State v. Knoll
| Decision Date | 01 May 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 16050,16050 |
| Citation | 110 Idaho 678,718 P.2d 589 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Mary Lou KNOLL, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Frederick G. Loats, Coeur d'Alene, for defendant-appellant.
Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., by Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., and Myrna A.I. Stahman, Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.
We are asked to review a district court decision upholding a judgment of conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol. The appeal presents two questions: (1) Does Idaho's DUI statute create separate offenses--driving under the influence of alcohol, and driving with a proscribed blood-alcohol content--which require mutually exclusive methods of proof? (2) Is the result of a blood-alcohol test admissible without supplementary evidence showing how the result "relates back" to the time when the motor vehicle was operated?
These issues are framed by undisputed facts. At approximately 1:00 a.m. on August 12, 1983, a Kootenai County sheriff's deputy stopped an automobile on a public highway. The driver was Mary Lou Knoll. Some 47 minutes later, Knoll submitted to a blood-alcohol test, yielding a result of .25%. Knoll was charged with a misdemeanor, specified in the complaint as "operat[ing] a motor veh[icle] upon [a] public roadway while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage...." She initially pled not guilty and filed a motion to exclude the test result from evidence. The presiding magistrate denied the motion. Knoll then entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving the right to argue on appeal that her motion had been wrongly denied. After the magistrate entered a judgment of conviction, Knoll appealed to the district court. The district judge sustained the magistrate's ruling on the motion and upheld the judgment. Knoll appealed again, bringing the case to us. We affirm.
Knoll was charged with violating the DUI statute enacted during an Extraordinary Session of the Legislature in 1983. The statute was codified as I.C. § 49-1102. It now appears, with some changes, as I.C. § 18-8004. See 1983 Idaho Sess. Laws (Ex.Sess.) ch. 3, § 13, pp. 17-18; 1984 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 22, §§ 1 and 2, pp. 29-30. In pertinent part, the 1983 statute provided as follows:
(1) It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substances, or who has 0.10 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his blood, urine or breath, as shown by chemical analysis of his blood, urine, breath, or other bodily substance, to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property open to the public.
(2) Any person having less than 0.10 percent, by weight, of alcohol in his blood, urine or breath, as shown by chemical analysis of his blood, urine, breath, or other bodily substance by a test requested by a police officer shall not be prosecuted for driving under the influence of alcohol, except as provided in subsection (3). Any person who does not take a test to determine alcohol concentration may be prosecuted for driving or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or any other intoxicating substances, on other competent evidence.
(3) If the results of the test requested by a police officer show less than 0.10 percent, by weight, of alcohol in the person's blood, such fact may be considered with other competent evidence of drug use other than alcohol in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. [Emphasis added.]
Knoll contends that subsection (1), which prohibits any person to drive a motor vehicle on a public highway "while under the influence of alcohol" or while having "0.10 percent or more, by weight, of alcohol in his blood," creates two distinct offenses. Upon this hypothesis she argues that the state must choose which offense to prosecute and may not adduce evidence of a blood-alcohol level if it has chosen to prosecute for "driving under the influence." Accordingly, she urges that the result of her blood-alcohol test would have been inadmissible at trial on a complaint charging her with driving "under the influence." A similar contention recently has been considered, and rejected, by a panel of this Court in State v. Brown, 109 Idaho 981, 712 P.2d 682 (Ct.App.1985). However, because the issue continues to generate controversy, 1 we will examine it in greater detail here.
We begin by acknowledging that the 1983 statute is not a model of clarity. In a single sentence of 82 words, subsection (1) combines clauses referring to a fact (a motorist's blood-alcohol level) and to a familiar description of the crime (driving "under the influence"). Linking these clauses with the disjunctive term "or," the statute seemingly invites the criticism that it confuses a fact with the definition of a crime. However, the statute should not be condemned, or shallowly construed, upon its awkward syntax. The statute reflects an effort by our elected representatives to express a coherent public policy on alcohol and traffic safety, in light of rapidly shifting public attitudes and advances in scientific knowledge. We are mindful of Disraeli's famous admonition: "It is much easier to be critical than to be correct."
