State v. Earnhardt
| Citation | 86 S.E. 960,170 N.C. 725 |
| Decision Date | 17 November 1915 |
| Docket Number | 393. |
| Parties | STATE v. EARNHARDT. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina |
Appeal from Superior Court, Stanly County; Carter, Judge.
John Earnhardt was indicted for working a convict on the chain gang without requiring him to wear the uniform of a felon and acquitted, and the State appeals. Affirmed.
An ambiguous statute is to be construed according to its apparent general purpose with a view to executing the design and purpose of the act.
Defendant John Earnhardt, was indicted in the superior court for having worked Walter J. Kennedy on the chain gang of the township mentioned in the indictment without requiring him to wear the uniform of a convicted felon, contrary to the statute, and was tried at said term, whereupon the jury returned a special verdict, as follows:
"(1) At November term, 1914, of Stanly superior court, W. J Kennedy was duly convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to work for a term of six years on the chain gang for North and South Albemarle townships.
(2) On or about the 13th day of May, 1915, W. J. Kennedy was turned over to the chain gang and began working out his sentence, and has worked on the chain gang continuously since said date.
(3) John Earnhardt, the defendant above named, is the superintendent in charge of the chain gang and also in charge of W. J. Kennedy, and has been working W. J. Kennedy on the chain gang ever since the resignation of N.C Cranford, superintendent.
(7) That a copy of the judgment of the court sentencing W. J. Kennedy is hereto attached and made a part of the facts as found by the jury.
If, upon the foregoing facts, the court be of the opinion that the defendant is guilty, the jury so find; otherwise they find him not guilty.
Upon the foregoing special verdict of the jury, the court being of opinion that the defendant was not guilty, so adjudged, whereupon the state appealed after having duly excepted."
The Attorney General and T. H. Calvert, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
Robert L. Smith, of Albemarle, for appellee.
WALKER, J. (after stating the facts as above).
The judgment of the court did not require that W. J. Kennedy, who was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to six years at hard labor in the penitentiary, should wear the uniform of a felon while at work, which defendant in this action contends was necessary to be stated in the judgment against Kennedy in order to make him criminally liable for not requiring him to do so. Public Laws of 1911, c. 64, § 4, provides that:
"It shall be unlawful to work persons convicted of a felony in other than the uniform of a felon, or to clothe a person convicted of a misdemeanor in the uniform of a felon." And section 5 provides that "any superintendent of convicts or other person in authority who shall violate this law shall be guilty of a misdemeanor," and fined or imprisoned or both, in the discretion of the court, and liable in damages to the party aggrieved. The first section of the chapter makes it the duty of "the several judicial officers of the state, in assigning any person to work the public roads of any county, to designate in each judgment that such as may be convicted of a felony shall wear felons' stripes, and such as are convicted of a misdemeanor shall not wear * * * stripes." The statute further provides that the state prison board shall prescribe uniforms to be worn by persons convicted of felonies and those convicted of misdemeanors, which shall be different and easily distinguishable, with the discretion to allow persons convicted of a misdemeanor to wear plain clothes "similar to those" of an ordinary citizen. As the judge did not designate, in the sentence of W. J. Kennedy, in what manner he should be clothed when at work on the chain gang, it is contended by the defendant, and denied by the state, that the omission of this direction is fatal to the further prosecution of the case. The question therefore is whether this provision of the statute is mandatory or merely directory. Our opinion is that it is mandatory, and the decision, as to the nature of the offense, is confined to the judge and not left to the defendant's keeper.
It is common learning that a statute must be so construed as to give effect to the presumed and reasonably probable intention of the Legislature and so as to effectuate that intention and the object for which it was passed. Where it is clearly worded, so that it is free from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded in favor of a mere presumption as to what policy was intended to be declared. Lewis v. U. S., 92 U.S. 618, 23 L.Ed. 513; Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 9 S.Ct. 651, 32 L.Ed. 1060; B. R. Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U.S. 1, 15 S.Ct. 508, 39 L.Ed. 601. But where it admits of more than one construction, or is doubtful of meaning, uncertain, or ambiguous, it is not to be construed only by its exact language, but by its apparent general purpose; that meaning being adopted which will best serve to execute the design and purpose of the act, for a thing within the intention is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter. Wood v. U. S. 16 Pet. 342, 10 L.Ed. 987; Bernier v. Bernier, 147 U.S. 242, 13 S.Ct. 244, 39 L.Ed. 152; Smythe v. Fiske, 23 Wall. 374, 23 L.Ed. 47; Fortune v. Commissioners, 140 N.C. 322, 52 S.E. 950; McLeod v. Commissioners, 148 N.C. 85, 61 S.E. 605. There are other principles of statutory construction, which are that technical rules as to the force or meaning of particular terms must yield to the clear expression of the Legislature's paramount will; and a construction of a statute should not be adopted, if the words will permit, which will lead to evil, unjust, oppressive, or absurd consequences, or those in direct violation of its own provisions. Endlich on Int. of Statutes, 258 and notes, 264 and 267; U.S. v. Freeman, 3 How. 556, 11 L.Ed. 724; Huidekoper v. Douglass, 3 Cranch, 1, 2 L. Ed. 347; Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 23 S.Ct. 787, 47 L.Ed. 1016; U.S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 19 L.Ed. 278; Oates v. First Nat. Bank, 100 U.S. 239, 25 L.Ed. 580. The statute, in other words, should be construed sensibly, and, in order to make sure of the true intent, the meaning of words or phrases may be extended or narrowed or additional terms implied, or it may be presumed that the Legislature intended exceptions to its language, where this is necessary to be done in order to enforce the evident purpose, but this is all subject to the general restriction, that the meaning is to be ascertained from the words of the statute and the subject-matter to which it relates. U.S. v. Freeman, 3 How. 556, 11 L.Ed. 724; Brewer v. Blougher, 14 Pet. 178, 10 L.Ed. 408; U.S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 19 L.Ed. 278; U.S. v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95, 18 S.Ct. 3, 42 L.Ed. 394; Gardner v. Collins, 2 Pet. 58, 7 L.Ed. 347; Endlich on...
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