State v. Eason, No. 30420.

• Decision Date: 25 August 2009
• Docket Number: No. 30420.
• Citation: 116 Conn.App. 601,976 A.2d 797
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Juan EASON.

976 A.2d 797

116 Conn.App. 601

STATE of Connecticut v. Juan EASON.

No. 30420.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 19, 2009.

Decided August 25, 2009.

Richard W. Callahan, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Rocco A. Chiarenza, special deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John A. Connelly and Gail P. Hardy, state's attorneys, for the appellee (state).

FLYNN, C.J., and GRUENDEL and HARPER, Js.

GRUENDEL, J.

The defendant, Juan Eason, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) assumed the role of advocate on behalf of the state and (2) failed to consider, sua sponte, whether certain photographs admitted into evidence should have been cropped to excise allegedly prejudicial images contained therein, as a matter of due process. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. The defendant and the victim, Robin Wilcox, were involved in a periodic relationship for approximately eight years. Throughout their relationship, the defendant lived at the victim's apartment in Waterbury along with two of the victim's children and her granddaughter. Upon learning of the defendant's affair with her sister, the victim ended her relationship with the defendant, and he moved out of the apartment.

Approximately three weeks later, the victim agreed to help the defendant move from Waterbury to Middletown. After meeting, they drove together in the victim's minivan to pick up the defendant's nephew, who also had agreed to help the defendant in his move. Unable to reach the nephew on his cellular telephone, the defendant and the victim parked in the vicinity of the nephew's home. While waiting, the defendant's affair with the victim's sister came up in conversation, and an argument ensued. At that moment, the defendant "just lost it" and strangled the victim to death.

Despite the defendant's belief that the victim was dead, he failed to notify anyone of her condition. Instead, the defendant moved the victim's body to the rear of the minivan, wrapped it in a blanket and placed T-shirts over the victim's face and feet. With the deceased victim in the back of the minivan, the defendant drove to the victim's apartment in search of a change of clothes, withdrew $500 from the victim's bank account, using her automatic teller machine card, and purchased a carton of cigarettes from a store and crack cocaine from someone on a street corner. The defendant then parked the minivan on a street where he believed that no one would discover the victim. Four days later, however, the police found the minivan with the victim's decomposing body inside. The defendant was apprehended that same day. A jury trial followed, at the conclusion of which the jury found the defendant guilty of murder, and the court rendered judgment accordingly. From that judgment, the defendant appeals.

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly cast itself into the role of advocate on behalf of the state, thereby depriving him of his constitutional right to due process and a fair trial. Specifically, the defendant alleges that after the court determined that certain autopsy photographs lacked relevance for identification purposes, it improperly suggested that such evidence was relevant as to cause of death. Having failed to object to such matters at trial, the defendant claims that he is entitled to relief pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). We disagree.

To prevail on his unpreserved constitutional claim, the defendant must satisfy all four conditions set forth in Golding. He must show that "(1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation clearly exists and clearly deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. Failure to satisfy any of the four conditions will cause the defendant's claim to fail. Id., at 240, 567 A.2d 823. "The appellate tribunal is free, therefore, to respond to the defendant's claim by focusing on whichever condition is most relevant in the particular circumstances." Id. Our analysis in the present case centers on Golding's third prong.¹

