State v. Edmonds

Citation145 A.3d 861,323 Conn. 34
Decision Date13 September 2016
Docket NumberNo. 19389.,19389.
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
Parties STATE of Connecticut v. Michael EDMONDS.

323 Conn. 34
145 A.3d 861

STATE of Connecticut
v.
Michael EDMONDS.

No. 19389.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Sept. 10, 2015.
Decided Sept. 13, 2016.


145 A.3d 864

Bradford Buchta, assistant public defender, with whom, on the brief, was Nicole Donzello, senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John C. Smriga, state's attorney, and Marc R. Durso, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and ROBINSON, Js.

McDONALD, J.

323 Conn. 37

The defendant, Michael Edmonds, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming his conviction, following a conditional plea of nolo contendere, of one count of possession of narcotics with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 21a–277 (a), and one count of failure to appear in the first degree in violation of

145 A.3d 865

General Statutes § 53a–172. See State v. Edmonds, 151 Conn.App. 763, 765, 96 A.3d 607 (2014). On certification to this court, the defendant contends that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that: (1) the trial court, Rodriguez, J., in denying the defendant's motion to suppress narcotics evidence, correctly determined that the defendant was not seized until police officers performed a patdown search for weapons; and (2) the record was inadequate to review the defendant's claim that he was unreasonably seized, in violation of the federal and state constitutions, when two police cruisers simultaneously descended upon him from opposite directions in a small private parking lot behind a Subway restaurant and a uniformed officer verbally commanded him to stop.1 We agree with both

323 Conn. 38

of the defendant's claims and conclude that the evidence the defendant sought to suppress was seized in violation of the fourth amendment to the United States constitution2 and article first, §§ 7 and 9, of the constitution of Connecticut.3 We therefore reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

Before setting forth the relevant facts and procedural history, we begin by observing that the standard of appellate review governing allegedly unconstitutional police searches and seizures differs from the standard that governs appellate review of other types of similarly fact intensive questions. It is well established that we

323 Conn. 39

must “undertake a more probing factual review” of allegedly improper seizures, so that we may come to “an independent legal determination of whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have believed that he was not free to

145 A.3d 866

leave.” State v. Burroughs, 288 Conn. 836, 843, 844 n. 5, 955 A.2d 43 (2008). “A proper analysis of this question is necessarily fact intensive, requiring a careful examination of the entirety of the circumstances in order to determine whether the police engaged in a coercive display of authority....” Id., at 846, 955 A.2d 43. Although we must, of course, defer to the trial court's factual findings, “our usual deference ... is qualified by the necessity for a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain whether [each] finding is supported by substantial evidence....” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 843, 955 A.2d 43. Furthermore, in reviewing the record, we are bound to consider not only the trial court's factual findings, but also the full testimony of the arresting officers; in particular, we must take account of any undisputed evidence that does not support the trial court's ruling in favor of the state but that the trial court did not expressly discredit. See State v. DeMarco, 311 Conn. 510, 520 and n. 4, 88 A.3d 491 (2014) ; id., at 543, 88 A.3d 491 (Palmer, J., dissenting).

In the present case, the trial court's oral decision, as supplemented by the undisputed testimony of the arresting officers, reveals the following relevant facts.4 On the evening of Friday, January 28, 2011, Officers Elson Morales and Joseph Lawlor of the Bridgeport Police Department (department) were patrolling in the vicinity of Madison Avenue and Capitol Avenue. The officers had been assigned to patrol there because a

323 Conn. 40

large number of teenagers were expected to attend a basketball game at nearby Central High School and teenagers tended to congregate on Madison Avenue after such games, clogging traffic.

The officers testified that this area of Bridgeport is plagued by a high rate of violent crime. Both officers conceded, however, that the department considers essentially the entire city of Bridgeport to be a high crime area. There was no testimony that the crime rate in the neighborhood of Madison Avenue and Capitol Avenue is any higher than in other areas of Bridgeport.

At approximately 7 p.m., the two officers were driving northbound on Madison Avenue in a marked police cruiser when they stopped at a red light at the intersection of Madison and Capitol Avenues. As they waited for the light to change, they briefly observed a man, later identified as the defendant, who is black, standing alone in the parking lot at 944 Madison Avenue, behind a Subway sandwich restaurant located on the corner. Although it is not evidenced in the record, it may reasonably be assumed—and the state conceded at oral argument before this court—that the Subway restaurant would have been open for dinner at that hour.

