State v. Earls
| Decision Date | 14 February 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 56502-3,56502-3 |
| Citation | 116 Wn.2d 364,805 P.2d 211 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Michael Duane EARLS, Appellant. En Banc |
Michael Duane Earls, c/o Julie A. Kesler, Seattle, pro se.
Washington Appellate Defender Ass'n, Julie A. Kesler, Seattle, for appellant.
Michael E. Rickert, Skagit County Prosecutor, David R. Needy, Deputy, Mount Vernon, for respondent.
Michael Duane Earls was convicted by jury of one count of premeditated first degree murder and was sentenced to 340 months in prison. Earls appeals his conviction, asserting that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the confession he made to the police. He claims that the statements were made after an invalid waiver of his rights under article 1, section 9 of Washington's constitution, which protects against self-incrimination. Holding that Earls' waiver was made freely, knowingly, and voluntarily, we affirm.
Earls does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction other than as it pertains to the issue of his waiver. Thus, we discuss only those facts relevant to the trial court's denial of Earls' motion to suppress his statements.
On March 31, 1987, Roy Alaniz was shot while in his home in Sedro Woolley. 1 Alaniz was taken to a hospital, where he died the next day from a gunshot wound to the head. Detective Kenneth Rosencrantz of the Sedro Woolley Police Department was in charge of the investigation of the Alaniz death, which was determined to be a homicide. On December 7, 1987 a confidential informant told the Sedro Woolley Police Department of a possible suspect in the Lynnwood area. This information led them to talk with Earls' girl friend, Cindy Neal. Based on the interview with Neal, Rosencrantz determined that there was probable cause to arrest Earls for the murder of Alaniz. On January 21, 1988, at approximately 12:30 p.m., Detective Gary
Northrup of the Lynnwood Police Department, accompanied by Rosencrantz, arrested Earls. Northrup advised Earls of his constitutional rights at the time the arrest was made. Earls was then taken to the Lynnwood Police Department.
The parties have stipulated that Earls called his ex-wife, Valerie LaPier, from the jail at 1:50 p.m. that same day. Earls testified that he told the booking officer that he wanted to call LaPier so that she could contact an attorney. He also testified that the call was made in the presence of the booking officer and that the booking officer dialed the phone. Rosencrantz testified that he was not sure if the booking officer usually dials these calls. Because Earls did not mention this call to his attorney until shortly before the April suppression hearing, defense counsel did not question police department personnel about it until some 3 months after Earls' arrest. The parties stipulated that the booking officer has no independent recollection of this call.
Earls further testified that he told LaPier that he was at the police station and that he said, "I don't know what they have me here for but I need a lawyer." 2 He testified that LaPier told him that she was quite sure she could find someone.
Valerie LaPier testified that she received a call from Earls shortly after lunch on the 21st, and that Earls said that he was in jail charged with murder and that he needed an attorney. LaPier got the name of Robert Leen from an attorney at the law firm where she is employed as a paralegal. Because Leen was not in his office when she called, she left a message. LaPier testified that Leen returned her call between 4:30 and 5 p.m. LaPier then told Leen that her ex-husband was in jail and charged with murder. She said that Leen said that he would "call and try to find out what was going on."
Robert Leen testified that, while he did not recall the specific date, he did receive a call from Valerie LaPier. He confirmed that LaPier told him that a boyfriend was charged with murder and that she asked if he was interested in representing him. His response to her was "yes, I would--I needed to find out what was happening." He then called the Lynnwood Police Department. Leen testified that he identified himself and stated that he was calling for Earls and that a friend had contacted him on Earls' behalf. He asked to speak to Earls, but was told that he could not. He then asked to leave his name and number so the police could have Earls call him back. He testified that he called the station before 5 p.m., but could not be more specific about the time.
Leen did not say that he was Earls' attorney or that he did not want the police to talk to Earls. "All I ever represented was that I was contacted by his family or friends." He made no attempt to go to the station or see Earls first hand. Leen did not consider himself retained at that point. LaPier also testified that Leen was never hired. Earls does not claim that Leen was ever retained to represent him.
