State v. Eddings
Decision Date | 02 November 2021 |
Docket Number | No. COA20-758,COA20-758 |
Citation | 866 S.E.2d 499 |
Parties | STATE of North Carolina, v. Dominique Jawann EDDINGS, Defendant. |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Jonathan R. Marx, for the State.
W. Michael Spivey, for Defendant-Appellant.
¶ 1 Defendant Dominique Jawann Eddings ("Defendant") appeals convictions of possession with intent to sell or deliver fentanyl, possession of fentanyl, possession of a firearm by a felon, and intentionally keeping or maintaining a building for keeping or selling a controlled substance. Prior to trial, Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his residence. The trial court denied the motion, finding probable cause. On appeal, Defendant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress; the denial of his motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon; jury instructions given regarding the distinction between actual and constructive possession; and an alleged sentencing error. After careful review, we reverse the order denying Defendant's motion to suppress and grant Defendant a new trial.
¶ 2 In 2018, the Buncombe County Sherriff's Office believed Robert Jones ("Jones") was selling narcotics in Leicester, North Carolina. Law enforcement had a confidential informant make a controlled purchase of narcotics from Jones at Jones's residence.
¶ 3 When the confidential informant successfully purchased fentanyl from Jones, law enforcement asked the informant to complete a second controlled purchase. Jones told the informant that Law enforcement began surveilling Jones and observed Jones travel to a residence located at 92 Gillespie Drive. Jones remained at 92 Gillespie Drive for less than thirty minutes before meeting the informant at a nearby convenience store and providing narcotics to the informant. After observing this, law enforcement formed an opinion that Jones was procuring narcotics from 92 Gillespie Drive.
¶ 4 On April 19, 2018, Buncombe law enforcement officers arranged for the informant to purchase drugs from Jones for a third time. Prior to the scheduled controlled purchase, a surveillance team followed Jones1 as he traveled to 92 Gillespie Drive. Jones remained at the residence for approximately ten minutes. Approximately two minutes after Jones left the residence, law enforcement attempted to perform a traffic stop. However, Jones did not stop his vehicle when law enforcement officers activated their emergency lights. While pursuing Jones, law enforcement officers "could see him eating something." Officers "finally got him stopped at [a] gas station" and noticed "that there was something in his beard that looked like white powder." It was determined later that Jones ingested narcotics.
¶ 5 Once law enforcement detained Jones, Detective Jason Sales ("Detective Sales") of the Buncombe County Sherriff's Office "wrote a search warrant" for the residence Jones had recently left. At the time, law enforcement did not know who resided at 92 Gillespie Drive, but Detective Sales "believe[ed] that [the house] [was] where [ ] Jones purchased his narcotics from, that this was, in fact, his source of supply." "[A] search warrant was drafted, approved by a supervisor, [and] taken to a magistrate."2
The search warrant was executed that same day.
¶ 7 At the time the search warrant was executed, several individuals — including Defendant's cousin, Defendant's fiancé, an infant, and a teenaged girl — appeared to be either living at or visiting the residence. The search revealed digital scales, fentanyl, inositol powder, and a safe containing money and documents belonging to Defendant. Officers recovered a handgun with a holster and magazine from Defendant's bedroom. Officers further recovered magazines and ammunition from various places inside the residence. The following day, Detective Sales obtained a second search warrant for the residence. During the second search, officers found a coffee can in the backyard containing packages of fentanyl.
¶ 8 Subsequently, on January 7, 2019, Defendant was indicted for possession with the intent to sell or deliver a Schedule II controlled substance, possession of fentanyl, possession of a firearm by a felon, and intentionally keeping or maintaining a dwelling for keeping or selling a controlled substance. On September 16, 2019, Defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained during the searches of 92 Gillespie Drive, arguing the issuing magistrate "erred in finding probable cause to issue the search warrant to search Defendant's residence located at 92 Gillespie Drive." Defendant argued that the search warrant lacked sufficient probable cause and violated Defendant's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Defendant's motion was denied. In its order denying Defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court made findings of fact which Defendant challenges. The relevant findings of fact are as follows:
¶ 9 Defendant's trial began on September 17, 2019, in the Buncombe County Superior Court. On September 20, 2019, a jury convicted Defendant on all counts: possession with intent to sell or deliver fentanyl, possession of fentanyl, possession of a firearm by a felon, and intentionally keeping or maintaining a dwelling for keeping or selling a controlled substance. Judgments were entered upon the jury's verdicts. Defendant timely gave notice of appeal in open court.
¶ 10 On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and his motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a firearm by a felon. Defendant further contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on constructive possession of a firearm and in sentencing Defendant as a Class I felon.
¶ 11 Defendant first contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained through the search warrant, as the search warrant affidavit lacked probable cause for its issuance. After careful review, we agree and reverse the order denying Defendant's motion to suppress, as the application affidavit is fatally defective.
¶ 12 Our review of a trial court's denial of...
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