State v. Edmondson
| Decision Date | 12 January 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 20330,20330 |
| Citation | 867 P.2d 1006,125 Idaho 132 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Raymond Russell EDMONDSON, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Larry Echohawk, Atty. Gen., Douglas A. Werth, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for appellant.
No appearance by respondent.
This is a review of a district court's decision on an intermediate appeal setting aside a jury verdict finding Raymond Edmondson guilty of misdemeanor driving under the influence. The sole question presented for our review is whether the magistrate erroneously excluded evidence offered by Edmondson to show that he manifested no observable signs of intoxication when police pulled him over in his vehicle. As explained below, we hold that the magistrate's evidentiary ruling was correct. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's appellate decision and reinstate the verdict.
In the early morning of February 23, 1991, Edmondson was stopped by the police while driving a vehicle with a broken taillight. When the officers noticed the smell of alcohol on Edmondson's breath, they subjected him to field-sobriety tests. The officers recorded the entire encounter on audio tape. They then transported Edmondson to the police station where several samples of Edmondson's breath were tested using an Intoximeter. Based upon the Intoximeter test results, the state charged Edmondson with DUI, a violation of I.C. § 18-8004(1), accusing him of driving a motor vehicle "with a B.A.C. above .10, to-wit: .14/.13."
Prior to trial, the state advised the court and Edmondson that it would seek a conviction solely upon evidence that Edmondson was driving with an alcohol concentration in excess of the .10 proscribed by I.C. § 18- 8004(1). Having thus limited itself to proving a per se violation of the statute, the state then sought to prevent Edmondson from introducing any evidence concerning the observable signs of actual intoxication, or lack thereof, at the time he was stopped. Specifically, the state objected to the admission of the results of the field-sobriety tests and the audio tape made of the stop, arguing that neither was relevant to the allegations in the case. The magistrate sustained the state's objection on the ground of relevance and refused to admit the evidence. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Edmondson guilty of DUI. Pursuant to its authority under I.C. § 19-2601, the magistrate entered an order withholding judgment and placing Edmondson on probation.
Appealing from that order to the district court, Edmondson challenged the magistrate's refusal to admit the results of the field-sobriety tests and the audio tape, contending that such evidence was relevant and admissible to impeach the accuracy of the Intoximeter test results. The district court agreed with Edmondson, reversed the magistrate's ruling, set aside the jury verdict, and remanded the case for a new trial. The state then brought this appeal.
The question presented on appeal is whether the magistrate properly excluded the evidence offered by Edmondson to show his observable signs of impairment. Although questions of admissibility often involve the exercise of the trial court's discretion, the threshold determination of whether the evidence offered is "relevant" presents an issue of law over which we exercise free review. 1 See I.R.E. 401 and 402; Lubcke v. Boise City/Ada County Housing Authority, 124 Idaho 450, 496, 860 P.2d 653, 699 (1993); State v. Maylett, 108 Idaho 671, 674, 701 P.2d 291, 294 (Ct.App.1985) (Burnett, J., concurring). In addressing the magistrate's rulings below, this Court will conduct its review independently from, albeit with due regard for, the district court's intermediate appellate decision. See State v. Jordan, 122 Idaho 771, 839 P.2d 38 (Ct.App.1992).
Rule 401, I. R.E., defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." All relevant evidence is admissible unless excludable on certain grounds. I.R.E. 402; State v. Pressnall, 119 Idaho 207, 804 P.2d 936 (Ct.App.1991). Conversely, evidence which is not relevant is inadmissible, and should be excluded if a proper objection is made.
Idaho Code § 18-8004(1)(a) makes it a criminal offense for a person to drive while under the influence of alcohol. That offense may be established under either of two alternative theories of proof: (1) by direct or circumstantial evidence of impairment of ability to drive due to the influence of alcohol; or (2) by forensic testing of the driver's blood, breath or urine showing an alcohol content in excess of the statutory limit, i.e., .10 or more. State v. Andrus, 118 Idaho 711, 800 P.2d 107 (Ct.App.1990); State v. Knoll, 110 Idaho 678, 718 P.2d 589 (Ct.App.1986). The state, in its complaint, may elect to proceed against the defendant under either or both theories of proof. Evidence relevant under one theory of proof is not necessarily relevant under the other. Andrus, 118 Idaho at 713, 800 P.2d at 109.
This Court has previously held that when a defendant is charged only with the being under the influence theory, the defendant may not attempt to show that had an alcohol concentration test been given, the result would have been less than .10. See State v. Tate, 122 Idaho 366, 834 P.2d 883 (Ct.App.1992). The speculation of whether a defendant would have been above or below a .10 is not relevant as to whether that person was under the influence to the extent that his driving was impaired. In the instant case, the state elected to prove the charge of DUI solely with evidence showing an excessive alcohol concentration. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the driver had an alcohol concentration of .10 or more is deemed a per se violation of the statute, and is conclusive, not presumptive, of guilt. Andrus, 118 Idaho at 713, 800 P.2d at 109. Consequently, the extent of Edmondson's impairment was neither an element nor a fact of consequence in the state's case-in-chief.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that such evidence will be inadmissible for the purpose of impeachment. As we observed in State v. Pressnall, supra:
A defendant charged with driving under the influence by proof of excessive alcohol content is entitled to offer any competent evidence tending to impeach the results of the evidentiary tests admitted against him. See State v. Clark, 286 Or. 33, 593 P.2d 123, 128 (1979); State v. Gates, 7 Haw.App. 440, 777 P.2d 717, 720-21 (1989). Thus, a defendant may introduce evidence of his blood alcohol content, or other direct or...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Meanor v. State, 106
...intoxication "by reason of loss of faculties or by reason of alcohol concentration (intoxication per se)," and State v. Edmondson, 125 Idaho 132, 867 P.2d 1006 (App.1994) is cited for a similar proposition. What the State omits to mention, however, is that the Texas and Idaho statutes, unli......
-
State v. Hardesty
...of whether the evidence offered is relevant presents an issue of law over which we exercise free review. State v. Edmondson, 125 Idaho 132, 134, 867 P.2d 1006, 1008 (Ct.App.1994). ANALYSIS We begin by emphasizing that Hardesty made only a very vague offer of proof to the magistrate as to ex......
-
State v. Robinett, Docket No. 28564 (Idaho App. 1/7/2004)
...concentration of .08 or more as determined by analysis of blood, urine or breath (known as "per se" DUI). State v. Edmondson, 125 Idaho 132, 134, 867 P.2d 1006, 1008 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Andrus, 118 Idaho 711, 800 P.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. Knoll, 110 Idaho 678, 682, 718 P.2d 5......
-
State v. Robinett, 30842.
...of proof. Evidence that is relevant under one theory of proof is not necessarily relevant under the other. State v. Edmondson, 125 Idaho 132, 133, 867 P.2d 1006, 1007 (Ct.App.1994); State v. Andrus, 118 Idaho 711, 713, 800 P.2d 107, 109 (Ct.App.1990); State v. Knoll, 110 Idaho 678, 682, 718......