State v. Edison
| Decision Date | 01 September 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 72,72 |
| Citation | 318 Md. 541,569 A.2d 657 |
| Parties | STATE of Maryland v. Joseph W. EDISON. , |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Mary Ellen Barbera, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. both on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.
John L. Kopolow, Asst. Public Defender (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, both on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.
Argued before ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE and ADKINS, JJ., HOWARD S. CHASANOW * (Specially Assigned) and CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., (retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Retired Specially Assigned Judge.
The Grand Jury for Baltimore City handed down four indictments alleging that Joseph Winslow Edison was the criminal agent in a variety of crimes. Prior to trial, Edison filed a motion for separate trials. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City denied the motion. Trial proceeded before a jury on all of the indictments and each of their counts. The charges and verdicts thereon were as follows.
Indictment Count Date of Offense Charge Verdict
---------- ----- --------------- --------------------------- -------------
1 1 16 July 1986 Murder of Ernest L. Ellis Guilty of
murder in the
first degree
2 16 July 1986 Use of a handgun in a Guilty
crime of violence
3 16 July 1986 Possession of a handgun Guilty
2 1 16 July 1986 Conspiracy to murder Ellis Guilty
3 1 6 November 1986 Attempted murder of Not Guilty
Officer Darryl A. Kane
2 6 November 1986 Assault and battery of Kane No Verdict
3 6 November 1986 Possession of a handgun Guilty
4 6 November 1986 Use of a handgun in a Not Guilty
crime of violence
5 6 November 1986 Possession of a handgun Motion for
after having been convicted judgment of
of a crime of violence acquittal
granted
4 1 9 February 1987 Escape Guilty
Sentences were imposed and Edison appealed. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the judgments. Edison v. State, No. 1142, September Term, 1988, filed 7 April 1989, unreported. We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari. The writ calls upon us to determine whether the Court of Special Appeals was correct in its conclusion that the trial court erred in its insistence that all of the indictments be jointly tried.
The four indictments related to three incidents:
a) Indictments 1 and 2--the murder of Ellis on 16 July 1986;
b) Indictment 3--the attempted murder of Officer Kane on 6 November 1986;
c) Indictment 4--the escape from the Baltimore City Jail on 9 February 1987.
Edison believed that each incident should be tried separately--thus, indictments 1 and 2 at one trial, indictment 3 at another trial, and indictment 4 at a third trial. He did not ask for a severance of counts within an indictment. In the proceedings in the trial court--during the hearing on his pretrial motion for severance, throughout the guilt stage of the trial and in argument at his post-trial motion for a new trial--Edison continuously objected to the joinder. He stoutly maintained in his persistent requests for severance that the joinder of the indictments was so prejudicial as to deprive him of a fair and impartial trial. But his entreaties were unavailing.
Potential prejudice is the overbearing concern of the law of this State with respect to joint or separate trials of a defendant charged with criminal offenses. To this end, we adopted Maryland Rule 4-253(c):
If it appears that any party will be prejudiced by the joinder for trial of counts, charging documents, or defendants, the court may, on its own initiative or on motion of any party, order separate trials of counts, charging documents, or defendants, or grant any other relief as justice requires.
And, in ruling on a motion for a joint trial when a defendant is charged in two or more charging documents, "the court may inquire into the ability of either party to proceed at a joint trial." Md. Rule 4-253(b). 1 We have observed that joinder may be prejudicial to a defendant in three important aspects:
First, he may be embarrassed, or confounded in presenting separate defenses.... Secondly, the jury may cumulate the evidence of the various crimes charged and find guilt when, if the offenses were considered separately, it would not do so. At the very least, the joinder of offenses may produce a latent hostility, which by itself may cause prejudice to the defendant's case. Thirdly, the jury may use the evidence of one of the crimes charged, or a connected group of them, to infer a criminal disposition on the part of the defendant from which he may also be found guilty of other crimes charged.
McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 609, 375 A.2d 551 (1977).
The matter of a severance or a joinder is ordinarily committed to the discretion of the trial judge. Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 705, 506 A.2d 580, cert. denied 479 U.S. 873, 107 S.Ct. 38, 93 L.Ed.2d 174, reh. denied, 479 U.S. 1001, 107 S.Ct. 611, 93 L.Ed.2d 609 (1986); Graves v. State, 298 Md. 542, 544, 471 A.2d 701 (1984). The exercise of that discretion usually brings into play what is commonly known as the "other crimes" rule. "Generally, 'evidence of a defendant's prior criminal acts may not be introduced to prove that he is guilty of the offense for which he is on trial.' " State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 633, 552 A.2d 896 (1989), quoting Straughn v. State, 297 Md. 329, 333, 465 A.2d 1166 (1983). We observed in Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468, 473, 386 A.2d 757 (1978):
A mere cursory review of the case law ... readily reveals that there are few principles of American jurisprudence more universally accepted than the rule that evidence which tends to show that the accused committed another crime independent of that for which he is on trial, even one of the same type, is inadmissible. The law of this State is fully in accord.
There are numerous exceptions, however, to the general rule that a defendant's other acts or conduct must be suppressed. "Evidence of this type may be admitted if it tends to establish motive, intent, absence of mistake, a common scheme or plan, identity, opportunity, preparation, knowledge ... or accident," Faulkner, 314 Md. at 634, 552 A.2d 896, citing to Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 669-670, 350 A.2d 680 (1976), see Cross, 282 Md. at 473-474, 386 A.2d 757. But exceptions to the general rule are not limited to those noted in Ross; the Ross exceptions are not exclusive. For example, prior criminal conduct, with strict limitations, may be admitted to show "sexual propensity," Vogel v. State, 315 Md. 458, 464-466, 554 A.2d 1231 (1989), and to show consciousness of guilt, Bedford v. State, 317 Md. 659, 664-65, 566 A.2d 111 (1989). The admission of other crimes evidence "should be subjected to rigid scrutiny by the courts...." Ross, 276 Md. at 671, 350 A.2d 680. "The evidence proffered to the trial judge must be clear and convincing in establishing the accused's involvement in the other crimes." Faulkner, 314 Md. at 634, 552 A.2d 896, citing to Cross, 282 Md. at 478, 386 A.2d 757. Judge Adkins, speaking for the Court in Faulkner, outlined a three-step procedure to be followed when a trial court is faced with the need to decide whether to admit evidence of another crime--that is, evidence that relates to an offense separate from that for which the defendant is presently on trial. 314 Md. at 634, 552 A.2d 896. Id. at 634-635, 552 A.2d 896. Id. at 635, 552 A.2d 896 (citations omitted).
Even though the evidence may fall within one or more of the exceptions of the "other crimes" rule, the trial judge still possesses discretion as to whether it should be received. Id. at 640, 552 A.2d 896.
Thus "other crimes" evidence, even though independently and substantially relevant to some contested issue, may be excluded if its probative value is exceeded by potential jury hostility or unfair prejudice.
Id. at 641, 552 A.2d 896. "The leeway of this discretion lies in the direction of excluding otherwise admissible evidence." Id. A clearly incorrect decision to admit other crimes evidence is an abuse of discretion. Id. In the exercise of its discretion, the court is guided by the mutuality of evidence principle. If, in separate trials, evidence as to each individual offense would be mutually admissible, the offenses may be joined. McKnight, 280 Md. at 612, 375 A.2d 551.
As we have seen, evidence of other criminal conduct which tends to show consciousness of guilt provides an exception to the "other crimes" rule. It is well settled that "evidence of flight from justice is admissible to show awareness of guilt...." Hunt v....
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