State v. Edgecombe
| Decision Date | 08 March 1973 |
| Docket Number | 52452,Nos. 52451,s. 52451 |
| Citation | 275 So.2d 740 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. William F. EDGECOMBE, Jr. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Perez, Fernandez & Seemann, Melvyn J. Perez, Manuel A. Fernandez, G. Frederick Seemann, Chalmette, Milton P. Masinter, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Harry H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Leander H. Perez, Jr., Dist. Atty., Charles H. Livaudais, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Defendant appeals from his convictions of the crimes of aggravated rape and aggravated kidnapping and his sentence to death. (The alleged crimes were allegedly committed consecutively by the defendant; there were separate indictments, but the defendant was tried for both crimes during one prosecution in order to avoid the issue of double jeopardy.) LSA-R.S. 14:42 and 14:44. During the proceedings, some thirty-four bills of exceptions were reserved and are presented for our determination.
Defense counsel present their argument under four headings, each embodying bills of exceptions reserved by counsel during the proceedings and pertinent to the subject heading.
Bill of Exceptions No. 6 was reserved when the trial court denied defense counsel's prayer for oyer which requested: 'Access to an examination by counsel to examine all physical evidence taken from the accused or allegedly used by the accused in the commission of an alleged offense, so that they may have the opportunity of countering any expert testimony offered by the prosecution.' (Vol. I, p. 91, Par. 2 of Prayer for Oyer)
Bill of Exceptions No. 8 was reserved when the trial court denied defense counsel's prayer for oyer which requested: 'A copy of any written or oral reports concerning polygraph, chemical, medical, formological or any other report of tests made by the State or by someone acting under the direction and control of the State.' (Vol. I, p. 92, Par. 4 of Prayer for Oyer)
Bill of Exceptions No. 34 was reserved when the trial court overruled defense counsel's motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial.
Counsel for the defendant contend that initially defendant was confronted with the problem of ascertaining the nature of the physical evidence in the possession of the State which it contended or would contend at trial linked the defendant to the commission of the crimes charged. They argue that the obvious intent of the prayer for oyer was to obtain the result of scientific tests in order that the same could be utilized by the defendant if such tests were indicative of defendant's innocence. They further argue that defendant was not requesting a full disclosure but only an opportunity to ascertain physical evidence in order to prepare his defense, ascertain the favorable nature of the evidence, or subject, or the opportunity to subject the same the recognized laboratory, clinical, or diagnostic tests. Counsel still further argue that there was suppression by the State of evidence tending to be favorable to the defendant; this suppression, they say, amounted to a violation of defendant's constitutional rights, particularly the right to a fair trial and effective representation by counsel. Amendments VI and XIV to the Constitution of the United States.
Submitted in evidence by the State during trial were the dress and under garments worn by the victim on the night the instant offense was committed. On direct examination by the State, there was testimony adduced with respect to seminal fluid; on cross examination by defense counsel, testimony was adduced with respect to blood type. Prior to trial, defense counsel apparently surmised that tests had been made by the State on the victim's clothing; defense counsel in its prayer for oyer demanded inspection of the clothing and the results of the tests. Infra, we shall hold that they were not entitled to such inspection.
Initially, we hold that the case of State v. Migliore, 261 La. 722, 260 So.2d 682, is not apposite to the instant matter. In Migliore, we granted defendant pretrial inspection of an alleged dangerous substance; he was charged with having in his possession a dangerous substance, and we felt that he was entitled to make an independent inspection of the substance in order to analyze the substance's ingredients. The substance had to be dangerous in order for the charge to stand. Such is not the case of the evidence herein involved.
It is legion in our jurisprudence that State v. Clack, 254 La. 61, 222 So.2d 857 (1969). See, State v. Migliore, 261 La. 722, 260 So.2d 682.
The record discloses that there was no deception on the part of the State with respect to the evidence sought by defense counsel. They make no averments of deliberate deception or presentation of known false evidence. See, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104. There are no averments by defense counsel that they were taken by undue surprise; there are no averments that they were precluded from having the defendant's blood typed; they make no averments that they wre refused a continuance during the hearing of the prayer for oyer. The evidence sought was privileged to the State; it was a part of its proof upon which it was relying for a conviction. Defendant was not entitled to inspection of the evidence sought in Paragraphs 2 and 4 of his Prayer for Oyer. Defendant's constitutional rights were not violated, and the trial court committed no reversible error in its denial. See, State v. Taylor, 253 La. 653, 219 So.2d 484; State v. Daniels, 262 La. 475, 263 So.2d 859; State v. McLeod, 264 La. 239, 271 So.2d 45; State v. Ranker, 263 La. 914, 269 So.2d 812; State v. Brumfield, 263 La. 147, 267 So.2d 553; State v. Jones, La., 267 So.2d 559; State v. Anderson, 254 La. 1107, 229 So.2d 329; State v. Crook, 253 La. 961, 221 So.2d 473.
The case of Brady v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) is not apposite to this matter because defense counsel herein have not shown that the evidence sought was favorable to the defendant. In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held: 'We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence Favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.' See, State v. Gladden, 260 La. 735, 257 So.2d 388; State v. Bailey, 261 La. 831, 261 So.2d 583. (Emphasis ours)
Bill of Exceptions No. 34 avers as stated supra that the trial court committed error in refusing to grant defendant's motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment. These matters will be discussed infra where we will find that Bill of Exceptions No. 34 is without merit.
Bill of Exceptions Nos. 6 and 8 are without merit.
Bill of Exceptions No. 10 was reserved when the trial court denied that part of defense counsel's prayer for oyer which requested: 'A copy of all photographs of the defendant and of others shown to the victims of the crimes for which the defendant is charged herein, wherein the victim identified or reported to identify photograph of the defendant.' (Vol. I, p. 92, Par. 6 of the Prayer for Oyer)
Bill of Exceptions No. 24 was reserved when the trial court overruled defense counsel's objection to the nature of the testimony of Melony Carmouche and Mary Ann Munson, witnesses for the State, on the following grounds:
As stated supra, Bill of Exceptions No. 34 was reserved to the trial court's denying defense counsel's motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial.
The record discloses that prior to the defendant's bail hearing, the State presented to the victim a number of mug shots, and from the group, she selected a picture of the defendant.
Defense counsel contend that they needed the photographs for comparative purposes; they were necessary to show the possible deprivation of a constitutional right.
We find no need for a lengthy discussion of Bill No. 10; our reasoning supra with respect to Bills of Exceptions Nos. 6 and 8 applies to the instant bill.
Additionally, during defendant's bail hearing and during trial, the victim definitely identified the defendant. This identification was independent of the selection she had made of photographs. Her identification during trial was as follows:
'Q. Now, Joanne, do you know now who it was that did that to you that night?
'A. Yes, sir, I do.
'Q. Do you see that man in the courtroom right now?
'A. Yes, sir.
'Q. I'm going to ask you to get up from that witness chair, to point out the man who did that to you...
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