. at 244; cf. Nash v. United States (1913), 229 U.S. 373, 33 S.Ct. 780, 57 L.Ed. 1232; United States v. National Dairy Products Corp. (1963), 372 U.S. 29, 83 S.Ct. 594, 9 L.Ed.2d 561.

This standard, as articulated by the Supreme Court, is clearly satisfied in the present case. While we recognize that the statutory terms "willful" and "wanton" represent two differing degrees of culpability, see Hawkins v. Ivy (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 114, 118, fn. 4, 363 N.E.2d 367, 4 O.O.3d 243, and that the legislature has failed to expressly define these terms, we are nevertheless convinced that the language of R.C. 4511.20 is sufficiently definite to provide clear and adequate notice of the conduct proscribed therein.

Under the language of the statute, a person is prohibited from operating a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the safety of persons or property. Contrary to the holding of the court of appeals, we believe that the statute simply provides two definite and clear bases upon which a finding of guilt may be premised. ¹ A person may be found guilty of violating ...