Leen testified that Earls called him back at 8 or 9 o'clock that evening and told Leen that he had confessed and he did not think there was anything Leen could do. Earls testified that he did not call Leen until the next day. Leen then spoke to LaPier who told him that she was not sure if they would hire an attorney or try to get a public defender.
Leen heard nothing further regarding Earls until about 3 months later. He had not made any notes regarding the calls. Leen testified that his first impression was that Earls was being interviewed by the police when he called. However, he then testified that he could not recall for sure whether he had been told that the police were interviewing Earls, that Earls was unavailable, or that calls could not be transferred to the jail.
At about 4:43 p.m. on the day of his arrest, Earls was taken from his cell and brought into a private office at the Lynnwood Police Department to be interviewed by Detective Rosencrantz. No one else was present in the room. Rosencrantz testified that he read Earls his constitutional rights from a pocket rights card at the beginning of the interview. It is undisputed that Rosencrantz re-advised Earls of his constitutional rights at 5:21 p.m. and that Earls signed a written waiver at that time.
At 5:25 p.m., Rosencrantz began a taped interview. Immediately prior, an agreement was reached that Earls would not be charged with aggravated first degree murder, which carries a penalty of death or life in prison without parole. At the beginning of the tape, Earls was again advised of his rights. It is undisputed that Earls did not invoke his constitutional rights at any time during the interview with Rosencrantz. Earls testified that during the interview he at no time asked for an attorney, stated that he was waiting for a call from an attorney, or in any way indicated that he did not want to answer questions.
Rosencrantz testified that he was not in the booking room when Earls called LaPier nor was he aware that Earls had called LaPier to see if she could get an attorney. While he was aware that Earls had made a call, he had no knowledge of the content of the call. Rosencrantz was not made aware of Leen's call until 2 weeks before the suppression hearing.
The parties have stipulated that no one at the police station has independent recollection of Leen's call coming in; that there is no record of the call because the message pad used at the booking desk is routinely destroyed every third day or so, unless a request is made to save a particular message; and that incoming calls can be transferred back to the jail.
Prior to trial, Earls filed two motions to suppress, one as to his statements and another as to all the evidence resulting from his arrest, which he contended was illegal. Earls challenged the existence of probable cause for his arrest and the authority of the Lynnwood Police Department to make the arrest.
After a hearing, the trial court denied both motions. In so doing, the court signed two orders. The first referred specifically to the CrR 3.5 hearing, which was held to determine the admissibility of the statements. The second dealt with both motions. The court specified that the two orders "should be read together and not separately" because, while the phone call by Leen was addressed only in the second order, facts relevant to the voluntariness of Earls' statement are contained in both.
In the first order, the court listed the following undisputed facts: At the time of his arrest, Earls was advised of his constitutional rights by the Lynnwood police; at 4:43 p.m., Earls was taken from his cell to be interviewed by Rosencrantz; at 5:21 p.m., Rosencrantz re-advised Earls of his constitutional rights and Earls executed a written waiver; at 5:25 p.m., the taped interview was started and Earls was advised of his rights on the tape; Earls never invoked his constitutional rights during the interview; and the interview tape was made after an agreement was reached not to charge Earls with aggravated murder. The testimony given at the hearing conflicted as to whether or not Earls was under the effect of barbiturates during the interview and was advised of his rights when the interview began at 4:43 p.m. There was also a dispute as to who first suggested that Earls give a statement in exchange for a reduced charge.
The trial court entered the following conclusions: There was insufficient evidence that Earls was intoxicated or that his will was affected by drugs; Earls was verbally advised of his rights at 4:43 p.m.; Earls was the first to suggest a confession in exchange for avoiding the death penalty or a sentence of life in prison without parole; Rosencrantz did not threaten Earls with the death penalty or life in prison without parole unless he confessed; and Earls' statement was not induced by threat or promise. Earls has not assigned error to any of these conclusions.
The court went on to conclude that Earls' statement to Rosencrantz was "given...
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