State v. Eddon

• Decision Date: 23 February 1894
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. EDDON.

36 P. 139

8 Wash. 292

STATE v. EDDON.

Supreme Court of Washington

February 23, 1894

Appeal from superior court, Lincoln county; James Z. Moore, Judge.

William C. Eddon appeals from a conviction of manslaughter. Reversed.

Thomas C. Griffith, for appellant.

DUNBAR C.J.

At the time of the transaction out of which this trial grows, the defendant, William C. Eddon, was a resident of the town of Sprague. He owned a stock ranch about 40 miles from Sprague then in possession of Eddon's tenant, one Samuel Carlton. The day previous to the shooting, Eddon had come to the ranch, and remained overnight at his tenant's house. The shooting took place early in the morning of the 1st day of July, 1892. Adjoining this farm, one Peter Meyers lived. Meyers had foreclosed a mortgage which he held on the ranch occupied by Carlton, and owned by Eddon, and at the foreclosure sale bought the ranch himself. Eddon would not yield possession, and out of this the controversy grew.

The testimony shows that, on the morning of the shooting, Meyers with his hired man, John Burfine, in passing from his home to some point of destination beyond, went near that portion of the Eddon ranch where the stable was situated. They had gotten past the house some little distance, when Meyers turned his horse, and rode back to a point in the lane opposite the stable, and called to Carlton, whom he saw asking him if Eddon was there, Eddon being then in the barn. Carlton replied that he was, whereupon Meyers said "Tell the damn, dirty, low-flung son of a bitch to come out here. I want to see him." Carlton testifies that he told Eddon that Meyers wanted to see him, not repeating to him the violent language which Meyers used. This information being imparted to him, Eddon went out. Meyers, upon seeing him, commenced using violent and abusive language, threatening to thrash him, etc., and calling him the name above mentioned. Meyers descended from his horse and hitched it, and started towards the fence, there being a fence between him and Eddon. Here there is a contradiction in the testimony, Meyers' testimony by dying declaration being that, after he called Eddon a "son of a bitch," Eddon drew his revolver, and told him to take it back. He replied that he would not take it back, and told Eddon to put it up. These expressions passed between them two or three times, and Eddon fired, shooting Meyers through the body. Eddon's version is that Meyers told him to come out there, and he would stamp him into the road. Eddon declared that he would not come, whereupon Meyers insisted that he would go to him, all the time cursing and damning, and using violent words, and making violent gestures; and he, believing that he was in danger of great bodily harm, fired upon Meyers. The result was that Meyers died within two days. Eddon was arrested, and charged with murder in the first degree. Upon the trial he was found guilty of the crime of manslaughter, and sentenced to 10 years in the penitentiary. From this judgment he appeals to this court.