The statute was not enacted in a vacuum. It has been demonstrated empirically, and it is now widely accepted, that a motorist's ability to drive safely is adversely affected by a blood-alcohol content of .10%, even though some individuals may exhibit few outwardly visible symptoms of intoxication at that level. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, ALCOHOL AND THE IMPAIRED DRIVER 146 (1970), cited in State v. Clark, 35 Or.App. 851, 583 P.2d 1142, 1148 (1978) (Johnson, J., dissenting). Consequently, many states have legislated directly against driving with a blood-alcohol content of .10%, some defining it as a separate offense and some treating it as driving under the influence per se. See State v. Ulrich, 17 Ohio App.3d 182, 478 N.E.2d 812 (1984) (); Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 748, § 11 (1985 Supp.). Both approaches embody a determination of fact and policy well within a legislature's constitutional competency--a determination that drivers with blood-alcohol levels of .10% or higher pose unacceptable risks to society. Erickson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 662 P.2d 963 (Alaska Ct.App.1983) (Singleton, J., concurring).
Idaho's choice of the per se approach is revealed by examining the 1983 statute as a whole. Subsection (1), like any statutory provision, must be construed with other provisions of the entire statute. E.g., Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 Idaho 700, 682 P.2d 1247 (1983). Subsection (2) demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend to make driving with a blood-alcohol level of .10% an offense wholly separate from driving "under the influence." This subsection provides in part that if a motorist submits to a blood-alcohol test at the request of a police officer, and if the test shows a blood-alcohol level less than .10%, the motorist is shielded from any prosecution under subsection (1). 2 No purported distinction is articulated between a prosecution for driving "under the influence" and a prosecution for driving with a proscribed blood-alcohol level. The only apparent exception to the shield erected by subsection (2) is one provided in subsection (3), which allows prosecution where intoxication has resulted from a combination of alcohol, drugs or other substances.
The 1983 statute also must be construed in pari materia with other statutes relating to the same subject matter. E.g., Union Pacific R. Co. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 103 Idaho 808, 654 P.2d 901 (1982). Here, the blood-alcohol test specified in I.C. § 49-1002 is one authorized by Idaho's "implied consent" law. In 1983 that law was codified, and substantially amended, as I.C. § 49-352. It now appears, with further revisions, as I.C. § 18-8002. See 1983 Idaho Sess. Laws (Ex.Sess.) ch. 3, § 9, pp. 15-16; 1984 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 22, §§ 1 and 2 pp. 27-28. The 1983 statute provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
(1) Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration as defined in section 49-1102, Idaho Code, provided that such test is administered at the request of a police officer having reasonable grounds to believe that person has been driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or of any other intoxicating substances, and in accordance with the rules and regulations established by the Idaho department of law enforcement. [Emphasis added.]
This section again reveals a legislatively perceived nexus between a motorist's blood-alcohol level and the influence of alcohol upon his ability to drive safely. A police officer must have "reasonable cause," based upon the motorist's operation of a vehicle or upon other observable symptoms of intoxication, before he may administer the test specified in I.C. § 49-1102. This predicate relationship is inconsistent with any notion that the Legislature intended to treat a motorist's blood-alcohol level and the influence of alcohol as wholly separate offenses.
Moreover, when construing a statute, a court should give the language a sensible interpretation. Absurd or unreasonable consequences must be avoided. E.g., Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1978). Here, several practical considerations militate against construing I.C. § 49-1102 as requiring the state to choose between two entirely separate offenses. First, when a police officer prepares a complaint, he does not always know whether a blood-alcohol test will be administered. In some cases the tests are administered by other officers, after the complaining officer has...
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