The officers offered three reasons why the defendant aroused their suspicions at that time. First, Morales testified that, at the time the officers observed the defendant, “[i]t was pre-dark, it was starting to get dark.” He indicated that the defendant “was loitering in the rear in the shadows ....” (Emphasis added.)

The trial court does not appear to have credited Morales' testimony that, at 7 p.m. on January 28, 2011, in Bridgeport, it was just “starting to get dark.”5 And for good

145 A.3d 867

reason. On that particular winter evening, the sun had set two hours earlier, at 5:04 p.m., and even

323 Conn. 41

the twilight had long since passed.6 Moreover, there was undisputed testimony that no lights illuminated the Subway parking lot at that time. Accordingly, the only reasonable inference is that anyone standing outside the Subway restaurant at dinnertime on that particular evening necessarily would have been standing in the “shadows.”

Second, both officers testified that the defendant aroused their suspicions because he was “loitering” in the Subway lot. In the police report they completed the evening of the incident, the officers wrote that “we observed a heavy set black male wearing a tan colored hooded sweatshirt loitering behind the Subway [s]andwich [s]hop....” In the section of the report entitled “Point of Illegal Entry/Means of Attack,” the officers entered: “Loitering near Subway.”

During the suppression hearing, however, both officers acknowledged that, at the time they first observed the defendant and decided to question him, they had no reason to believe that he was in violation of Bridgeport's loitering ordinance. Bridgeport Municipal Code § 9.04.010 provides: “Any person who, without permission or legitimate purpose, loiters upon the property of another or upon city-owned property, and who upon command of any police officer or person in charge of city-owned property fails to quit such property, shall be punished as provided in Chapter 1.12 of this code.” In this case, there were no signs indicating “no loitering” posted at that location, and the officers had no information that the defendant was on Subway's property without permission or legitimate purpose, nor that he had

323 Conn. 42

been commanded to leave by a police officer or city official. Indeed, the officers readily conceded that the defendant might have been a resident of one of the apartment units located above the Subway restaurant. In addition, the period during which the officers were stopped at the red light, and had an opportunity to observe the defendant and conclude that he might be loitering, lasted only a few seconds. During that brief period, and given the poor lighting conditions, the officers were unable to determine even the defendant's skin color. All they could see was a “silhouette and just a vague color of his jacket.”

Third, the officers testified that their suspicions were aroused because the Subway restaurant had been robbed multiple times in the past, including within the past year. There was undisputed testimony, however, that no incidents of any sort had been reported in the Bridgeport police logs for that Subway location during the preceding four months. Nor did the officers receive any calls with respect to that location on the date in question.

In any event, after having observed nothing more than...

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36 cases
  • State v. Ashby
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • August 6, 2020
    ...not support the trial court's ruling in favor of the state but that the trial court did not expressly discredit." State v. Edmonds , 323 Conn. 34, 39, 145 A.3d 861 (2016)."[T]he United States Supreme Court has held that a state violates the sixth amendment when, acting through an undisclose......
  • State v. Griffin
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    ...trial court's ruling in favor of the state but that the trial court did not expressly discredit ." (Emphasis added.) State v. Edmonds , 323 Conn. 34, 39, 145 A.3d 861 (2016). Accordingly, because the trial court expressly rejected the psychologist's conclusion that the defendant was likely ......
  • Commonwealth v. Daveiga
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    ...similarly have noted specific factors to assist in determining whether a vehicle encounter is a seizure. See, e.g., State v. Edmonds, 323 Conn. 34, 50-51, 145 A.3d 861 (2016) ; People v. Paynter, 955 P.2d 68, 73 (Colo. 1998). The Connecticut Supreme Court, for example, has focused on the nu......
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    ...erroneous." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mangual , 311 Conn. 182, 197, 85 A.3d 627 (2014) ; see also State v. Edmonds , 323 Conn. 34, 39, 145 A.3d 861 (2016) ("we must, of course, defer to [a] trial court's factual findings"). If, however, "a question of fact is essential to......
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  • Probable cause and reasonable suspicion: arrests, seizures, stops and frisks
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Suppressing Criminal Evidence Fourth amendment searches and seizures
    • April 1, 2022
    ...to race or the Court rejects race, there are concurring opinions which discuss race as a factor in policing. In State v. Edmonds , 145 A.3d 861 (Conn. 2016), the Court held PROBABLE CAUSE, REA SONABLE SUSPICION §5:92 Suppressing Criminal Evidence 5-48 that a Black man was unlawfully seized ......

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