State v. Eaton
| Decision Date | 28 December 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 69A05-9402-CV-59,69A05-9402-CV-59 |
| Citation | 659 N.E.2d 232 |
| Parties | STATE of Indiana and Indiana State Highway Department, Appellants-Defendants, v. James R. EATON, Shirley Eaton, as Legal and Natural Guardians of Jeffrey J. Eaton, Appellees-Plaintiffs. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Jeffrey Eaton, a minor, was injured in a collision occurring on a State highway. His parents, acting as guardians, sued the State on Jeffrey's behalf and also sued on their own behalf for loss of services. After a trial by jury the Eatons received two awards for damages which together exceeded the cap imposed by the Indiana Tort Claims Act. The State now appeals raising four issues for our review which we consolidate and rephrase as: (1) Did the trial court err in instructing the jury on Jeffrey Eaton's duty of care as a traveler on a public highway? (2) Did the trial court err in prohibiting the State from introducing evidence of Jeffrey Eaton's failure to use protective eyewear, including a full helmet? (3) Did the trial court err in refusing to apply a single statutory cap of Three Hundred Thousand Dollars ($300,000.00) to the jury verdicts in favor of the Eatons?
We affirm.
This is the second time this case has come before us for review. The relevant facts were set forth in the first appeal as follows:
On October 2, 1981, a state highway maintenance crew was continuing the work it began the day before, "clipping" the shoulder of U.S. Highway 421 ("Highway") for drainage. [Record Cite omitted]. When clipping a highway's shoulder, a grader pulls up dirt, gravel, and other materials along the edge of the road onto the road. Dust is created when a highway is clipped. A loader loads the dirt onto a dump truck, which hauls the debris away. Normally, a sweeper makes several passes to clear away much of the dirt and gravel left on the roadway.
Warning signs were posted in the vicinity of the area in which the crew was clipping. The crew was clipping the Highway from south to north, and much dust was generated by its activities. However, the evidence is conflicting on exactly the amount of dust present: some witnesses testified that the Highway was only slightly dusty, while others stated that the dust formed a sizeable cloud on the roadway.
At approximately 2:30 p.m. on October 2, 1981, Jeffrey Eaton ("Jeffrey"), then a high school senior, was driving his motorcycle home from school on the Highway, traveling in a northerly direction. Jeffrey noticed dirt and dust on the Highway. As he came up over a slight rise in the Highway, he slowed down from his speed of forty (40)--forty-five (45) miles per hour.
A semi-tractor trailer was traveling on the Highway in front of Jeffrey. The evidence is unclear regarding whether the trailer was slowing down, stopped, or beginning to move after stopping, but the driver stated that he was following a flagman's directions in the area of the Highway being clipped. The trailer's driver remembers hearing a bang and seeing something in the roadway in his rearview mirror. Upon exiting the trailer's cab, the driver discovered Jeffrey, who had apparently run into the rear of the trailer. Jeffrey, who suffered severe neurological injuries as a result of the accident, does not clearly remember the day's events, but it appears that Jeffrey's motorcycle collided with the rear end of the trailer.
Jeffrey and his parents brought suit against the State and the owner and operator of the trailer. At trial, they proceeded only against the State, since proceedings against the trailer's owner and operator had previously been dismissed.
State v. Eaton (1991), Ind.App., 581 N.E.2d 956, 957-958, reh'g denied. The jury returned a verdict in the Eatons' favor, but we reversed and remanded the case for a new trial because of a faulty jury instruction. Id. In the second trial, the jury again returned a verdict in the Eatons' favor. The jury awarded the Eatons Four Hundred Forty-nine Thousand Two Hundred Eighty Dollars ($449,280.00) as Jeffrey's legal guardians for Jeffrey's personal injuries, and awarded them One Hundred One Thousand One Hundred Seventy-eight Dollars and Sixty-four Cents ($101,178.64) as Jeffrey's natural guardians for loss of Jeffrey's services. The trial court reduced the larger award to Three Hundred Thousand Dollars ($300,000.00) in accordance with the Indiana Tort Claims Act, but allowed the loss of services award to stand. This appeal ensued in due course.
The State first contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury on Jeffrey's duty of care as a motorist on a public highway. The jury was instructed that Jeffrey had a duty to use ordinary care. In so doing the court refused the State's tendered instruction which would have advised the jury that Jeffrey was required to use extraordinary care. In support of its contention the State points out that at the time of the collision Indiana Code § 9-4-1-33 then in effect provided in relevant part:
(a) No driver of a vehicle or motorman of a street car shall disobey the instructions of any official traffic control device placed in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, unless at the time otherwise directed by a police officer.
(b) When traffic control devices or flagmen are utilized at worksites on any public highway for traffic control, all motorists shall exercise extraordinary care to secure the mutual safety of all persons and motorists at the worksite.
The State's tendered instruction tracked the language of the forgoing statute; and the State argues the court erred in rejecting it because the instruction was a correct statement of the law, supported by the evidence, and not covered by any other instruction.
The giving of jury instructions is a matter within the trial court's discretion, and we review only for abuse. Weller v. Mack Trucks, Inc. (1991), Ind.App., 570 N.E.2d 1341, 1343. The refusal of a tendered instruction constitutes reversible error when: (a) the instruction is shown to correctly state the law, (b) the instruction is supported by the evidence, (c) the instruction is not covered by others which were given, and (d) there is a reasonable probability substantial rights of the complaining party have been adversely affected. Transport Ins. Co. v. Terrell Trucking, Inc. (1987), Ind.App., 509 N.E.2d 220, 224.
Whether the State was entitled to an instruction that Jeffrey had a duty to use extraordinary care depends in part at least on whether there was evidence in the record showing the collision occurred at a worksite. This is so because ordinarily there are no degrees of care in Indiana, Neal v. Home Builders, Inc. (1953), 232 Ind. 160, 111 N.E.2d 280, reh'g denied, and absent a statute requiring otherwise, the proper standard is ordinary care. At the time of the collision the term "worksite" was defined as "[a] location or area upon which a public purpose construction or maintenance activity, or a private purpose construction or maintenance activity which is properly authorized by a governmental agency, is being performed on a public highway." Ind.Code § 9-4-1-19.5. The location or area comprising a worksite depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Here, the only evidence of whether the collision occurred at a worksite was provided by the Eatons in their case in chief. Doctor Jack Humpries, a professor emeritus in civil engineering at the University of Tennessee, was qualified by the trial court as an expert in the field of highway safety. Without objection he testified, among other things, that the worksite Record at 989-990. According to Doctor Humpries the location of the "flagmen" in this case established the outer boundaries of where work was physically taking place on the roadway. The record shows the collision occurred at some distance away from the flagmen and thus not at the worksite. Because the collision did occur at or within a worksite, Jeffrey was only required to use ordinary care while driving his motorcycle. The State's instruction concerning extraordinary care was not supported by the evidence and was therefore properly rejected. We find no error on this issue.
The State next contends the trial court erred in prohibiting it from introducing evidence of Jeffrey's failure to use protective eyewear including a full helmet. The State argues that Jeffrey had a duty to keep a look out, and not allowing the jury to consider his failure to wear goggles or a helmet with a face shield substantially affected the State's contributory negligence defense.
The trial court is invested with sound discretion in admitting or rejecting evidence, and we reverse only where an abuse of discretion is shown. Second Nat. Bank v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. (1979), 181 Ind.App. 1, 3, 390 N.E.2d 229, 231. As the State...
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