Various assignments of error are made, two of which we shall discuss. After the testimony of the defense had closed, and without the character of the deceased having been raised or put in question by the defense, the state, on rebuttal, offered evidence tending to establish the reputation of the deceased as a law-abiding and peaceable man. It further offered evidence tending to show that Meyers was not in the habit of carrying deadly weapons. There are many authorities holding that it is not competent for the defense to prove the reputation of the deceased as a law-abiding and peaceable man; but many others hold that where the question of self-defense is in issue, and where such testimony serves to explain the conduct of the deceased, and is, therefore, a part of the res gestae, he can show the bad character and reputation of the deceased as a turbulent, quarrelsome man; and the rule is universal, we think, that, when this question is gone into by the defense, the state may rebut such testimony by showing his good character. There is, unfortunately, no brief filed by the respondent in this case; but from the examination of the cases cited by the appellant, the text-books on the subject, and all the information we have been able to gather, we think the universal rule is opposed to the doctrine that the prosecution on a trial for murder, in the first instance and as a part of their case, can show the character and reputation of the deceased; and, if they cannot do this in the opening, much less should they be allowed to go into this question in rebuttal, after the defendant has closed his case. In State v. Potter, 13 Kan. 415, that eminent jurist, Judge Brewer, in discussing this proposition, says: "In such cases it is said that the authorities hold that the defendant may show the bad character and reputation of the deceased as a turbulent, quarrelsome man. And if the defendant may show that the deceased was a known quarrelsome, dangerous man, why may not the state show that he was a known peaceable, quiet citizen? The argument is not good. The books are full of parallel cases. The accused may in some cases show his own good character. The state can never, in the first instance, show his bad character. A party can never offer evidence to support a witness' credibility until it is attacked. The reasons for these rules are obvious. Such testimony tends to distract the minds of the jury from the principal question, and should only be admitted when absolutely essential to the discovery of the truth. Again, the law presumes that a witness is honest, that a defendant has a good character, and that a party killed was a quiet and peaceable citizen, except so far as the contrary appears from the testimony in the case; and this presumption renders it unnecessary to offer any evidence in support thereof." It is evident that, if the introduction of such testimony is unnecessary, it is liable to have a pernicious influence, as Judge Brewer says, by attracting the minds of the jury to the immaterial evidence, and leading their minds from the true issues in the case. In Ben v. State, 37 Ala. 103, in deciding this question the court says: "It has been decided in this state that the bad character of the deceased is competent evidence for the accused, where the circumstances are such that they would be illustrated by such character. The reason upon which that decision rests is that the slayer must be reasonably presumed to act upon the circumstances surrounding him, as they are colored by the bad character of the deceased; and that, therefore, it is but just to the accused that the jury should know that character. We do not think that this reasoning requires us to hold that the state may go into evidence of the peaceable character of the deceased when it is not assailed on the part of the accused. If the character of the deceased was that of a peaceable man, the circumstances may safely be left to speak their own language. It is not requisite to their interpretation that the character should be known." Especially can it be seen that the testimony offered in this case to show that Meyers was a man of a peaceable character, and that he was a man who did not carry arms, and never had any firearms in his possession, was exceedingly prejudicial to the defendant, for there was no attempt made to show that the defendant had any knowledge of Meyers' reputation as a peaceable man, or any knowledge of the fact that he was not in the habit of carrying firearms; and the logical result of such testimony would be to hold Eddon responsible for acting on the theory that Meyers was the kind and character of a man he was proven to be, when there is nothing to justify the conclusion that he was aware of Meyers' character in this respect; in other words, the jury would judge Eddon's acts in the light of their knowledge of Meyers' character, instead of in the light of Eddon's knowledge of Meyers' character, in arriving at a conclusion whether or not Eddon was justified in concluding that he was in such danger of great bodily harm as to justify him in shooting him. Of course, the rule is that he must act as a prudent man would be justified in acting under the circumstances; and to hold him responsible for circumstances of which he was not aware is plainly an injustice. "In a prosecution for homicide it is not competent for the prosecution to show the peaceable disposition or character of the deceased, or his good reputation, except in rebuttal, when it has been assailed by the defense; for it is to be presumed, until otherwise shown, that the character, disposition, or habits of the person killed had no influence upon the defendant in committing the homicide." Kerr, Hom. § 420. In Pound v. State, 43 Ga. 88, the court, in passing upon this question, says: "When the state of Georgia charges the commission of crime against the citizen, it is incumbent on the state to prove the accusation, and to rebut, by proper testimony, matters permitted to be given in evidence for the defense, but not, in the first instance, to repel the presumption of the defense before these are put in issue by proof." To the same effect, People v. Anderson, 39 Cal. 704; People v. Bezy, 67 Cal. 223, 7 P. 643; and in fact, as we before said, such is the universal holding of the court where the question of character is allowed to be introduced at all.

The state also, over the objection of the defense, introduced the dying declaration of Meyers concerning the affray. The subject of dying declaration is a difficult one to adjudicate.

The general doctrine is that the full belief in impending death is the true and only test of admissibility in evidence of such declarations. The trouble with this character of evidence...