Before addressing the allegations made by the defendant, we "recite certain well established principles regarding the responsibilities of the trial judge in conducting a criminal trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Harris, 28 Conn.App. 474, 478, 612 A.2d 123, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 926, 614 A.2d 828 (1992). In particular, "[d]ue process requires that a criminal defendant be given a fair trial before an impartial judge and unprejudiced jury in an atmosphere of judicial calm." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 272 Conn. 106, 362, 864 A.2d 666 (2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 848, 126 S.Ct. 102, 163 L.Ed.2d 116 (2005). In a criminal trial, the judge is not simply a moderator of the proceedings. State v. Pharr, 44 Conn.App. 561, 568, 691 A.2d 1081 (1997). Rather, it is the responsibility of the judge to ensure that the trial is "conducted in a manner which approaches an atmosphere of perfect impartiality which is so much to be desired in a judicial proceeding." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Peloso, 109 Conn.App 477 489, 952 A.2d 825 (2008). In so doing, the function of the judge "is neither that of automaton nor advocate...." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fernandez, 198 Conn. 1, 10, 501 A.2d 1195 (1985). The judge is not merely an "umpire in a forensic encounter"; (internal quotation marks omitted) Cameron v. Cameron, 187 Conn. 163, 169, 444 A.2d 915 (1982); but, rather, "a minister of justice ... [who] should be cautious and circumspect in his language and conduct"; (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted) id.; in whatever he does.

The judge "should never assume a position of advocacy, real or apparent, in a case before [him or her], and should avoid any displays of hostility or skepticism toward the defendant's case, or of approbation for the prosecution's." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pharr, supra, 44 Conn.App. at 570, 691 A.2d 1081. Although the judge should not hesitate to intervene when matters warrant, he or she "should avoid trying the case for the lawyers." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fernandez, supra, 198 Conn. at 11, 501 A.2d 1195; State v. Peloso, supra, 109 Conn.App. at 492, 952 A.2d 825; see also United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923, 926 (2d Cir.1945) (Hand, J.) ("[p]rosecution and judgment are two quite separate functions in the administration of justice; they must not merge"). If the judge chooses to intervene in a criminal trial, such intervention must "reach a significant extent and be adverse to the defendant to a substantial degree" before risking impaired functioning of the finder of fact or the appearance of an impartial judge. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Peloso, supra, at 491, 952 A.2d 825. The judge's intervention, however, may be necessary to bring out facts needed to resolve a doubt that he or she apparently had with regard to the admissibility of certain evidence. See Hutchinson v. Plante, 175 Conn. 1, 3, 392 A.2d 488 (1978).

In considering a judge's intervention, our Supreme Court has observed that "[t]he influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hernandez, 218 Conn. 458, 462, 590 A.2d 112 (1991). The jury is ever watchful of the judge's words; State v. Cox, 50 Conn.App. 175, 182, 718 A.2d 60 (1998), aff'd, 251 Conn. 54, 738 A.2d 652 (1999); and has "a natural tendency to look to the trial judge for guidance, and may find it even where it is not intended." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fernandez, supra, 198 Conn. at 12, 501 A.2d 1195. It follows that "[t]he judge's attitude and the result he supposedly desires may be inferred by the jury from a look, a lifted eyebrow [or] an inflection of the voice...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. For this reason, the judge must avoid taking a position of advocacy that "may bear the seeds of tilting the balance against the accused and place the judge in the eyes of some jurors, on the side of the prosecution." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Delarosa, 16 Conn.App. 18, 29, 547 A.2d 47 (1988).

In the present case, the jury was excused from the courtroom before the judge engaged in the colloquy that the defendant asserts crossed the line of impartiality as he considered the admissibility of certain autopsy photographs. Unless the jury was made aware of the colloquy between the judge and the parties during that time, it is factually impossible for the jury to have been prejudiced by actions of the trial judge to which it was not made witness. See State v. Pharr, supra, 44 Conn.App. at 570-71, 691 A.2d 1081 (noting jury may be improperly guided by actions of judge it observes); see also State v. Fernandez, supra, 198 Conn. at 12, 501 A.2d 1195 (same); cf. State v. Peloso, supra, 109 Conn.App. at 493, 952 A.2d 825 (when judge and fact finder one and the same, any appearance of partiality in court's conduct carried less danger of prejudicing defendant than it would have in jury trial). There is no indication that the jury was made aware of the actual events that transpired after it had been excused.

Even if we assume that the autopsy photographs were admitted into evidence as a result of improper judicial advocacy, their admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt....